Garcia v. Commonwealth
| Citation | 164 N.E.3d 862,487 Mass. 97 |
| Decision Date | 22 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | SJC-12863 |
| Parties | Marcos GARCIA v. COMMONWEALTH. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Elizabeth Hugetz, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the petitioner.
Ryan J. Rall, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Wendlandt, JJ.
After a defendant has been found not criminally responsible by reason of mental illness, G. L. c. 123, § 16 (a ), allows the trial judge to order that the defendant be hospitalized "at a facility" for forty days for observation and examination.1 If the defendant is male and the judge determines "that the failure to retain him in strict security would create a likelihood of serious harm by reason of mental illness, or other mental defect," the judge may order that the hospitalization occur at the Bridgewater State Hospital (Bridgewater). Id. Yet for defendants sent to a facility other than Bridgewater, § 16 (a ) does not provide a standard to guide the judge's determination whether to temporarily commit for an examination.
After a jury-waived trial in October 2019, the defendant, Marcos Garcia,2 was found not criminally responsible by reason of mental illness based on a February 2018 incident.3 Immediately after the trial concluded, and despite a lack of evidence that at the time of trial the defendant presented a risk of harm to himself or others, the judge nevertheless ordered him to be hospitalized pursuant to § 16 (a ) at a facility for forty days for observation and examination.
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the defendant's substantive due process rights were violated. Specifically, we hold that the clause of § 16 (a ) referring to hospitalization "at a facility" (first clause) is unconstitutional when applied to the defendant, where he was found not criminally responsible and where there was insufficient evidence that he posed a current likelihood of serious harm.4
Background. The essential facts are uncontested. On February 28, 2018, the defendant was arrested following an incident occurring after he crashed his van while driving on Interstate Highway 495. When a passerby stopped to help, the defendant approached the passerby's car with a pickaxe and attempted to enter the vehicle but was thwarted. When another driver stopped and got out of her Chevrolet Equinox, the defendant entered that vehicle and drove away. The defendant then struck the rear of a tow truck, as well as two additional vehicles, but continued driving. About five to seven miles down the road, the defendant crashed the vehicle and came to a stop. A nurse who was driving by stopped to assist the defendant, who was visibly injured. The defendant tried to kiss her hand and grabbed the door handle of her minivan, but he relented when she said her children were inside. The defendant then entered one of the cars involved in the crash and tried to drive away, but the car would not move. Officers arrived at the scene and eventually placed the defendant under arrest after firing a stun gun at him nine times. The pickaxe was recovered from inside the Chevrolet Equinox that the defendant had taken.
While in an ambulance en route to the hospital to treat his injuries, the defendant's demeanor changed. He became visibly upset and remorseful. He told the State police trooper who was accompanying him that he had been having mental health issues and had been living in the parking lot of the treatment center where he had been receiving help. He also told the trooper that he was driving because he thought someone was trying to kill him.
In August 2018, a Middlesex County grand jury returned a twelve-count indictment charging the defendant with two counts of armed carjacking and multiple related charges.5 The defendant was held on bail from his arrest until his bail was reduced in December 2018, and he was released with the requirement that he wear a global positioning system monitoring bracelet. He remained out of custody until trial without issue. Once released, he participated in a nonresidential mental health program until the program closed in April 2019. At the time of trial, the defendant was on two different waiting lists to continue outpatient treatment, although he had not been able to access care due to long waiting lists at providers that accepted his insurance.
Before trial, the defendant was evaluated by two forensic psychologists. At the jury-waived trial on October 1, 2019, Dr. John Daignault testified for the defendant, and Dr. Andrea Buonaugurio testified on behalf of the Commonwealth. Both experts also submitted written reports to the court. Both experts opined that at the time of the incident, the defendant lacked criminal responsibility. At the conclusion of the trial, the judge found the defendant not guilty for lack of criminal responsibility.
