Gallert v. Courtaulds Packaging Co. Inc., IP 97-1567-C M/S.

• Decision Date: 30 April 1998
• Docket Number: No. IP 97-1567-C M/S.,IP 97-1567-C M/S.
• Citation: 4 F.Supp.2d 825
• Parties: Victor GALLERT, Plaintiff, v. COURTAULDS PACKAGING CO. INC., Thatcher Tubes, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

4 F.Supp.2d 825

Victor GALLERT, Plaintiff, v. COURTAULDS PACKAGING CO. INC., Thatcher Tubes, Defendant.

No. IP 97-1567-C M/S.

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

April 30, 1998.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Raymond J. Hafsten, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff.

James K. Stucko, Jr., Scott, Scriven & Wahoff, LLP, Columbus, OH, for Defendant.

ORDER

MCKINNEY, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on a motion filed by defendant Courtaulds Packaging Co. Inc., Thatcher Tubes ("Courtaulds") to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or, in the alternative, to transfer venue to the Northern District of Illinois. The parties have completed their briefing, and the issues are now ready for decision. For the following reasons, Courtaulds's motion to dismiss is DENIED, and its motion to transfer is also DENIED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Victor Gallert ("Gallert") filed a complaint against his former employer Thatcher Tubes, a division of Courtaulds, alleging that his employment was terminated in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Courtaulds is a West Virginia corporation comprised of four divisions: Thatcher Plastic Tubes ("Thatcher Plastic"), Thatcher Laminate Tubes ("Thatcher Laminate"), Knight Engineering & Plastics ("Knight"), and Betts Tubes. Thatcher Plastic has its headquarters in Woodstock, Illinois, with an office in Washington Courthouse, Ohio. Knight is also located in Woodstock, Illinois, and Thatcher Laminate is based in Florence, Kentucky. Pl's Ex. 3, Def's Ans. to Pl's Interrogs. at 2.

In the absence of an evidentiary hearing, the Court must resolve all factual disputes relating to jurisdictional facts in Gallert's favor. See Logan Productions, Inc. v. Optibase, Inc., 103 F.3d 49, 52 (7th Cir.1996); Turnock v. Cope, 816 F.2d 332, 333 (7th Cir.1987). According to his complaint, Gallert had been employed by Thatcher Plastic as a sales representative for more than thirteen years when he was terminated on June 2, 1997, at the age of fifty-nine. Compl. ¶¶ 1-2. Pl's Resp. to Def's Mot. to Dism. or Transf. ("Response") at 2. He resided in Indiana for more than ten of those years, and "maintained the Thatcher Tubes sales office at his home in Trafalgar, Indiana." Compl. ¶ 4; Response at 2. Indiana had been part of his sales territory for more than five years. Response at 2. Jerry Perez, Vice President of Sales and Marketing at Thatcher Plastic, confirmed that Gallert lived in Indiana while employed by Thatcher Plastic, and that Gallert "had a facsimile machine and telephone in his residence that he used to communicate with Thatcher ...." Perez Aff. ¶ 5. Perez stated that he "made the decision to terminate Mr. Gallert's employment in Illinois" and "advised [him] of his termination when [Gallert] was in Illinois." Id. ¶ 6.

During Gallert's employment at Thatcher Plastic, the company was purchased by Courtaulds and became one of its divisions. Pl's Ex. 4, Ans. to Interrogs. at 2. Thatcher Plastic is not incorporated, and it does not have a separate legal identity. Id. Courtaulds admits that it files a consolidated federal tax return, none of its divisions file separate returns, and Courtaulds's assets are not immune from collection of an adverse judgment against Thatcher Plastic. Pl's Ex. 4 at 3-4.

