Garcia v. Bialozor (In re The Estate of Garcia)

• Decision Date: 26 May 2022
• Docket Number: 21CA0263
• Citation: 2022 COA 58
• Parties: In re the Estate of Deborah Gene Garcia, deceased. v. Krysta Bialozor, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Deborah Gene Garcia, and Diana Strong, Appellees. Julius Garcia, Appellant,
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

2022 COA 58

In re the Estate of Deborah Gene Garcia, deceased.

Julius Garcia, Appellant, v. Krysta Bialozor, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Deborah Gene Garcia, and Diana Strong, Appellees.

No. 21CA0263

Court of Appeals of Colorado, Third Division

May 26, 2022

Alamosa County District Court No. 16PR30038 Honorable Martin A. Gonzales, Judge

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART

Erich Schwiesow, P.C., Erich Schwiesow, Alamosa, Colorado, for Appellant

Staggs Morris, P.C., Ernest Staggs, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee Krysta Bialozor

Hutchinson Black & Cook, LLC, John C. Clune, Meghan C Hungate, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellee Diana Strong

OPINION

LIPINSKY JUDGE

¶ 1 Nearly a century ago, Colorado enacted a "slayer statute" to bar felonious killers from gaining a financial benefit from the killing. Yet, until today, no published Colorado case has considered whether a person who has no legal relationship with a decedent's heirs has standing to assert a slayer statute claim in the name of the heirs, or whether a person who could not obtain a financial benefit from the forfeiture or revocation sections of the statute may assert a slayer statute claim solely to obtain a judicial determination that the defendant feloniously killed the decedent.

¶ 2 We hold that a person who has no legal relationship with the decedent's heirs lacks standing to assert a claim under the slayer statute for the heirs' financial benefit. We further hold that a party who cannot gain financially from the forfeiture or revocation sections of the slayer statute may not bring a claim solely to obtain a judicial determination that the defendant feloniously killed the decedent.

I. Background

¶ 3 Deborah Gene Garcia (the decedent) was thirty-four years old at the time of her death. Her husband, Julius Garcia (father), reported that he found the decedent "face down" in bed and unresponsive several hours after they had engaged in "kinky sex," during which her hands were tied to the bed.

¶ 4 The decedent did not leave a will. She was survived by father and their children, Krysta Bialozor and A.G. (the children). (We refer to A.G. by his initials because, unlike Bialozor, he was a minor when this case was filed.) Father was the decedent's sole heir. The children lived with father following their mother's death.

¶ 5 The report of an autopsy performed the day after the decedent's death noted evidence supporting a conclusion that she had died of terminal cardiac arrhythmia resulting from an existing heart condition.

¶ 6 Twelve years later, the decedent's sister, Diana Strong, obtained a second opinion regarding the cause of the decedent's death. After analyzing tissue samples from the decedent's body and reviewing other information, a pathologist concluded that the decedent's death was not the result of cardiac arrhythmia but, rather, of pulmonary edema. The pathologist said that causes of pulmonary edema include "intoxication, mechanical asphyxiation, smothering, cho[]king, neck compression using ligature, . . . and hyper/hypothermia." The pathologist reported that these causes of pulmonary edema needed to be "further examined and considered."

¶ 7 Armed with the pathologist's report, Pete DeHerrera, the decedent's father, sued father under the slayer statute. DeHerrera sought a court order that included

(1) a determination under the slayer statute that father feloniously caused the decedent's death;

(2) a determination under the slayer statute that the children are the decedent's sole heirs; and

(3) a judgment directing father to "forfeit his rights to all assets belonging to or in which Decedent had an interest, and in which he was named as a beneficiary or received benefits under the statutes and governing instruments," and to "account for and disgorge to the [children] all proceeds from their sale and transfer."

¶ 8 Bialozor was an adult and A.G. was a minor when DeHerrera filed the petition. At the time, the children were not parties to the case.

¶ 9 Several weeks after DeHerrera filed the petition, Bialozor, through counsel, filed an objection to the petition. In her objection, Bialozor sought dismissal of the petition, including the claims that DeHerrera asserted on her behalf.

¶ 10 Because A.G. was a minor at the time, the court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) for him. The GAL recommended that the court dismiss the case, "as dismissal of this action would be in [A.G.]'s best interest."

