Gantling v. State

• Decision Date: 13 April 1898
• Parties: GANTLING v. STATE.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

23 So. 857

40 Fla. 237

GANTLING v. STATE.

Florida Supreme Court

April 13, 1898

Error to circuit court, Hamilton county; John F. White, Judge.

C. G Gantling was convicted of murder in the first degree, and from the sentence of death he brings error. Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

1. Where two counts in an indictment relate to the same transaction, and are only meant to meet various aspects in which the evidence may present itself, the court commits no error in refusing to compel the solicitor, before any evidence is offered, to elect between the counts, or to designate the count upon which he intends to rely for conviction.

2. Evidence of circumstances tending to connect the accused with the commission of the alleged crime, even though inconclusive, is properly admitted.

3. A nonexpert witness may testify to the fact of stains upon clothing found upon the body of a deceased person, and may state the color of those stains, these being matters of common knowledge and common observation.

4. An objection to evidence that it is 'clearly inadmissible according to law' is properly overruled because of its generality.

5. Where it is shown that a confession was freely and voluntarily made, and that no improper influences were exerted to induce it, evidence of such confession is properly admitted.

6. Under the legal maxim, 'Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus,' a jury may disregard the entire testimony of a witness, where such witness has willfully and knowingly or corruptly sworn falsely to a material fact in the case; but they are not required to do so; neither does the law attach any such condition or qualification to the rule as prevents its operation in cases where the false witness is corroborated by some circumstances proven, or by the testimony of some other credible witness in the case.

7. The court may properly advise the jury that they may disregard the entire testimony of a witness where such witness has willfully and knowingly or corruptly sworn falsely to a material fact in the case; and in determining whether they will disregard it, or what weight they shall give to it, they may take into consideration the fact that such witness is or is not corroborated by other credible evidence in the case.

8. The court may properly advise the jury that they have a right to reject the testimony of any witness whose general reputation for truth and veracity has been proven to be bad, and that in determining whether they will disregard it, or what weight they shall give to it, they may take into consideration the fact that such witness is or is not corroborated by other credible evidence in the case.

9. Courts have no right to qualify the rule requiring the guilt of an accused to be proven beyond reasonable doubt, or to disparage it in the estimation of juries by giving immediately after and in connection with a charge upon this subject an instruction to the effect that 'the humane provision of the law is designed to protect innocent persons who are wrongfully charged with the commission of crime from being unjustly, convicted, and is not designed to enable persons to escape punishment who are guilty of the commission of crime if they are shown to be guilty by the evidence.'

10. The jury determines the credence which shall be attached to a confession given in evidence, and of every part thereof. They should give it a fair and unprejudiced consideration. The confession should be taken as a whole. The time and circumstances of its making, its harmony or inconsistency in itself or with the other evidence in the case, the motives which may have operated on the defendant in making it, should all be fairly considered by the jury, and then they should give effect to such parts as they find sufficient reason to credit, and reject all that they find sufficient reason to reject, but they should not give effect to ro reject any part arbitrarily or capriciously.

11. An instruction 'that circumstantial evidence is not only legal evidence, but also that a well-connected train of circumstances is as conclusive of a fact as is the greatest array of positive evidence,' in connection with further instructions to the effect that, where a conviction of guilt depends upon circumstantial evidence alone, the circumstances proven should not only all concur to show that defendant committed the crime, but that they are all inconsistent with any other rational conclusion, and that circumstances, when alone relied upon for a conviction, should to a moral certainty actually exclude every hypothesis but the one to be proved, is not erroneous.

12. An instruction upon the facts or as to the weight and sufficiency of evidence is properly refused.

COUNSEL

Mallory F. Horne, for plaintiff in error.

William B. Lamar, Atty. Gen., for the State. At a special term of the circuit court of Hamilton county, held in October, 1896, plaintiff in error was indicted for the murder of one Lilly Gantling, alleged to have been committed August 1, 1896. The indictment contained two counts; the first charging that the murder was effected with a razor, the second that it was committed in a manner and by means unknown to the grand jury. The defendant was tried, and convicted of murder in the first degree at the fall term, 1897, of said court, and from the death sentence imposed upon him sued out this writ of error.

The conviction was based upon circumstantial evidence supplemented by proof of defendant's extrajudicial confessions. There was evidence tending to show the following facts: On and prior to August 1, 1896, the defendant kept a restaurant in Jasper, and also ran a hack and buggies for the public. His children were waiters in the restaurant, among whom was Lilly Gantling, a daughter about 15 years of age. She disappeared in the latter part of July or first part of August, 1896, although very few people observed it, and defendant made slight efforts, if any, to ascertain her whereabouts. Between midnight and day in the latter part of a week in the first part of August, 1896, two men and a girl were seen going down the road in the direction of a bay or pond northwest of, but near, Jasper. The girl was 'hollering and going on, and jumped off, and looked like she ran.' One of the men spoke to her, and said 'Come back here to me. Didn't I tell you not to go another step further that way? ' The girl seemed to be crying, and the parties passed on down the road. Later in the night other 'hollering' was heard down in the bay, impressing the witness who heard it that there was a death down there that night. The hollering down in the bay sounded like a girl, not a woman. On the first Saturday night after the first Monday in August, 1896 between 1 and 2 o'clock, a woman's voice was heard by persons in Jasper, crying, as if in great distress, 'Oh Lordy! Oh Lordy!' and a few moments afterwards it was repeated. At about 3 o'clock a vehicle was heard going in the direction of defendant's house, and when it reached his house defendant's voice was recognized, calling 'Ira! Ira!' to one of his sons. The woman's screams were in a direction northwest of Jasper and the vehicle came from that direction. On Sunday morning about the 1st of October, 1896, between 8 and 9 o'clock, the remains of a colored female were found about 20 yards from the edge of a swamp or bay located near Jasper, in a northwesterly direction. The body was badly decomposed, but from the clothing and certain peculiarities of the hair, forehead, and teeth it was identified as the body of Lilly Gantling. The body was covered when first found. The defendant and his wife, at the request of the coroner's jury, went down, and viewed the remains, but neither seemed to recognize them. There was also evidence tending to show that when Lilly Gantling disappeared she was apparently three or four months advanced in pregnancy; also conflicting evidence as to whether defendant ever made any inquiries or searches for his daughter, either before or after his arrest, which occurred within a few days after the body was found. There was also evidence tending to show that defendant confessed to two persons at different times on the afternoon of the day the body was found that he had been intimate with his daughter Lilly; that she became pregnant; that he killed her because he had to do so in order to 'keep in with the Masons.' One of these persons testified that defendant told him 'Dellage held her hands, and I cut her throat.' There was also evidence tending to show that defendant asked a prisoner in the jail with him, who was about to be liberated on bond, to go to Georgia, and write defendant a letter, 'saying that you are my daughter, Lilly Gantling, and it will do me lost of good in my case.'

The court charged the jury, among other things, as follows '(1) [When you are satisfied that a witness has willfully sworn falsely to a material matter or fact in the case, then you may disregard the entire evidence of such witness, unless the evidence of such witness is corroborated by circumstances proven, or by the testimony of some other credible witness.] (2) The general reputation of a man for truth and veracity is what his neighbors generally say concerning him about his veracity. [When a witness' general reputation for truth and veracity is thus shown to be bad, you may disregard the evidence of such witness from your consideration, unless the evidence of such witness is corroborated by some circumstances proven, or by the evidence of some witness who is truthful. What one or two neighbors alone say as to veracity does not constitute the general reputation of such witness for truth and veracity, where such witness had numerous neighbors.] (3) On the trial of persons charged with the commission of murder in the...