Garcetti v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 29 December 2000
• Citation: 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 703,85 Cal.App.4th 1113
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 2000) GIL GARCETTI, as District Attorney, etc., Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; BARRY MERIL BLAKE, Real Party in Interest. B141817 Filed

102 Cal.Rptr.2d 703 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 2000)

GIL GARCETTI, as District Attorney, etc., Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondent;

BARRY MERIL BLAKE, Real Party in Interest.

B141817

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE

DISTRICT, DIVISION THREE

Filed 12/29/00

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. Harold E. Shabo, Judge.

Petition granted.

(Super. Ct. No. ZM003762)

Gil Garcetti, District Attorney, Fred Klink and Brent Riggs, Deputy District Attorneys, for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Michael P. Judge, Public Defender, Albert J. Menaster, John Douglas and Jack T. Weedin, Deputy Public Defenders for Real Party in Interest.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

KLEIN, P.J.

Gil Garcetti, District Attorney of Los Angeles County, petitions for a writ of mandate to overturn the superior court's order sustaining a demurrer by Barry Meril Blake (Blake) to the People's commitment petition under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVP Act) (Welf. & Inst. Code, 6600 et seq.) and dismissing the commitment proceedings. ¹

A requisite to a commitment under the SVP Act is that a defendant have been convicted of sexually violent offenses against at least two victims. ( 6600, subd. (a).) Section 6600, subdivision (a) provides "a conviction resulting in a finding that the person was a mentally disordered sex offender . . . shall . . . be deemed to be a sexually violent offense[.]" The essential issue presented is whether a conviction of an attempted lewd or lascivious act upon a child under age 14 (hereafter lewd act), resulting in a finding that the defendant was a mentally disordered sex offender (MDSO), qualifies as a prior conviction for purposes of the SVP Act. ²

We conclude that any conviction resulting in an MDSO finding qualifies as a prior conviction for purposes of the SVP Act. Therefore, the commitment petition is well pled. We reject the trial court's ruling the statute is ambiguous in this regard and we grant the relief requested.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 2, 2000, the People filed a petition to commit Blake pursuant to the SVP Act. The petition alleged Blake was convicted on February 6, 1977, of a violation of Penal Code sections 664/288 (attempted lewd act), and on January 4, 1980, of a violation of Penal Code section 288 (lewd act).

On May 9, 2000, Blake filed a demurrer asserting the petition should be dismissed for failing to allege two qualifying convictions as required by section 6600, subdivision (a), because the alleged conviction of an attempted lewd act is not a qualifying prior conviction under section 6600, subdivision (b).

On May 23, 2000, the trial court sustained Blake's demurrer with leave to amend.

On May 31, 2000, the People filed an amended petition, again alleging as the required two priors the convictions of a lewd act and attempted lewd act, with the latter conviction resulting in a finding that Blake was an MDSO.

The matter was heard on May 31, 2000. Blake's counsel entered an oral demurrer by reference to the written demurrer to the original petition. Following argument on the interpretation of the statute, the People stated: "The case falls or stands on the basis of the two alleged priors. There are no other priors." The trial court ruled the conviction of an attempted lewd act, accompanied by an MDSO finding, did not qualify as a prior conviction under section 6600 and ordered the petition dismissed, but stayed an order for Blake's release until June 6, 2000.³

On June 5, 2000, the People filed a petition for writ of mandate. We promptly stayed Blake's release pending determination of the writ petition and issued an order to show cause.

CONTENTIONS

The People contend the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer because Blake's conviction of an attempted lewd act, accompanied by an MDSO finding, qualifies as a predicate offense for a commitment under the SVP Act.

DISCUSSION

1. The pertinent statute.

The SVP Act "is aimed at protecting society from, and providing treatment for, that 'small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators' who have diagnosable mental disorders identified while they are incarcerated for designated violent sex crimes, and who are determined to be unsafe and, if released, to represent a danger to others through acts of sexual violence. (Stats. 1995, ch. 763, 1.) Such persons may be committed to a state mental institution for a period after their term of imprisonment. To be eligible for such commitment, there must be determinations under the auspices of the Departments of Corrections and Mental Health, and a petition filed by the prosecutor. The defendant must have suffered convictions for defined sex crimes against at least two different persons, and can be committed only after a probable cause hearing and trial. ( 6600, subd. (a), 6602, 6603.)" (Garcetti v. Superior Court (Pierre) (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 685, 688.)