¶ 11 Strong later joined the case as co-petitioner, and after DeHerrera was dismissed from the case, she became the sole petitioner.

¶ 12 Early in the case, father filed several motions, including a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) DeHerrera and Strong lacked standing to bring the slayer statute claims asserted in the petition and (2) their claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The court denied the motions.

¶ 13 After nearly four years of litigation, father made an offer of settlement in the amount of $500, 000 to the children and Strong pursuant to section 13-17-202(1)(a)(II), C.R.S. 2021. The children accepted the offer. Strong accepted the offer conditionally in satisfaction of the "monetary claim" in the petition - the forfeiture claim asserted in the children's interest. But she said that father's offer did not address her "non-monetary claim" - her individual claim for a determination that father had feloniously killed the decedent.

¶ 14 After the children accepted father's offer of settlement, father moved for entry of final judgment pursuant to C.R.C.P. 54(b). The court denied the motion, however, reasoning that the children were "not the proper offerees with respect to the settlement offer" because, according to the court, "the heirs of the Decedent" are not the "sole beneficiaries that can litigate a claim under the slayer statute." The court said that Strong's individual claim "cannot be unilaterally extinguished by an agreement to settlement between [father] and [the children]."

¶ 15 Shortly before the scheduled trial date, father filed a Contingent Admission of Liability and Motion in Limine in which he said his "resources are exhausted," he "intends to rely on appeal on his defenses of standing and statute of limitations," and he "admits liability under § 15-11-803(7)(b) . . . to preserve his resources where they can be most usefully applied, i.e. to appealing this Court's rulings on [his] standing and statute of limitations defenses." He said that the "only . . . issues remain[ing] for trial" were damages and the "facts relating to" his argument that DeHerrera and Strong's claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

¶ 16 During a conference with the court conducted eighteen days later, counsel for father said that, although he was confessing liability under the slayer statute to effectuate his settlement with the children, he was not confessing liability to Strong, and he intended to pursue an appeal on "issues of standing and statute of limitations." He reiterated his position that Strong "has no financial stake in this matter at all." (In a later filing, however, father said "no issues remain for the Court to determine.")

¶ 17 The court accepted father's admission and entered an unconditional final judgment with two parts: (1) a judgment in favor of Strong on her "felonious killing claim" that reflected father's "admission of liability" and (2) a judgment against father in the amount of $500, 000 "to be apportioned equally" between the children. In addition, the court awarded costs to Strong under C.R.C.P. 54(d).

II. Discussion

¶ 18 Father contends the district court erred by (1) determining that DeHerrera and Strong had standing to assert claims under the slayer statute; (2) deciding that DeHerrera and Strong's claims were not barred by the statute of limitations; and (3) awarding costs to Strong as the prevailing party under C.R.C.P. 54(d).

¶ 19 We conclude that DeHerrera and Strong lacked standing to seek relief under the slayer statute in the children's interest or in their individual capacities. Thus, we reverse the portion of the judgment reflecting the entry of judgment in favor of Strong - the court's acknowledgment of father's conditional admission of liability. Given our disposition, we reverse the court's award of costs to Strong and do not reach father's statute of limitations argument.

A. DeHerrera and Strong's Standing under the Slayer Statute

¶ 20 We analyze DeHerrera and Strong's standing to bring (1) claims under the slayer statute for the benefit of the children and (2) their claim seeking a determination that father feloniously killed the decedent.

¶ 21 We conclude that DeHerrera and Strong lacked standing to bring claims in the interest of the children because they had no legal relationship with the children, Bialozor was above the age of majority, and the legal representatives of both children disavowed DeHerrera's and Strong's efforts to seek relief on the children's behalf. Further, because neither DeHerrera nor Strong could have obtained a financial benefit under the forfeiture or revocation sections of the slayer statute, they lacked standing to assert a slayer statute claim in their own names.

1. Standard of Review

¶ 22 "We . . . review de novo a trial court's interpretation and application of a statute." May v. Petersen, 2020 COA 75, ¶ 11, 465 P.3d 589, 592. "Our goal in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the legislature's intent. We read statutory words and phrases in context, interpret them according to their plain meaning, and construe them according to the rules of grammar and common usage." Id. (citation omitted).

¶ 23 We also review issues of standing de novo. Aurora Urb. ...