Pembroke Hosp. v. D.L.

• Decision Date: 23 May 2019
• Docket Number: SJC-12599
• Parties: PEMBROKE HOSPITAL v. D.L.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

482 Mass. 346

122 N.E.3d 1058

PEMBROKE HOSPITAL

v.D.L.

SJC-12599

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Plymouth..

Argued January 10, 2019

Decided May 23, 2019

Devorah Anne Borenstein, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the defendant.

Michael T. Porter, Boston, for the plaintiff.

Lester D. Blumberg, Special Assistant Attorney General, & Jeffrey Mackenzie, for Department of Mental Health, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Kathryn Rucker, Robert D. Fleischner, Nicole Holbrook, Phillip Kassel, Stanley Eichner, & Richard Glassman, for Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.

BUDD, J.

"The right of an individual to be free from physical restraint is a paradigmatic fundamental right." Matter of E.C., 479 Mass. 113, 119, 92 N.E.3d 724 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Knapp, 441 Mass. 157, 164, 804 N.E.2d 885 (2004). General Laws c. 123 governs involuntary civil commitment due to mental illness, and thus may curtail that freedom, but only in particular circumstances, and by way of specified procedures designed to protect due process rights. See Williams v. Steward Health Care Sys., LLC, 480 Mass. 286, 292, 103 N.E.3d 1192 (2018), citing O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975) (statute "written in recognition of psychiatric patients' fundamental right to liberty"). See also Matter of N.L., 476 Mass. 632, 636, 71 N.E.3d 476 (2017) (recent legislative reforms to G. L. c. 123 intended "to afford individuals more due process in civil commitment and medical treatment hearings than had been available previously" [citation omitted] ).

Here, D.L. was held involuntarily at Pembroke Hospital (Pembroke) on a temporary basis due to mental illness. Upon the denial of Pembroke's petition to extend D.L.'s confinement, Pembroke allegedly "discharged" D.L., but simultaneously detained and transported him without his permission to a second hospital for another mental health evaluation. This second evaluation ultimately led to an order for involuntary confinement for a period of up to six months. In this appeal we are called upon to interpret the meaning of the word "discharge" as that term is used in G. L. c. 123 to determine whether an individual may be said to have been "discharged" from a facility if his or her liberty has not been restored. We conclude that the answer is no.¹

1. Statutory framework for civil commitments. General Laws c. 123, § 12, which provides for the temporary emergency involuntary restraint and commitment of persons with mental illness in certain circumstances, is the "primary route" for the involuntary civil commitment of an individual. Guardianship of Doe, 391 Mass. 614, 621, 463 N.E.2d 339 (1984). Section 12 (a ) provides in pertinent part:

"[any mental health professional qualified under G. L. c. 112] who, after examining a person, has reason to believe that failure to hospitalize such person would create a likelihood of serious harm by reason of mental illness may restrain or authorize the restraint of such person and apply for the hospitalization of such person for a [three]-day period at [an authorized facility]."²

Once an individual is detained under § 12 (a ), he or she may be admitted for care and treatment if a designated physician of the facility "determines that failure to hospitalize such person would create a likelihood of serious harm by reason of mental illness." G. L. c. 123, § 12 (b ). Commitment pursuant to § 12 (b ) may last only three business days. G. L. c. 123, § 12 (a ) and (d ) ; Mass. R. Civ. P. 6 (a), 365 Mass. 747 (1974). By the end of that period of time, the individual must be discharged unless the facility files a petition for continued involuntary commitment pursuant to G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 - 8, or the person chooses to stay voluntarily. G. L. c. 123, § 12 (d ).

An individual who has been admitted involuntarily to a hospital pursuant to § 12 (b ) is entitled to legal representation and may request an emergency hearing in District Court if he or she has reason to believe that the admission is the result of an "abuse or misuse" of § 12. G. L. c. 123, § 12 (b ). See Newton-Wellesley Hosp. v. Magrini, 451 Mass. 777, 784 (2008) ( Magrini ).

