Garcia v. State

• Decision Date: 12 May 1994
• Docket Number: No. 13-92-679-CR,13-92-679-CR
• Citation: 877 S.W.2d 809
• Parties: Alfonso GARCIA, A/K/A Alonzo Ramirez Garcia, A/K/A Alonzo Garcia, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 809

877 S.W.2d 809

Alfonso GARCIA, A/K/A Alonzo Ramirez Garcia, A/K/A Alonzo Garcia, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 13-92-679-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas,

Corpus Christi.

May 12, 1994.

Petitions for Discretionary Review Refused Oct. 5,

1994.SY2Defendant was convicted in the 139th District Court,

Hildalgo County, Walter Dunham, J., of murder, and he

appealed. The Court of Appeals, Seerden, C.J., held that:

(1) statute permitting civil litigants to recuse assigned

former judges automatically but denying criminal litigants

that same power did not violate equal protection; (2) trial

court's failure to explicitly inform defendant that he was

charged with murder when defendant pled guilty did not make

defendant's guilty plea involuntary; (3) trial court

properly admonished defendant concerning possibility of

deportation when defendant pled guilty; and (4) evidence

did not raise voluntary manslaughter issue, so as to require

trial court to sua sponte withdraw defendant's guilty plea.

Floyd D. Holder, Law Firm of Floyd Holder, Sam Medina, Lubbock, for appellant.

Theodore C. Hake, Asst. Crim. Dist. Atty., Rene Guerra, Dist. & County Atty., Hildago County Courthouse, Edinburg, Cynthia A. Morales, Asst. Crim. Dist. Atty., Nueces County Courthouse, Corpus Christi, for appellee.

Before SEERDEN, C.J., and GILBERTO HINOJOSA, and FEDERICO G. HINOJOSA, Jr., JJ.

OPINION

SEERDEN, Chief Justice.

Appellant pled guilty before a jury to murdering Eluterio Villarreal, III, and the jury assessed his punishment at 80 years in prison. We affirm.

In his first point of error, appellant contends that Tex.Gov't Code Ann. § 74.053(b) (Vernon Supp.1994) violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This section permits civil litigants to recuse assigned former judges automatically but denies criminal litigants the same power. ¹ Appellant asserts that it is improper to treat criminal and civil defendants differently.

The Equal Protection clause allows the legislature considerable leeway to enact legislation that may appear to affect similarly situated people differently. Clark v. State, 665 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). Absent an interference with the exercise of a fundamental right or a burden on a suspect class, classifications will not be set aside on equal protection grounds if they are rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id. Alternatively stated, the test is whether the challenged classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to achievement of a valid state objective. Id. at 481.

In Lanford v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 847 S.W.2d 581, 587 (Tex.Crim.App.1993), the Court of Criminal Appeals discussed policy reasons for the legislature's decision to grant only civil litigants the right to peremptorily challenge former judges. The Court mentioned that giving such power to the State, a party in all criminal prosecutions, would give the State an inordinate power of influence over former judges. Id. The Court also noticed that giving the power to criminal litigants would give prosecutors and defense attorneys the right to receive an automatic continuance any time a former judge presided in a case, a situation that could result in defendants spending more time in already overcrowded jails. Id.

Although Lanford did not involve an equal protection challenge to § 74.053, the Court's analysis is helpful in assessing whether the legislature's decision to treat civil and criminal litigants differently has a rational basis. Appellant argues that while there may be a reason to treat the State differently from civil plaintiffs, there is no rational basis for treating criminal defendants differently from civil defendants. He argues that the criminal defendant, unlike the State, is not a party to every criminal case and has no more power of influence over the judge than a civil defendant. He further argues that any delay resulting from a continuance caused by the defendant's peremptory challenge to the judge is attributable to the accused, not the State, and therefore any resulting delay does not serve as a rational basis for section 74.053.

We disagree with appellant's arguments. While society does not have a personal "speedy trial right" with respect to a particular defendant, society does have a legitimate interest in disposing of its criminal prosecutions in a timely manner. Therefore, to the extent the absence of automatic continuances promotes the faster disposition of criminal cases, section 74.053 is rational. Lanford also recognized the possibility that automatic continuances could place additional burdens on overcrowded jails. Society has a legitimate interest in controlling its jail population. The legislature's decision to deny criminal defendants an automatic continuance is not wholly irrelevant to relieving jail overcrowding. Whether such a policy is a wise or an efficient way to achieve that interest is not subject to our review.

