Gantt v. Selph

• Decision Date: 30 May 2018
• Docket Number: Appellate Case No. 2016-002134,Opinion No. 27807
• Citation: 814 S.E.2d 523
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Robert GANTT and Edward K. White, Respondents, v. Samuel J. SELPH as Director, and Marjorie Johnson, Adell Adams, E. Peter Kennedy, Sylvia Holley and Jane Emerson as the Members of the Board of Voter Registration and Elections of Richland County, The Board of Voter Registration and Elections of Richland County, and Kim Murphy, Defendants, Of whom Kim Murphy is the Appellant.

423 S.C. 333

814 S.E.2d 523

Robert GANTT and Edward K. White, Respondents,

v. Samuel J. SELPH as Director, and Marjorie Johnson, Adell Adams, E. Peter Kennedy, Sylvia Holley and Jane Emerson as the Members of the Board of Voter Registration and Elections of Richland County, The Board of Voter Registration and Elections of Richland County, and Kim Murphy, Defendants,Of whom Kim Murphy is the Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-002134

Opinion No. 27807

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Submitted January 16, 2018

Filed May 30, 2018

Rehearing Denied June 27, 2018

Brian C. Gambrell, of The Law Offices of Jason E. Taylor, P.C., of Columbia, for Appellant.

Michael H. Montgomery, of Montgomery Willard, LLC, of Columbia, for Respondents.

JUSTICE JAMES :

In this case, the circuit court ruled Appellant Kim Murphy was not qualified to be a candidate for election to a Richland County seat on the District 5 Richland-Lexington School Board of Trustees (School Board). The circuit court based this ruling on its conclusion that Murphy resides in Lexington County. We first hold the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over Respondents' declaratory judgment action challenging Murphy's qualifications. Second, we hold there is probative evidence in the record supporting the circuit court's conclusion that Murphy resides in Lexington County. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court's ruling that Murphy is not qualified to be a candidate for election to a Richland County seat on the School Board.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Kim Murphy has lived at the same residence in Chapin since the year 2000. Murphy was registered to vote and voted in the Spring Hill Precinct of Richland County from 2000 to 2013 without controversy. In 2004 and 2010, Murphy filed to run for a Richland County seat on the School Board, and the Richland County Board of Voter Registration and Elections (Richland Election Board) accepted her candidate's application as a resident of Richland County both times. Murphy was elected to a Richland County seat on the School Board in 2010.

The dispute as to Murphy's qualifications as a candidate centers upon Act No. 326 of 2002, § 9 (Act No. 326), which provides that the School Board must be comprised of three residents of Richland County and four residents of Lexington County. Act No. 326 first became an issue after Murphy was elected in 2010. In 2012, the Office of Research and Statistics (an arm of the South Carolina Budget and Control Board), the body then charged with keeping official records of voting precincts and the location of county lines, conducted a routine screening of voter precinct assignments in Richland County.¹ During that screening, Murphy's residence was flagged as being in Lexington County. In March 2013, relying upon this information, the School Board determined Murphy was not a resident of Richland County and was instead a resident of Lexington County. The School Board removed Murphy from her seat for cause pursuant to section 59-19-60 of the South Carolina Code (2004). The School Board based its decision on Murphy not meeting the residency requirements prescribed by Act No. 326.

In August 2016, Murphy filed to run against Respondent Robert Gantt in the November 2016 election for a seat representing Richland County on the School Board. Robert Gantt and Edward White (Respondents) petitioned the Richland Election Board, challenging Murphy's qualification as a Richland County voter pursuant to section 7-5-230 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2017). After a hearing, the Richland Election Board found Murphy was a qualified voter and allowed her to remain on the ballot. Respondents attempted to appeal to the circuit court; however, while section 7-5-230 would have allowed Murphy to appeal an adverse ruling, neither section 7-5-230 nor any other statute gave Respondents the right to appeal the Richland Election Board's conclusion that Murphy was a qualified voter in Richland County.

Respondents then commenced this declaratory judgment action in the circuit court. They seek a declaration that Murphy does not reside in Richland County and is therefore not qualified under Act No. 326 to be a candidate for a Richland County seat on the School Board. The circuit court ruled Murphy resides in Lexington County and is therefore not qualified to be a candidate for a Richland County seat on the School Board. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Murphy claims the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear and decide Respondents' challenge to her qualifications as a candidate. We disagree.

