Garay-Amaya v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 28 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | 0417-22-4 |
| Parties | SAUL GARAY-AMAYA v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY [1] Stephen C. Shannon, Judge
Michael C. Cash, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
William K. Hamilton, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Malveaux, Fulton and White Argued by videoconference
A jury convicted Saul Garay-Amaya ("appellant") of one count each of abduction, in violation of Code § 18.2-47, strangulation, in violation of Code § 18.2-51.6, and object sexual penetration, in violation of Code § 18.2-67.2.[2] On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the abduction charge because any detention was incidental to the strangulation and object sexual penetration charges. He also argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove the requisite penetration for a conviction for object sexual penetration. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
On the night of September 11, 2020, seventeen-year-old T.M.R.[3] attended a house party in Maryland. At 2:00 a.m. the following morning, she posted a message on her Snapchat social media account requesting a ride home. At 4:30 a.m., T.M.R.'s Snapchat "friend," appellant, picked her up in a van in response to her request. T.M.R. gave appellant her Virginia address, and the address was entered into the GPS function on appellant's cell phone. As appellant drove, T.M.R. noticed him giving her "looks" and she became "uncomfortable" and "afraid."
Despite having T.M.R.'s address in his cell phone, appellant eventually "went down another route" before stating that he was lost. Appellant stopped the van in a neighborhood T.M.R. did not recognize. When T.M.R. told him that she "wanted to go," appellant asked her to kiss him. T.M.R. stated that she "didn't want to," and appellant went "crazy" and accused her of "want[ing] to escape." T.M.R. tried to open her door, but appellant "grabbed [her]" hand, "pulled it," and locked the door shut. He prevented T.M.R. from trying to open the door again. Appellant then kissed T.M.R., reached under her shirt, and touched and licked her breasts. He also grabbed T.M.R.'s neck and throat and choked her. Despite T.M.R.'s resistance and pleas for appellant to stop, he shoved his hands into the rear of her pants and underwear and touched her anus and put "his fingers inside [her] vagina." T.M.R. also characterized this contact as appellant "putting his fingers in a little bit," and she denied having any doubt that appellant was inside her vagina "because [she] felt his hand." T.M.R. eventually managed to unfasten her seat belt, opened her door, and ran home to contact the police.
T.M.R. later went to the hospital, where forensic nurse Ashleigh Daniel conducted a sexual assault examination. T.M.R. told Daniel that appellant touched her breasts, "put his fingers in her intimate parts," and tried to suffocate her. She also reported that she was sexually active and had had sex five days earlier, during which her partner had penetrated her vagina. Daniel noted bruises to T.M.R.'s neck and two abrasions on her back, but T.M.R.'s genitals and anus were uninjured.
Police arrested appellant, and a grand jury indicted him for abduction, strangulation, and two counts of object sexual penetration. One of the indictments for object sexual penetration specifically alleged that appellant "did feloniously penetrate the labia majora of T.M.R."
At trial, Daniel testified as an expert in sexual assault examinations and forensic nursing. She opined that T.M.R.'s bruised neck was "consistent with the report of strangulation" and stated that she had "confirmed" T.M.R.'s report of "fingers in the vagina contact" during her examination. Although Daniel had not detected any injuries to T.M.R.'s vaginal area and T.M.R.'s results had been those of a "normal genital exam," Daniel explained that she was unsurprised by this because "[y]ou don't always see injury with the report of sexual assault." She also testified that she would not necessarily expect to see substantial injury from fingers being inserted into a vagina.
After the Commonwealth's evidence, appellant moved to strike the object sexual penetration charges. He argued that T.M.R.'s testimony describing the assault was "just inherently incredible." He also moved to strike the abduction charge, asserting that T.M.R.'s detention was incidental to the charges of object sexual penetration and strangulation. The trial court denied the motion to strike the abduction charge. It granted in part and denied in part the motion to strike the object sexual penetration charges, granting only appellant's request that language referencing the mental incapacity or physical helplessness of the victim be struck from the indictments.
