Hawthorne v. Schneiderman

• Decision Date: 20 August 2012
• Docket Number: Docket No. 10–4324–pr.
• Parties: Rudolph HAWTHORNE, Petitioner–Appellant, v. Eric T. SCHNEIDERMAN, Respondent–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

695 F.3d 192

Rudolph HAWTHORNE, Petitioner–Appellant,

v.Eric T. SCHNEIDERMAN,¹ Respondent–Appellee.

Docket No. 10–4324–pr.

United States Court of Appeals,Second Circuit.

Argued: June 13, 2012.

Decided: Aug. 20, 2012.

Julia Pamela Heit, New York, NY, for Petitioner–Appellant Rudolph Hawthorne.

Daniel Bresnahan, Assistant District Attorney (John M. Castellano, on the brief), Kew Gardens, NY, for Richard A. Brown, Queens County District Attorney, for Respondent–Appellee Eric T. Schneiderman.

Before: CALABRESI, CABRANES, and LOHIER, Circuit Judges.

Judge CALABRESI concurs in a separate opinion.

PER CURIAM:

Petitioner-appellant Rudolph Hawthorne appeals from a December 9, 2010 judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Nina Gershon, Judge ) denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Because the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court, Second Department, issued a reasonable decision on the merits of petitioner's claim, to which we are required to defer, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.

This appeal arises out of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Rudolph Hawthorne, who at the time was proceeding pro se.² Hawthorne is incarcerated pursuant to a state court judgment convicting him, after a jury trial, of criminal possession of a weapon and assault on one Milton Tennessee. ³ The facts elicited at trial demonstrated that, on or about October 31, 2000, Tennessee and another man, Kelvin Armstead, were attacked by a man wielding a hammer. Armstead, who sustained approximately ten blows, died of his wounds; Tennessee, who sustained only one to two blows and survived the attack with severe brain damage, is paralyzed on his right side and unable to speak.

On November 2, 2000, the day after the crime was discovered, Hawthorne was briefly interviewed in connection with the attack by Detective Edgecombe, the lead investigator on the case. The interview took place at the local police precinct, but Hawthorne was not placed in custody. On November 13, he voluntarily returned to the precinct at approximately 1:45 p.m. to conduct a supplemental interview. After several hours of interrogation, Hawthorne confessed to another investigator, Detective Bardin, that he had committed the attacks on Tennessee and Armstead.

Although Hawthorne had not been read his Miranda⁴ rights earlier in the interview, Bardin testified that, immediately after Hawthorne began to implicate himself in the crime, Bardin stopped the interview and read Hawthorne his Miranda rights. Hawthorne signed a waiver of his Miranda rights at 8:45 p.m. on November 13, 2000, and thereafter dictated a written confession to Detective Bardin.⁵ The confession, signed by Hawthorne at 9:45 p.m. that night, was the only evidence connecting Hawthorne to the crime.

After exhausting his state court appeals, Hawthorne filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus on September 27, 2007, alleging that his confession was the result of a violation of his Miranda rights; that his counsel was ineffective at a suppression hearing regarding that confession; and that the prosecutor in his case had engaged in misconduct. The petition was referred to Magistrate Judge Cheryl L. Pollak, who on July 22, 2009, in a thorough and detailed Report and Recommendation (the “Report”), recommended denial of the petition in full. As relevant here, the Report held that petitioner's Miranda claim had not been exhausted in the state courts and that, because petitioner had already taken his permitted direct state appeal, the claim was also procedurally defaulted. Hawthorne v. Spitzer, No. 07–cv–4128, 2009 WL 6895978, at *23–24 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2009).

On September 19, 2010, Judge Gershon adopted the Report in its entirety and denied the petition for habeas corpus. In pertinent part, she held that petitioner had not established that his counsel had rendered ineffective assistance at a pre-trial suppression hearing conducted pursuant to People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838, 204 N.E.2d 179 (1965) (the “Huntley hearing,” or the “hearing”).⁶Hawthorne v. Spitzer, No. 07–cv–4128, 2010 WL 3803861, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2010). Judgment was entered on December 9, 2010.

We granted a Certificate of Appealability on July 5, 2011 on the following issues: (1) whether petitioner had established prejudice for the procedural default of his claim that his Miranda rights were violated; and (2) whether petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel during the Huntley hearing, where (i) counsel failed to cross-examine either of the detectives who interrogated petitioner on the day he confessed to the crime, and (ii) counsel allegedly refused to permit petitioner to testify on his own behalf.⁷

DISCUSSION

We review a district court's denial of a writ of habeas corpus de novo, and review any factual findings for clear error. Drake v. Portuondo, 553 F.3d 230, 239 (2d Cir.2009). As a result of our de novo review, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner argues that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel when his Huntley counsel failed to cross-examine either Detective Edgecombe or Detective Bardin, the two detectives who (among others) interrogated him on November 13, 2000. In order to determine whether a federal habeas petitioner was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel, courts follow the rule set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984):

A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction ... has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction ... resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.

Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

The petitioner argued in the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court that he had been prejudiced by Huntley counsel's failure to examine the detectives.⁸ Br. of Appellant at 39, People v. Hawthorne, 35 A.D.3d 499, 826 N.Y.S.2d 147 (2d Dep't 2006) (No. 03–5646), leave to appeal denied, 8 N.Y.3d 946, 836 N.Y.S.2d 557, 868 N.E.2d 240 (2007). The Appellate Division, while vacating another of petitioner's convictions, summarily denied relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Hawthorne, 35 A.D.3d at 502, 826 N.Y.S.2d 147 (holding that “[t]he defendant's remaining contentions are without merit”).

We are required to defer to a state court's adjudication of an issue on the merits, unless the state court's decision is “contrary to, or involve[s] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law ... [or is] based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “For the purposes of AEDPA deference, a state court ‘adjudicate[s]’ a state prisoner's ... claim on the merits when it (1) disposes of the claim ‘on the merits,’ and (2) reduces its disposition to judgment. When a state court does so, a federal habeas court must defer ... to the state court's decision.” Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 312 (2d Cir.2001)) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)) (alteration in the original). A summary disposition constitutes a disposition “on the merits.” Harrington v. Richter, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 770, 784–85, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011).

AEDPA unquestionably requires deference to a state court's “summary disposition” of an appeal. See id. at 784. (“Where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner's burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.”). Where, as here, a state appellate court decides an issue of federal law in a summary fashion, see Hawthorne, 35 A.D.3d at 502, 826 N.Y.S.2d 147, we exercise AEDPA deference by asking, first, “what arguments or theories ... could have supported” the decision of the state court, and second, “whether it is possible fair-minded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 786. As explained below, the decision of the Appellate Division merits such deference.

The evidence presented at trial was available to the Appellate Division when it determined petitioner's Strickland claim. Although petitioner's Huntley counsel did not cross-examine either detective at the Huntley hearing regarding the voluntariness of petitioner's confession, trial counsel conducted a thorough cross-examination of both detectives before the jury. Detective Edgecombe testified, on cross-examination, that neither he nor any other detectivehad threatened or otherwise coerced petitioner during the first several hours of interrogation. Detective Bardin testified similarly on direct and cross-examination. It would not be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law for the Appellate Division to have determined that the evidence elicited by the defendant at trial would likewise have been elicited by competent counsel at the Huntley hearing, and that that evidence did not merit suppression of the confession.⁹

We determine that the decision of the Appellate Division was not “contrary to,” nor did it involve “an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Although we might not have...