A court order is required if a facility seeks to hold an individual involuntarily beyond the temporary emergency commitment allowed by § 12. The facility must file such a petition within the initial three-day period and must allege that "the failure to hospitalize would create a likelihood of serious harm by reason of mental illness." G. L. c. 123, § 7 (a ). The court shall order the commitment of an individual only if it finds that the individual is mentally ill, that his or her discharge would create an imminent likelihood of serious harm, and there is no less restrictive alternative to continued involuntary hospitalization. G. L. c. 123, § 8 (a ). Commonwealth v. Nassar, 380 Mass. 908, 917, 406 N.E.2d 1286 (1980). Such findings must be made beyond a reasonable doubt. Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v. Hagberg, 374 Mass. 271, 276, 372 N.E.2d 242 (1978). See Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667, 678 n.14, 611 N.E.2d 204 (1993).³

Once the petition is filed, the court is to schedule a hearing within five days, with certain exceptions, G. L. c. 123, § 7 (c ), after which the court ordinarily must render its decision on the petition within ten days, G. L. c. 123, § 8 (c ). While the outcome of the petition is pending, the facility may continue the involuntary commitment. G. L. c. 123, § 12 (d ). Periods of commitment under § 8 may last for periods of six to twelve months -- depending on the circumstances -- before additional judicial review is required. G. L. c. 123, § 8 (d ). Under G. L. c. 123, § 9 (b ), "[a]ny person" may also file a written application for a patient's discharge prior to the expiration of an order for commitment.

2. Background. The material facts are undisputed. On December 16, 2015, D.L. was committed involuntarily to Pembroke under § 12 (b ) based on suicidal statements that he had made. Pembroke timely filed a petition for continued involuntary commitment pursuant to G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 - 8, alleging that D.L. had not been "eating or drinking for several days," and he would die in the following one to two weeks without intervention.

At the hearing, a Pembroke doctor testified that D.L. had been unresponsive, minimally cooperative with staff, and selectively mute during his stay. The doctor further testified that D.L. had been refusing food and medication, and that he was drinking no more than a minimal amount of fluids. The doctor expressed concern that "if this continues [D.L.] will completely stop eating, drinking, and die." Finally, the doctor testified that, in his opinion, there was no less restrictive setting appropriate and available for D.L. On cross-examination, however, the doctor agreed that progress notes indicated that D.L. had been eating and drinking "when hungry." After hearing the testimony and arguments, the District Court judge denied the petition, finding that Pembroke had not met its burden.

In the hours following the denial of the petition to continue D.L.'s involuntary commitment, staff at Pembroke were unable to locate a family member willing to house D.L. Thereafter, Pembroke determined that, because D.L. was psychotic and his family would not take him in, D.L. needed "continued inpatient psychiatric care for his own safety in the context of worsening psychosis." Pembroke asserts that it then discharged D.L.⁴ but, without allowing him to leave the hospital, Pembroke arranged to have D.L. transported without his permission to South Shore Hospital (South Shore) for a second evaluation pursuant to § 12 (a ).⁵ After being examined by a different doctor at South Shore, D.L. was returned to Pembroke in the early morning of December 31, 2015, this time pursuant to South Shore's § 12 (a ) application. Once back at Pembroke, D.L. was rehospitalized involuntarily under § 12 (b ).

Pembroke thereafter timely filed a second petition for D.L.'s continued commitment pursuant to G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 - 8. D.L. moved to dismiss the petition, claiming that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to rule on it because of the "abuse or misuse" of the § 12 procedure that occurred prior to the filing of the petition. The judge denied the motion to dismiss and, after a hearing, ordered D.L.'s commitment to Pembroke for a period of up to six months.⁶ D.L. appealed from the denial of his motion to dismiss and from the District Court judge's order of commitment to the Appellate Division of the District Court Department, which affirmed the District Court judge's rulings and also found that there was no abuse of the involuntary commitment procedure under G. L. c. 123, § 12. We granted D.L.'s application for direct appellate review.

3. Discussion. Pembroke does not dispute that it had no authority to hold D.L. after its first petition to continue D.L.'s involuntary confinement was denied. See Thompson v. Commonwealth, 386 Mass. 811, 816, 438 N.E.2d 33 (1982) ("once the conditions justifying confinement cease to exist, the State's power to confine terminates, and the person is entitled to be released"). See also G. L. c. 123, § 6 (a ).⁷ Pembroke argues, however, that it followed proper procedure by discharging D.L. and simultaneously arranging for his involuntary transportation to and psychiatric examination by South Shore pursuant to § 12.

D.L. contends that Pembroke did not discharge him within the meaning of G. L. c. 123, and that the continued restraint was an "abuse or misuse" of § 12. Thus, he argues, that everything that took place subsequently, including the second petition for continued confinement, was tainted, and therefore, his motion to dismiss the petition was improperly denied. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. See Meikle v. Nurse, 474 Mass. 207,...