Courtaulds states that it does not have a business office in Indiana, nor does it operate any manufacturing plants in this state.¹ According to Courtaulds, sales in Indiana accounted for only about .0055% of Thatcher Plastic's total annual sales. Perez Aff. ¶ 4. However, two other Courtaulds divisions enjoyed more substantial sales in Indiana. Thatcher Laminate sold eighty million dollars of products during the last four years to the Colgate plant in Jeffersonville, Indiana. Pl's Ex. 3 at 3. In addition, Knight sold five million dollars of aerosol overcaps to Indiana businesses during the same period. Id.

Courtaulds filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(3) on grounds that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Courtaulds and that, consequently, venue in this district is improper. In the alternative, Courtaulds requests that the Court transfer this case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(c), 1406(a). The Court will discuss each request in turn.

II. DISCUSSION

A federal district court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if a court of the state in which the district court sits would have such jurisdiction. NUCOR v. Aceros Y Maquilas de Occidente, S.A. de C.V., 28 F.3d 572, 580 (7th Cir.1994); Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239, 1243 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 947, 111 S.Ct. 1415, 113 L.Ed.2d 468 (1991); Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e)(1). In the case of a defendant foreign corporation that does not have its principal place of business in Indiana, an Indiana court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant where both (1) Indiana's long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of such jurisdiction; and (2) exercise of such jurisdiction complies with the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. NUCOR, 28 F.3d at 580; Wilson, 916 F.2d at 1243. Indiana's long-arm statute, Trial Rule 4.4(A), is deemed to extend the State's personal jurisdiction to the constitutional limit. Wilson, 916 F.2d at 1243; Brokemond v. Marshall Field & Co., 612 N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ind.Ct.App.1993). Thus, the inquiry regarding personal jurisdiction focuses on the scope of the Due Process clause under the circumstances.

The Due Process clause has been interpreted to protect a nonresident defendant from binding judgments of a forum unless the defendant has established certain "minimum contacts" with the forum. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). Due Process requires such minimum contacts so that maintaining the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Wilson, 916 F.2d at 1243 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. 154). These minimum contacts must be established by a defendant's purposeful acts. Id. As the Supreme Court explained in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958):

The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State.... it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Moreover, the nonresident's contacts with the forum must be substantial enough for the defendant to anticipate being brought into court in the forum state. World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980).

Once the court has determined that minimum contacts would allow it to exercise some jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant, it must further refine the extent of that personal jurisdiction. There are two types of personal jurisdiction that can be established by a defendant's minimum contacts: specific and general. Wilson at 1244. Specific jurisdiction is present if the defendant has contacts from which the cause of action arises, and which constitute at least the minimum level of contact with the forum that allows the exercise of jurisdiction to be reasonable. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 & n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). General jurisdiction, on the other hand, is present if the defendant's overall activity in the state is sufficiently "continuous and systematic" that the court's exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant is reasonable and just, even though the plaintiff's cause of action does not arise from and is not related to the defendant's contacts with the forum. Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. at 414-15 & n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 1868. In practice, the standard for establishing general jurisdiction is fairly high. Wilson, 916 F.2d at 1245.

A. Specific Jurisdiction

A forum's exercise of specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who has not consented to suit in that forum, is proper when the defendant has deliberately directed its activities toward forum residents, and the litigation results from alleged injuries that "arise out of or relate to" such activities. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 475-76, 105 S.Ct. 2174; Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984). When the defendant has engaged in "some act by which [it] purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting business activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its law," Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958), then it is on notice that it would likewise be required to submit to "the burdens of litigation" in the forum as well. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476, 105 S.Ct. 2174.

In the Seventh Circuit, a defendant who has "purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in Indiana," should anticipate being hailed into court here. NUCOR v. Aceros Y Maquilas de Occidente, S.A. de C.V., 28 F.3d 572, 580 (7th Cir.1994). The "purposeful availment" requirement prevents nonresident defendants from being hailed into court solely as a result of "random," "fortuitous," or "attenuated" contacts with this state. Logan Productions, 103 F.3d at 52 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174). Unilateral actions by the plaintiff will not by themselves be sufficient to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980)....