Gallegos v. State of Colorado
Decision Date | 04 June 1962 |
Docket Number | No. 475,475 |
Citation | 87 A.L.R.2d 614,8 L.Ed.2d 325,82 S.Ct. 1209,370 U.S. 49 |
Parties | Robert Elmer GALLEGOS, Petitioner, v. STATE OF COLORADO |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
See 370 U.S. 965, 82 S.Ct. 1579.
Charles S. Vigil, Denver, Colo., for petitioner.
John F. Brauer, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Petitioner, a child of 14, and another juvenile followed an elderly man to a hotel, got into his room on a ruse, assaulted him, overpowered him, stole $13 from his pockets, and fled. All this happened on December 20 1958. Petitioner was picked up by the police on January 1, 1959, and immediately admitted the assault and robbery. At that time, however, the victim of the robbery was still alive, though hospitalized. He died on January 26, 1959, and forthwith an information charging first degree murder was returned against petitioner. A jury found him guilty, the crucial evidence introduced at the trial being a formal confession which he signed on January 7, 1959, after he had been held for five days during which time he saw no lawyer, parent or other friendly adult. The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the judgment of conviction. 145 Colo. 53, 358 P.2d 1028. We granted the petition for certiorari, 368 U.S. 815, 82 S.Ct. 70, 7 L.Ed.2d 23.
After petitioner's arrest on January 1, the following events took place. His mother tried to see him on Friday, January 2, but permission was denied, the reason given being that visiting hours were from 7 p.m. to 8 p.m. on Monday and Thursday. From January 1 through January 7, petitioner was in Junvenile Hall, where he was kept in security, though he was allowed to eat with the other inmates. He was examined by the police in Juvenile Hall January 2, and made a confession which an officer recorded in longhand. On January 3, 1959, a complaint was filed against him in the Juvenile Court by the investigating detectives.
The State in its brief calls this preliminary procedure in Juvenile Hall being 'booked in.' As noted, petitioner signed a full and formal confession on January 7. The trial in the Juvenile Court took place January 16 on a petition dated January 13 containing a charge of 'assault to injure.' He was committed to the State Industrial School for an indeterminate period. Thereafter, as noted above, the victim of the robbery died and the murder trial was held.
Confessions obtained by 'secret inquisitorial processes' (Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 237, 60 S.Ct. 472, 477, 84 L.Ed. 716) are suspect since such procedures are conducive to the use of physical and psychological pressures. Chambers v. Florida, supra; Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 74 S.Ct. 716, 98 L.Ed. 948. The reason that due process, as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, condemns the obtaining of confessions in that manner is a compound of two influences. First is the procedural requirement stated in Chambers v. Florida, supra, 309 U.S. 236—237, 60 S.Ct. 477:
We emphasized this point in Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 152, 64 S.Ct. 921, 925, 88 L.Ed. 1192, where we said that 'always evidence concerning the inner details of secret inquisitions is weighted against an accused * * *.'
Second is the element of compulsion which is condemned by the Fifth Amendment. Chief Justice Hughes in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285, 56 S.Ct. 461, 464, 80 L.Ed. 682, emphasized that ingredient of due process. After noting that the Court had held that the exemption from compulsory self-incrimination in the courts of the States is not guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, he went on to say:
And see Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States, 36 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 761.
We reiterated that view in Ashcraft v. Tennessee, supra, where we held that the principle in Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 562—563, 18 S.Ct. 183, 194, 42 L.Ed. 568, was applicable to state proceedings. 322 U.S. at 154, note 9, 64 S.Ct. at 926. We said:
322 U.S. at 154, 64 S.Ct. at 926. (Italics added.)
The application of these principles involves close scrutiny of the facts of individual cases. The length of the questioning (Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265), the use of fear to break a suspect (Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 65 S.Ct. 781, 89 L.Ed. 1029), the youth of the accused (Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224) are illustrative of the circumstances on which cases of this kind turn. The youth of the suspect was the crucial factor in Haley v. Ohio, supra, at 599—600, 68 S.Ct. at 303:
The fact that petitioner was only 14 years old puts this case on the same footing as Haley v. Ohio, supra. There was here no evidence of prolonged questioning. But the five-day detention—during which time the boy's mother unsuccessfully tried to see him and he was cut off from contact with any lawyer or adult advisor—gives the case an ominous cast. The prosecution says that the boy was advised of his right to counsel, but that he did not ask either for a lawyer or for his parents. But a 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely to have any conception of what will confront him when he is made accessible only to the police. That is to say, we deal with a person who is not equal to the police in knowledge and understanding of the consequences of the questions and answers being recorded and who is unable to know how to protest his own interests or how to get the benefits of his constitutional rights.
The prosecution says that the youth and immaturity of the petitioner and the five-day detention are irrelevant, because the basic ingredients of the confession came tumbling out as soon as he was arrested. But if we took that position, it would, with all deference, be in callous disregard of this boy's constitutional rights. He cannot be compared with an adult in full possession of his senses and knowledgeable of the consequences of his admissions. He would have no way of knowing what the consequences of his confession were without advice as to his rights—from someone concerned with securing him those rights—and without the aid of more mature judgment as to the steps he should take in the predicament in which he found himself. A lawyer or an adult relative or friend could have given the petitioner the protection which his own immaturity could not. Adult advice would have put him on a less unequal footing with his interrogators. Without some adult protection against this inequality, a 14-year-old boy would not be able to know, let alone assert, such constitutional rights as he had. To ...
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