Galloway v. State Of Iowa

• Decision Date: 05 November 2010
• Docket Number: No. 08-0776.,08-0776.
• Parties: Taneia GALLOWAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

790 N.W.2d 252

Taneia GALLOWAY, Appellant,

v.STATE of Iowa, Appellee.

No. 08-0776.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Nov. 5, 2010.

Ryan T. Beattie of Beattie Law Firm, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Joanne Moeller, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

HECHT, Justice.

A parent signed release forms waiving her minor child's personal injury claims as a condition of the child's participation in an educational field trip. This action was filed against the State after the child was injured during the trip. The district court granted the State's motion for summary judgment, concluding the releases signed by the parent resulted in an enforceable waiver of the child's personal injury claim. On appeal from the summary judgment ruling, we conclude the releases violate public policy and are therefore unenforceable.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In July of 2005, fourteen-year-old Taneia Galloway attended a field trip to Milwaukee, Wisconsin, with Upward Bound, a youth outreach program organized by the University of Northern Iowa and the State of Iowa. On the field trip, Galloway was injured when she was struck by a car as she attempted to cross the street.

Before Galloway went on the field trip, her mother signed two documents entitled “Field Trip Permission Form” and “Release and Medical Authorization.” The first document read:

Classic Upward Bound Summer Residential Program

Field Trip Permission Form

Dear Parent(s)/Guardian(s):

Each summer the participants of the Classic Upward Bound Program attend field trips locally and out-of-town. This form must be completed in order for your son/daughter to participate in said events.

As the parent/guardian of Taneia Galloway, I hereby give my permission for him/her to participate in ALL field trips sponsored by the University of Northern Iowa Classic Upward Bound Program during the Summer Residential and the Academic Year Program. Taneia Galloway understands he/she is to follow all rules of the Classic Upward Bound Program while participating in these field trips.

Furthermore, I will not hold the University of Northern Iowa or any of its employees or agents responsible for any accidents, losses, damages or injuries resulting from the son/daughter's participation in any or all the field trips. I also release the Classic Upward Bound Program, the University of Northern Iowa, and its employees and agents from all liabilities.

If the student is living with both parents/guardians, both parents/guardians must sign this form.

Galloway's mother signed and dated the form on June 13, 2005. She also signed another form which read as follows.

RELEASE AND MEDICAL AUTHORIZATION

University of Northern Iowa Classic Upward Bound - Dates:

June 1, 2005 - May 30, 2006

Read Carefully -

This document is a release and authorizes medical treatment.

Please return all copies of this form to the program staff. Registration is not considered complete until this completed form is filed with the University of Northern Iowa Classic Upward Bound Program.

The student will not be allowed to participate in the Classic Upward Bound Program if this information is not provided. This information is not routinely provided to individuals or organizations outside the University, except as provided by law.

In consideration of the University of Northern Iowa granting the student permission to participate in the Classic Upward Bound Program, I hereby assume all risks of her/his injury (including death) that may result from any program activity. As parent/guardian I do hereby release and agree to indemnify, defend and hold harmless the University of Northern Iowa, State Board of Regents, State of Iowa, Classic Upward Bound and its officers, employees, agents and all participants in the program from and against all liability including claims and suits of law or in equity for injury (fatal or otherwise) which may result from any negligence and/or the student taking part in program activities.

I certify that within the past year the student has had a physical examination and that she/he is physically able to participate in all Upward Bound activities.

In the event of injury or illness, I hereby give my consent for medical treatment, and permission to program staff for supervising and performing, as deemed necessary by staff, on-site first aid for minor injuries, and for a licensed physician to hospitalize and secure proper treatment (including injections, anesthesia, surgery, or other reasonable and necessary procedures) for the student. I agree to assume all cost related to any such treatment. I also authorize the disclosure of medical information to my insurance company for the purpose of this claim. I understand each student must provide her/his own medical insurance.