"Subject matter jurisdiction is ‘the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.’ " Dove v. Gold Kist, Inc. , 314 S.C. 235, 237-38, 442 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1994) (quoting Bank of Babylon v. Quirk , 192 Conn. 447, 472 A.2d 21, 22 (1984) ).

Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, and may be raised for the first time on appeal. Linda Mc Co., Inc. v. Shore , 390 S.C. 543, 557, 703 S.E.2d 499, 506 (2010). "The question of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law." Id. at 551, 703 S.E.2d at 503 (quoting Porter v. Labor Depot , 372 S.C. 560, 567, 643 S.E.2d 96, 100 (Ct. App. 2007) ). "An appellate court may decide questions of law with no particular deference to the trial court." Id.

As noted above, Respondents initially challenged Murphy's qualification to vote in Richland County by petitioning the Richland Election Board, claiming Murphy does not reside in Richland County. Article II, section 9 of the South Carolina Constitution provides that anyone denied registration to vote "shall have the right to appeal to the court of common pleas, or any judge thereof, and thence to the Supreme Court, to determine his right to vote." This section further provides that "the General Assembly shall provide for such appeal." S.C. CONST . art. II, § 9. To "provide for such appeal," the General Assembly enacted subsection 7-5-230(C) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2017), which allows for an appeal to the court of common pleas by any person who is denied registration to vote by the local election board. The Richland Election Board determined Murphy was a qualified Richland County voter; therefore, she did not have to exercise her right to appeal.

Murphy argues section 7-5-230 and South Carolina common law make the executive branch—the Richland Election Board—the sole arbiter of not only her qualification to vote in Richland County, but also of her qualification to be a candidate for election to the School Board. Therefore, Murphy contends, the circuit court and this Court do not have subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute. We disagree.

Murphy's reading of section 7-5-230 is overly broad, as subsection 7-5-230(A) simply does not address the Richland Election Board's authority to do anything other than be the judge "of the legal qualifications of all applicants for registration" to vote. It does not apply to a person who files as a candidate for office. Pursuant to subsection 7-5-230(C), if Murphy's application for voter registration had been denied by the Richland Election Board, she could have appealed that denial to the circuit court. In such an event, sections 7-5-240 and 7-5-250 would have governed appellate proceedings before the circuit court and this Court. However, the instant dispute does not center upon Murphy's application for voter registration; rather, the dispute centers upon her qualification to be a candidate for election to the School Board. Therefore, section 7-5-230 does not apply to the dispute before us.

Likewise, South Carolina common law has not established the executive branch as the final authority on Murphy's eligibility to run for and hold a seat on the School Board. Murphy's reliance on South Carolina Public Interest Foundation v. Judicial Merit Selection Commission , 369 S.C. 139, 632 S.E.2d 277 (2006), and Rainey v. Haley , 404 S.C. 320, 745 S.E.2d 81 (2013), for this proposition is misplaced.

In South Carolina Public Interest Foundation , we held that a declaratory judgment action was an inappropriate vehicle for resolving the issue of residency of a judicial candidate. 369 S.C. at 142-44, 632 S.E.2d at 278-79. We explained we have no authority to rule on questions "exclusively or predominantly political in nature rather than judicial" and stated "[t]he fundamental characteristic of a nonjusticiable ‘political question’ is that its adjudication would place a court in conflict with a coequal branch of government." Id. at 142-43, 632 S.E.2d at 278. The central premise of our conclusion that the dispute was a nonjusticiable political question was that article V, section 27 of the South Carolina Constitution specifically vested the General Assembly with the authority to investigate and determine the qualifications of judicial candidates. In turn, the General Assembly exercised this authority by enacting comprehensive legislation creating the Judicial Merit Selection Commission and giving it complete control over the investigation and determination of the qualifications of judicial candidates. Id. at 143, 632 S.E.2d at 279.

In the instant case, there is no such exclusive authority vested with the Richland Election Board by either the South Carolina Constitution or by statute to determine the qualifications of a candidate for election to the School Board. As noted above, article II, section 9 of the South Carolina Constitution addresses a person's right to vote ; subsection 7-5-230(A) prescribes a procedure for challenges to a person's qualification to register to vote , and subsection 7-5-230(C) gives a person who applies to register to vote the right to appeal the Richland Election Board's refusal to approve such an application. There is no provision in the South Carolina Constitution, South Carolina Election Law,² Act No. 326, or any other statute granting authority to any executive or legislative entity to...