" 'Sexually violent predator' " is defined by the statute as "a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against two or more victims for which he or she received a determinate sentence and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior." ( 6600, subd. (a).)

The original version of section 6600, effective January 1, 1996, made it a requisite to a commitment under the SVP Act that the defendant have been convicted of sexually violent offenses against at least two persons, for which he or she received a determinate sentence. (Garcetti v. Superior Court (Pierre), supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 691.) The statute was amended by urgency legislation, effective September 13, 1996. (Id. at p. 689.)

The second paragraph of section 6600, subdivision (a), was among the changes made by this amendment. (Garcetti v. Superior Court (Pierre), supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 689.) Said paragraph provides: "For purposes of this subdivision, a prior finding of not guilty by reason of insanity for an offense described in subdivision (b), a conviction for an offense under a predecessor statute that includes all of the elements of an offense described in subdivision (b), a conviction prior to July 1, 1977, for an offense described in subdivision (b), a conviction resulting in a finding that the person was a mentally disordered sex offender, or a conviction in another jurisdiction for an offense that includes all the elements of an offense described in subdivision (b), shall also be deemed to be a sexually violent offense even if the offender did not receive a determinate sentence for that prior offense." ( 6600, subd. (a), italics added.)

The term " '[s]exually violent offense' " is defined in section 6600, subdivision (b), as the "following acts when committed by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person, and that are committed on, before, or after the effective date of this article and result in a conviction or a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity, as provided in subdivision (a): a felony violation of paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 261, paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 262, Section 264.1, subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 288, or subdivision (a) of Section 289 of the Penal Code, or sodomy or oral copulation in violation of Section 286 or 288a of the Penal Code." ( 6600, subd. (b).)

There is no dispute that Blake's alleged conviction of an attempted lewd act (Pen. Code, 664/288) is not an offense described in section 6600, subdivision (b), and therefore said conviction qualifies, if at all, by reason of the resulting MDSO finding. ⁴

2. Trial court erred in finding the statute is ambiguous with respect to nature of prior offenses resulting in MDSO findings.

a. Trial court's ruling.

The trial court found section 6600 is ambiguous due to the Legislature's insertion of a comma between the phrase "a conviction resulting in a finding that the person was a mentally disordered sex offender" and the phrase describing a qualifying out-of-state prior, the latter phrase concluding with the language "for an offense that includes all the elements of an offense described in subdivision (b)." ( 6600, subd. (a).)

The trial court noted the People's argument "that the placing of [the] comma after the word 'offender' indicates the Legislature's intent not to require a subdivision (b) [offense for the MDSO] prior. It seems clear to the court that in every other part of that paragraph subdivision (b) is explicitly set forth including the description of the out-of-state prior which has all the elements of the subdivision (b) offense. [] And it seems to the court that [the] Legislature reasonably could have concluded, despite the comma following the word 'offender,' that [the] Legislature intended that the subdivision (b) qualifier also apply to the MDSO finding. If the Legislature did not so intend, then the court is faced with an ambiguity in the statute which given the restrictions on liberty interests requires the court to apply any reasonable doubt in favor of the person against whom the statute is sought to be applied[.]"

b. Trial court's interpretation is at odds with ordinary rules of statutory construction.

"In ascertaining the Legislature's intent, we turn first to the language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning. [Citations.] We must follow the statute's plain meaning, if such appears, unless doing so would lead to absurd results the Legislature could not have intended. [Citations.] If our examination of the statutory language leaves doubt about its meaning, we may consult other evidence of the Legislature's intent, such as the history and background of the measure. [Citations.]" (People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226, 231-232.)

The second paragraph of section 6600, subdivision (a) contains five...