I understand that I am responsible for any medical or other charges related to the student's attendance at the University of Northern Iowa Classic Upward Bound Program.

Galloway, through her mother as next friend, ¹ filed suit against various parties, including the State of Iowa. The State moved for summary judgment, contending the releases signed by Galloway's mother waived any claims against it for negligence. The district court concluded the releases constituted a valid waiver of Galloway's claims and granted summary judgment. Galloway appeals. ²

II. Scope of Review.

Our review is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App. P. 6.907. When reviewing a grant of summary judgment we must determine if “the moving party has demonstrated the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Huber v. Hovey, 501 N.W.2d 53, 55 (Iowa 1993). “Summary judgment is proper if the only issue is the legal consequences flowing from undisputed facts.” Id. Determining the legal effects of a contract is a matter of law to be resolved by the court. Id. at 55-56.

III. Discussion.

Galloway makes three arguments on appeal that we should conclude the releases signed by her mother are void and unenforceable. First, she asserts we should follow a majority of other state courts that have concluded it is against public policy for a parent to waive liability for a child's injury before the injury occurs. In the alternative, she argues an application of the factors enunciated in Tunkl v. Regents of University of California, 60 Cal.2d 92, 32 Cal.Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441 (1963), demonstrates it is against public policy to enforce releases signed by a parent as a condition of the child's participation in an educational activity. Her final contention is that these particular releases are insufficient to waive the State's liability because the intent to waive liability is not clearly expressed.

Galloway's primary argument is that public policy considerations should lead this court to conclude preinjury releases executed by parents as a condition of their children's participation in educational activities are incompatible with public policy and therefore unenforceable. In particular, she contends public policy should preclude enforcement of releases executed by parents because parents are ill-equipped to assess in advance the nature of risks of injury faced by children while they are participating in activities at remote locations under the supervision of others and because parents are uninformed of the nature and extent of the gravity of the injuries to which their children may be exposed when the releases are executed.

The State, however, argues that public policy weighs in favor of enforcing preinjury releases signed by parents. The State contends that all of the arguments supporting the enforcement of preinjury releases executed by adults waiving liability for their own injuries apply with equal force to releases given by parents on behalf of their minor children. The State further contends the public policy of this state requires courts to give deference to parents' child-rearing choices, including the choice to release third parties in advance for negligent injury to children.

We begin with an acknowledgment of the challenging nature of identifying which societal values are properly included within the purview of “public policy.” In our efforts to characterize the imprecise boundaries of the concept, we have made reference to the broad concepts of “public good,” In re Estate of Barnes, 256 Iowa 1043, 1051, 128 N.W.2d 188, 192 (1964), and “ ‘established interest[s] of society.’ ” Walker v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 340 N.W.2d 599, 601 (Iowa 1983) (quoting Wunschel Law Firm, P.C. v. Clabaugh, 291 N.W.2d 331, 335 (Iowa 1980)). However, despite the difficulty of characterizing the exact elements of the public interest, we have considered and weighed public policy concerns when deciding important legal issues. For example, such considerations were a critical aspect of our analysis when we abolished the doctrine of immunity for charitable institutions. Haynes v. Presbyterian Hosp. Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 1274, 45 N.W.2d 151, 154 (1950) (weighing and ultimately rejecting public policy justifications for the immunity doctrine).

We have also confronted public policy considerations in the context of litigation between family members. Our understanding of the public interest prompted this court to exercise its authority to abrogate the doctrine of interspousal immunity. Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Iowa 1979) (relying on the fundamental public policy that courts should afford redress for civil wrongs and rejecting the proposition that the doctrine of interspousal immunity involved determinations of public policy most appropriately made by the legislature). We again carefully considered public policy factors in the family context when we abolished the doctrine of absolute parental immunity and recognized a remedy for children injured by the negligent acts of a parent.

Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 787-88 (Iowa 1981) (rejecting the argument that “domestic government” and ...