In addition, the legislature did not act irrationally when it chose to eliminate the State's potential power of influence over assigned judges by making the act inapplicable to criminal cases in general. Giving a criminal defendant the power to disqualify the judge while not giving such power to the State would have created a difference in position for the parties to a criminal action. It is rational to keep the parties to a criminal action on an equal footing by denying the power of peremptory challenge to both sides. We find no equal protection violation. Appellant's first point of error is overruled.

By point two, appellant asserts the record fails to show that he knowingly pled guilty to murder instead of voluntary manslaughter. He argues that a plea to "intentionally or knowingly causing the death of another" could amount to a plea to either offense. He then recounts the evidence introduced before the jury and argues that it raises inferences which support voluntary manslaughter. He finally concludes that the record must affirmatively show he understood the distinction between the offenses and, that as the record does not so affirmatively show, the plea was involuntary.

It is axiomatic that to be valid, a plea must be voluntary. To determine the voluntariness of a plea, a reviewing court must examine the record as a whole, but once a defendant has pled guilty and attests to the voluntary nature of the plea, a heavy burden is placed on him at a subsequent hearing to show a lack of voluntariness. Hayden v. State, 818 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1991, no pet.); Sawyer v. State, 778 S.W.2d 541, 543 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1989, pet. ref'd). Other than the assertions in his appellate brief that the plea might be involuntary, appellant has not contested the voluntariness of his plea. He never contended in the trial court that his plea was entered involuntarily. He presented no evidence to show that he misunderstood the consequences of his plea, relied upon false information, or relied on inadequate legal advice when he entered his plea.

Appellant argues, and the record supports his contention, that the trial court never explicitly informed appellant that he was charged with murder. Instead, the prosecutor read the indictment to appellant, and he pled guilty. The trial court then asked appellant whether he had discussed the matter with his attorney. Appellant responded, "Yes, sir." Appellant then answered "yes" to a series of questions asked by the trial judge concerning whether he understood what he was doing. The trial court correctly informed appellant on the punishment range for a first degree felony. Appellant indicated his understanding. The trial court inquired about whether anyone had forced appellant to plead, whether he was threatened, or whether anyone had promised appellant anything. Appellant answered "no" to all these questions. Throughout the admonishments, the trial court never mentioned that the offense was "murder."

In Logan v. State, 506 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Tex.Crim.App.1974), the Court stated that the better practice would be to specifically name the offense in addition to reading the indictment. The Logan Court, however, found no error in light of the circumstances that the defendant was represented by counsel and that the indictment's allegations were read. The same finding is appropriate here. Appellant was represented by counsel, and the indictment allegations were read. In addition, the trial court correctly admonished appellant on the punishment range. We find no error and overrule point two.

Appellant next contends the record fails to show the trial court properly admonished him concerning the waiver of his rights against self-incrimination, to trial by jury, and to confront the witnesses. Appellant's argument is premised on the assumption that a defendant pleading guilty to a jury waives his right to trial by jury. This premise is incorrect. Any plea before a jury has always been considered to be a jury trial. Williams v. State, 674 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). When pleading guilty before a jury, the defendant does not waive his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. Id. There is no requirement that a defendant be informed of his right against self-incrimination at trial upon a plea of guilty. Id. at 320. See Vasquez v. State, 522 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex.Crim.App.1975); Johnson v. State, 501 S.W.2d 306 (Tex.Crim.App.1973); Sims v. State, 783 S.W.2d 786, 789 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no pet.). Point three is overruled.

In point four, appellant contends that the trial court did not properly admonish him concerning the possibility of deportation. Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 26.13(a)(4) (Vernon 1989). A complete failure to admonish regarding deportation is reversible error. Morales v. State, 872 S.W.2d 753 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (not yet reported); Ex parte Cervantes, 762 S.W.2d 577, 578 (Tex.1988). The record shows the following exchange regarding deportation:

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