Gallant v. City of Carson
Decision Date | 20 April 2005 |
Docket Number | No. B176052.,B176052. |
Citation | 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 318,128 Cal.App.4th 705 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | Ann Marie GALLANT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF CARSON et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
Horowitz & Clayton, Craig A. Horowitz, Wayne D. Clayton and Richard G. Munoz, Los Angeles, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Seyfarth Shaw, Lorraine H. O'Hara and Dennis C. DePalma, Los Angeles, for Defendants and Respondents.
An employee of a city sued the city and two of its employees for defamation and wrongful termination, claiming she was fired and defamed for exposing corruption in the city's bidding for trash collection. The defamation cause of action was stricken under the statute prohibiting strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP) (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16), and the employee appeals. We reverse because the employee "has established that there is a probability that [she] will prevail on the claim." (Id., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) (All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.)
Ann Marie Gallant was General Manager of the City of Carson. Her duties included overseeing the city's waste disposal services. As she explained in a declaration filed in connection with the hearing on defendants' special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute: On September 17, 2003, Groomes told Gallant that she was being terminated.
Her declaration continued: "I learned from a number of subordinate employees in the Development Services Work Group that Groomes had spoken to staff members and community members and told them that I was terminated because I was incompetent . . . .
Although Gallant does not expressly state that she was not incompetent or deny doing anything illegal, the gist of her declaration is that she was terminated for reporting the misdeeds of Attorney Pryce to the city council and cooperating with the FBI regarding Pryce.
Gallant filed this suit for wrongful termination and defamation against the City of Carson and its City Manager, Jerome Groomes, and Assistant City Manager, George Penn. With regard to her defamation claim, Gallant alleged that defendants
Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, contending that (1) the alleged defamatory statements came within the scope of protected communications (see § 425.16, subd. (e)) and (2) Gallant could not demonstrate a probability of success on the merits (see id., subd. (b)(1)). Gallant filed opposition papers, disputing both points. By order dated May 12, 2004, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. Gallant appealed.
Assuming for the sake of discussion that the anti-SLAPP statute applies here, we reverse because Gallant "has established that there is a probability that [she] will prevail on the claim." (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) By this we mean only that she has offered evidence, if credited at trial, demonstrating that she is likely to succeed.
The alleged statements—that Gallant is incompetent—are defamatory. (Gill v. Hughes (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1299, 1309, 278 Cal.Rptr. 306, citation omitted.)
Accordingly, the facts contained in Gallant's declaration, if properly before the court as evidence, "establish[ ] that there is a probability that [she] will prevail on [her] claim [for defamation]." (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
Although defendants interposed evidentiary objections against Gallant's declaration, they did not seek or obtain rulings on them at the hearing. Defendants therefore waived their objections under Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 137, 863 P.2d 207 (Ann M.), superseded by statute on another point as stated in Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, at pages 767-768, 107 Cal. Rptr.2d 617, 23 P.3d 1143. In Ann M., the Supreme Court stated: (Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 670, fn. 1, 25 Cal. Rptr.2d 137, 863 P.2d 207.)
The Ann M. rule, applied in the summary judgment context, also governs anti-SLAPP motions because the two types of proceedings have similar standards. As our Supreme Court recently stated: "[The anti-SLAPP statute] establishes a procedure where the trial court evaluates the merits of the lawsuit using a summary-judgment-like procedure at an early stage of the litigation." (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 192, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 298, 106 P.3d 958.) And as we stated at greater length in Schoendorf v. U.D. Registry, Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 227, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 313 (Schoendorf): " . . .
"' " (Schoendorf, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 236, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 313, quoting Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal. App.4th 628, 654, 656, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 620, overruled on another point in Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 68, fn. 5, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507, 52 P.3d 685.)
The anti-SLAPP statute states that "[i]n making its determination [whether the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim], the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based." (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) The statute is silent as to the kind of evidence required of the plaintiff.
The summary judgment statute, on the other hand, provides that "[i]n determining whether the papers show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact the court shall consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except that to which objections have been made and sustained by the court . . . ." (§ 437c, subd. (c).) And it further provides that "[s]upporting and opposing affidavits or declarations shall be made by any person on personal knowledge, shall set forth admissible evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is...
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