Following that finding, the Commonwealth moved that the defendant be hospitalized for evaluation pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 16 (a ), and stated that depending on the results of that evaluation, it might move for a six-month commitment under § 16 (b ). In anticipation that the defendant would be found not criminally responsible, the Commonwealth's expert, Dr. Buonaugurio, had testified at trial on the issue of "hospitalization" under § 16 (a ).6 Buonaugurio testified that the defendant did not currently present an "imminent risk of harm" to himself or others.7 The judge did not explicitly discredit this conclusion, and it is unclear from the record exactly what he determined regarding the defendant's risk of future harm. He said, "[T]here's nothing in the record that gives me any comfort that this won't happen again," and "sooner or later, the combination of [a] lack of treatment and serious mental ... illness [could lead] to a ... horrendous situation with criminal conduct." The judge's findings appear to be based on Buonaugurio's testimony that the defendant was currently unmedicated and out of treatment, which were similar to the preconditions leading to his criminal conduct. The judge, over the defendant's objection, ordered that the defendant be hospitalized at a facility for forty days for observation and examination pursuant to § 16 (a ).
The defendant filed a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, requesting relief from confinement. While the petition was pending, he was released from hospitalization because the § 16 (a ) period had expired. The facility's forensic psychologist concluded that the defendant did not meet the requirements for involuntary commitment. In total, the defendant was confined for forty-two days.8
Following his discharge, the defendant filed a motion to modify the relief sought in his petition, maintaining that he had an ongoing interest in the merits. A single justice of this court denied the defendant's petition, stating that the judge's hospitalization order under § 16 (a ) did "not constitute an error of law or abuse of discretion." The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, and his appeal was entered in this court.
Discussion. 1. Review under G. L. c. 211, § 3. A single justice faced with a G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition first decides whether, in his or her discretion, to review the substantive merits of the petition, and then if so, issues a decision on the merits. Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 482 Mass. 22, 24, 28, 120 N.E.3d 707 (2019). Here, the single justice exercised his discretion to reach the merits, holding that the trial judge's hospitalization order pursuant to § 16 (a ) did not constitute an error of law or abuse of discretion. In reviewing the single justice's decision, we look to whether "the single justice abused his or her discretion or made a clear error of law" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 480 Mass. 683, 685, 108 N.E.3d 447 (2018). Because the defendant raises an issue of law, we review the single justice's decision de novo.9 See id. 2. Mootness. "Ordinarily, litigation is considered moot when the party who claimed to be aggrieved ceases to have a personal stake in its outcome." Matter of a Minor, 484 Mass. 295, 299, 148 N.E.3d 1182 (2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Dotson, 462 Mass. 96, 98, 966 N.E.2d 811 (2012). Because individuals temporarily committed under § 16 (a ) have a personal stake in litigating a wrongful temporary commitment, even after release from confinement, we conclude that appeals from an order pursuant to § 16 (a ) are not moot.
"When considering other statutory provisions that allow involuntary civil commitment, we have determined that the continuing stigma of a potentially wrongful commitment alone sufficed to defeat a claim of mootness." Matter of a Minor, 484 Mass. at 299, 148 N.E.3d 1182 (). See Pembroke Hosp. v. D.L., 482 Mass. 346, 351, 122 N.E.3d 1058 (2019) (); Matter of M.C., 481 Mass. 336, 343, 115 N.E.3d 546 (2019) (). A temporary commitment under § 16 (a ), like other civil commitments, carries with it a stigma. Thus, the defendant has a surviving interest in the matter.
Moreover, even absent the defendant's surviving interest, "it is well established that cases involving the confinement of mentally ill persons present classic examples of issues that are capable of repetition, yet evading review, which thus warrant appellate review even after the confinement ends" (quotations and citation omitted). Pembroke Hosp., 482 Mass. at 351, 122 N.E.3d 1058. Thus, we reach the merits of the case.
3. Due process. At the heart of this case is whether the defendant's involuntary hospitalization at a facility other than Bridgewater, as permitted by the first clause of G. L. c. 123, § 16 (a ), violates due process.10 There is no doubt that this clause raises due process concerns. "The right of an...
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