Appellant testified that he and T.M.R. became "friends" on Snapchat in 2019 or 2020. He admitted that he had flirted with T.M.R. while driving her home and asked if she had a boyfriend. Appellant maintained that he drove directly to T.M.R.'s residence without stopping. He claimed that he showed T.M.R. his cell phone's GPS navigation application to prove that he had arrived at "the exact address" she provided. Appellant denied that he tried to kiss T.M.R., locked his van door when she tried to get out, placed his hand on her neck, or put a finger inside her vagina. Rather, he maintained that after arriving at her residence, they "said goodbye and she got out of the car."
Renewing his motion to strike on the same grounds, appellant added that the evidence failed to prove that he had penetrated "the outer lips of the female sexual organ or the labia majora." The trial court denied the motion. The jury convicted appellant of abduction, strangulation, and object sexual penetration of T.M.R.'s vagina.
Appellant moved to set aside the verdict, arguing that the Commonwealth had failed to show that any detention of T.M.R. was separate and apart from the restraint employed in the commission of the other offenses. He also contended that the indictment for the vaginal object sexual penetration charge required the Commonwealth to prove specifically that he had penetrated T.M.R.'s labia majora, but that "[t]here was no specific testimony by [T.M.R.] of what exact part of her body she was referring to when she referenced her vagina . . . or what part of her vagina [appellant's] finger went inside." The trial court denied the motion.
This appeal followed.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to strike and his motion to set aside the verdict on the abduction and object sexual penetration charges.
"In challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to strike, [appellant] necessarily asserts that the jury should not have been allowed to even consider the charges because '[a] motion to strike challenges whether the evidence is sufficient to submit the case to the jury.'" Massie v. Commonwealth, 74 Va.App. 309, 319 (2022) (last alteration in original) (quoting Linnon v. Commonwealth, 287 Va. 92, 98 (2014)). "As a result, [appellant's] challenge raises the question of whether the evidence adduced sufficiently presented 'a prima facie case [of the charged offenses] for consideration by the' jury." Walker v. Commonwealth, 74 Va.App. 475, 489 (2022) (quoting Vay v. Commonwealth, 67 Va.App. 236, 249 (2017)). "Whether the evidence adduced is sufficient to prove each of th[]e elements [of the offenses] is a factual finding, which will not be set aside on appeal unless it is plainly wrong." Vay, 67 Va.App. at 249 (quoting Linnon, 287 Va. at 98). Similarly, "[w]hen a trial court decides a motion to set aside the verdict, the [reviewing] court only looks to whether the jury's verdict is 'plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.'" Spell v. Commonwealth, 72 Va.App. 629, 634 (2020) (quoting Wagoner v. Commonwealth, 289 Va. 476, 484 (2015)).
In conducting our review, "this Court is required to 'discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences that may be drawn' from the evidence." Goodwin v. Commonwealth, 71 Va.App. 125, 146-47 (2019) (quoting Seaton v. Commonwealth, 42 Va.App 739, 743 (2004)). Washington v. Commonwealth, 75 Va.App. 606, 615-16 (2022) (alterations in original) (quoting Nelson v. Commonwealth, 73 Va.App. 617, 622 (2021)). "Similarly, '[i]n its role of judging witness credibility, the fact finder is entitled to disbelieve the self-serving testimony of the accused and to conclude that the accused is lying to conceal his guilt.'" Id. at 616 (alteration in original) (quoting Flanagan v. Commonwealth, 58 Va.App. 681, 702 (2011)). "After so viewing the evidence, the question is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime[s] beyond a reasonable doubt." Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 224 (2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. McNeal, 282 Va. 16, 20 (2011)). "In sum, if there is evidence to support the conviction, the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its judgment, even if its view of the evidence might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial." Linnon, 287 Va. at 98 (quoting Lawlor, 285 Va. at 224)....
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