Garcia v. Lee
Decision Date | 17 May 2018 |
Docket Number | No. 11-CV-1803 (KMK),11-CV-1803 (KMK) |
Parties | JOSE GARCIA, Petitioner, v. WILLIAMS LEE, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Appearances:
Jose Garcia
Stormville, NY
Andrew R. Kass, Esq.
Orange County Attorney's Office
Goshen, NY
Jose Garcia ("Petitioner"), proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his April 14, 2005, conviction in New York State Supreme Court, Orange County, for criminal sale of a controlled substance in violation of New York law (the "Petition"). (See Pet. For Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Pet.") (Dkt. No. 1).) The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction on October 6, 2009. People v. Garcia, 885 N.Y.S.2d 771 (App. Div. 2009). The New York Court of Appeals denied Petitioner leave to appeal on March 2, 2010. People v. Garcia, 925 N.E.2d 938 (N.Y. 2010). Respondent filed a Memorandum of Law opposing the Petition on June 14, 2011. Petitioner filed a Traverse Declaration and Reply Supplement on September 19, 2011. 1
In a Report and Recommendation ("R&R"), Magistrate Judge Paul E. Davison ("Judge Davison") recommended that the Petition be denied. (See Report & Recommendation ("R&R") 2 (Dkt. No. 41).) Petitioner has objections to the R&R. (See Pet'r's Obj's to R&R ("Obj's") (Dkt. No. 44).) Respondent has not responded to the objections. After a review of the R&R and Petitioner's objections, the Court adopts the result recommended in the R&R and denies the Petition.
A district court reviewing a report and recommendation addressing a dispositive motion "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), a party may submit objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. The objections must be "specific" and "written," Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2), and must be made "[w]ithin 14 days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition," id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), plus an additional three days when service is made pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2)(C)-(F), see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d), for a total of seventeen days, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(2).
Where a party submits timely objections to a report and recommendation, as Petitioner has done here, the Court reviews de novo the parts of the report and recommendation to which the party objected. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). The district court "may adopt those portions of the . . . report [and recommendation] to which no 'specific written objection' is made, as long as the factual and legal bases supporting the findings and conclusions set forth in those sections are not clearly erroneous or contrary to law." Eisenberg v. New England Motor Freight, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 224, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2)).
Finally, pleadings submitted by pro se litigants are held to a less strict standard than those drafted by attorneys. See Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008) . Because Petitioner is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his pleadings "to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." See Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (italics and internal quotation marks omitted). However, this "does not exempt a [pro se litigant] from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983).
Petitions for a writ of habeas corpus are governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which provides that a state prisoner may seek habeas corpus relief in federal court "on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). "The writ may not issue for any claim adjudicated on the merits by a state court unless the state court's decision was 'contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,' or was 'based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.'" Epps v. Poole, 687 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2)). In this context, "it is the habeas applicant's burden to show that the state court applied [federal law] to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per curiam); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) ().
A decision is "contrary to" clearly established Federal law if (1) "the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases," or (2) "the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A decision is "an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law" if a state court "correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case." Id. at 407-08 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. ( ); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007) ().
"Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102-03 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, a federal court must deny a habeas petition in some circumstances even if the court would have reached a conclusion different than the one reached by the state court, because "even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. at 102; see also Cullen, 563 U.S. at 202-03 (); Hawthorne v. Schneiderman, 695 F.3d 192, 197 (2d Cir. 2012) .
Additionally, under AEDPA, the factual findings of state courts are presumed to be correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Nelson v. Walker, 121 F.3d 828, 833 (2d Cir. 1997) . The petitioner must rebut this presumption by "clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217, 233 (2d Cir. 2003) (same).
Finally, only Federal law claims are cognizable in habeas proceedings. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) ().
"Habeas review is an extraordinary remedy," Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998), and a petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus must comply with the strict requirements of AEDPA, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Before the Court reviews the merits of a habeas corpus petition, the Court must determine whether Petitioner complied with the procedural requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244 and 2254.
AEDPA imposes upon a petitioner seeking federal habeas relief a one-year statute of...
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