Galveston Cnty. v. Leach
| Decision Date | 09 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | 14-20-00181-CV |
| Parties | GALVESTON COUNTY, Appellant v. VICTORIA LEACH AND STACIE HABETZ, Appellees |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 122nd District Court Galveston County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 19-CV-0027
Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Spain and Wilson.
In this interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction, Galveston County argues that its governmental immunity was not waived under the Texas Tort Claims Act[1] because the personal injuries alleged did not arise from a governmental employee's "operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle."[2] As to one of the two plaintiffs, the County also contends that it had neither formal notice nor actual knowledge of its alleged fault. The plaintiffs-two pedestrians who were struck by a car operated by an unlicensed driver-maintain that the County effectively operated or used the car because the unlicensed driver acted under the deputy's control, and that the formal notice provided by one plaintiff gave the County actual knowledge of its alleged fault in causing or contributing to the other plaintiff's injury. Because the conflicting evidence creates questions of fact on these jurisdictional issues, we affirm.
In May 2018, an event called "Go Topless Jeep Weekend" was held on Crystal Beach in Galveston County. Among the estimated 100, 000 attendees were Jazzmine Chin, Craig Bell Victoria Leach, and Stacie Habetz.
Chin decided to leave the event and Bell agreed to give her a lift in his Dodge Charger. Bell attempted to exit the beach via Monkhouse Road, which runs north and south perpendicular to the beach, but his car became stuck in the sand, blocking the traffic traveling east and west on the beach. Bell and Chin got out to check the car, then Chin sat in the car's driver's seat with the engine running and the air conditioner on. Chin, however, was not licensed to drive.
Meanwhile, Sergeant Brent Cooley and Corporal Rowlands, both of the Galveston County Sheriff's Office, had arrested a suspect for a weapons violation and were in a pickup truck heading east on the beach toward South Monkhouse Road to take the arrestee to the Crystal Beach substation. Rowlands was driving the truck, and Cooley was in the passenger seat. When the officers were between fifty and seventy-five yards from the intersection at South Monkhouse Road, traffic became gridlocked, and Cooley saw that the vehicle in front of Bell's Dodge was stuck in the sand at the intersection and three or four people were trying to dig the vehicle out. Behind that vehicle, Bell's Dodge was blocking the intersection, bringing eastwest traffic on the beach to a halt.
After telling Rowlands he was going to try to clear the intersection, Cooley walked to the Dodge and told Chin to move the car. Hearing this, Bell approached and told Cooley it was his, Bell's, car and that he would move it, but Cooley placed his hand on his gun and told Bell to shut up and back up. Chin told Cooley she did not have a driver's license, but Cooley again told her to move the car. Because Chin had previously had a learner's permit, she "thought [she] could handle it." But as she testified, Bell stated that the car "was spinning when it got out." The car continued in reverse, striking two pedestrians and a parked Jeep.
Leach had been standing in front of the parked Jeep, and she attempted to jump out of the way but one of her hands was caught between the Jeep and the Dodge. The reversing Dodge struck Habetz, too, but the parties do not describe Habetz's location or injuries.
Leach and Habetz sued the County for negligence in ordering an unlicensed driver to move a vehicle and in refusing to let the vehicle's owner move the car.[3]The County filed a plea to the jurisdiction on the ground of governmental immunity and lack of statutorily required notice, but the trial court denied the plea.
In two issues, the County argues that the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because (a) governmental immunity bars Leach's and Habetz's claims; and (b) as to Habetz's claims only, the County neither received pre-suit notice nor had actual notice of the claims.
Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction. Tex. Dep't of Parks &Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex. 2004). We review the trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. Chambers-Liberty Ctys. Navigation Dist. v. State, 575 S.W.3d 339, 345 (Tex. 2019). Parties may submit evidence supporting or opposing the plea, which we review under the same standard applicable to a traditional motion for summary judgment. Id. (citing Sampson v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 500 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex. 2016)). We take as true all evidence favorable to the plaintiff, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Sampson, 500 S.W.3d at 384. If the relevant evidence fails to raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue, the court rules on the plea as a matter of law. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228. But if the evidence creates a fact question regarding the jurisdictional issue, then the trial court must deny the plea to the jurisdiction and allow the factfinder to resolve the issue. Id. at 227-28.
The state generally has sovereign immunity from suit and liability. See Wasson Interests, Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, 489 S.W.3d 427, 429-30 (Tex. 2016). When political subdivisions of the state act in a governmental capacity, they share in the state's immunity, which is then referred to as governmental immunity. See id. Unless waived, governmental immunity from suit defeats a trial court's subjectmatter jurisdiction. See Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004).
The Texas Tort Claims Act provides a limited waiver of governmental immunity if certain conditions are met. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.021, 101.025. Under these provisions, governmental immunity from suit and liability is waived for, among other things, personal injury proximately caused by the wrongful act or omission or the negligence of a governmental employee acting within the scope of employment if the personal injury "arises from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle" and "the employee would be personally liable to the claimant according to Texas law." Id. § 101.021(1).
Given the limited nature of the immunity waiver, courts strictly construe the operation-or-use requirement. See, e.g., Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Fayette County, 453 S.W.3d 922, 927 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam); LeLeaux v. Hamshire-Fannett Indep. Sch. Dist., 835 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tex. 1992). "Operation" means "a doing or performing of practical work." Mount Pleasant Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Estate of Lindburg ex rel. Lindburg, 766 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tex. 1989) (quoting Jackson v. City of Corpus Christi, 484 S.W.2d 806, 809 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). "Use" "means 'to put or bring into action or service; to employ for or apply to a given purpose.'" Id. (quoting Beggs v. Tex. Dep't of Mental Health &Mental Retardation, 496 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ ref'd)). The Supreme Court of Texas has further explained that LeLeaux, 835 S.W.2d at 51; accord, San Antonio State Hosp. v. Cowan, 128 S.W.3d 244, 246 (Tex. 2004) ().
In the first half of the County's first issue, the County argues that this case falls outside the Texas Tort Claims Act's waiver of immunity because Cooley did not operate or use the vehicle that struck Leach and Habetz. Leach and Habetz, however, maintain that Chin acted under Cooley's direction such that Cooley must be considered to have been controlling her actions, and thus, operating or using the vehicle himself. The differing sides understandably rely on differing authorities, which we will attempt to reconcile.
In its first appellate argument, the County maintains that, under the facts in this case, Cooley did not operate or use the vehicle that struck Leach and Habetz because "operation" and "use" do not include law-enforcement officers' direction and control of traffic. In addition, the County argues that Cooley did not retain control over the vehicle Chin operated because Chin was free to disobey his instructions and she chose the vehicle's path and speed. In support of its position, the County relies primarily on three cases: Jackson v. Corpus Christi, 484 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.), Townsend v. City of Alvin, No. 14-05-00915-CV, 2006 WL 2345922 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 15, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.), and City of Sugar Land v. Gaytan, No. 01-18-01083-CV, 2020 WL 2026374 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 28, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
In Jackson, the plaintiffs' car struck a stalled vehicle that had been left unattended in the left lane of traffic. Jackson, 484 S.W.2d at 807. The stalled vehicle's lights were off, and there were no flares or other warning devices. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that two city police...
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