Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 11 July 1984
• Docket Number: No. 68952,68952
• Parties: Willie Ray WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 315

674 S.W.2d 315

Willie Ray WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 68952.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas,

En Banc.

July 11, 1984.

Ronald G. Mock, Houston (court appointed on appeal), for appellant; Catherine E. Greene and Janet Seymour Morrow, Houston, of counsel on appeal.

John B. Holmes, Jr., Dist. Atty., Alvin M. Titus and Robert N. Burdette, Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

Before the court en banc.

OPINION

W.C. DAVIS, Judge.

Appellant was indicted for capital murder. He pled guilty before a jury. The State put on evidence, and the jury then rendered an instructed verdict of guilty. The jury then heard evidence at the punishment stage of trial and answered the three special issues affirmatively. In accordance with Art. 37.071(e), V.A.C.C.P. the court assessed punishment at death.

On October 13, 1980 appellant and three other persons were riding around in a car looking at various places of business in Houston in which they might commit a robbery. They stopped behind a store called Joseph's Deli. Only appellant and Joseph Nichols got out of the car; they walked into the store and went to the back. Appellant took a quart of beer from the cooler; he and Nichols then walked to the front of the store and stood in front of the cash register. Both men pulled guns on Claude Shaffer, the man behind the counter. Shaffer reached for and grabbed a pistol which he pointed at appellant. Nichols fired a shot at Shaffer and Shaffer "went down" in what appellant described as a squatting position. Nichols and appellant turned and started to go out the door. Appellant still had his weapon pointed back toward Shaffer, whom he thought had not been hit. Nichols went out the door, but appellant turned back toward the counter and saw Shaffer squatting with his back to appellant. Appellant shot Shaffer in the back, killing him, ran out of the store, and then came back inside. He testified that he returned to see whether he had hit the deceased. He removed a box which contained money from behind the counter. Then he ran out of the store.

A witness testified that she was in the store that morning when appellant and Nichols came into the store. She left the store, and a few minutes later heard a gunshot and saw appellant run out of the store carrying a box.

Appellant's confession was introduced into evidence, along with testimony that appellant had been involved in three robberies prior to the instant one and had also been involved in two robberies immediately afterward.

Appellant asserts eight grounds of error. Four of those grounds concern his plea of guilty before the jury. First, appellant claims that a guilty plea to a jury in a capital case is equivalent to a waiver of trial by jury, which is forbidden by Art. 1.14, V.A.C.C.P. See also Arts. 1.13 and 1.15, V.A.C.C.P.

Art. 1.14 states:

The defendant in a criminal prosecution for any offense may waive any rights secured him by law except the right of trial by jury in a capital felony case.

Art. 1.14 evolved from earlier statutes that mandated that a defendant could not waive his right to trial by jury in any felony case. He could plead guilty but he had to do so before a jury. This was considered a jury trial. See Art. 11, V.A.C.C.P. (1925). In 1931 Art. 11 was amended to allow waiver of trial by jury in a felony case only when a defendant pled guilty to the felony. Acts 1931, 42nd Leg., p. 65, ch. 43, Sec. 2. In 1965 the statute was revised to read:

The defendant in a criminal prosecution for any offense may waive any rights secured him by law except the right of trial by jury in a capital felony case in which the State has made known in open court in writing at least 15 days prior to trial that it will seek the death penalty. No case in which the State seeks the death penalty shall be tried until 15 days after such notice is given. When the State makes known to the court in writing in open court that it will not seek the death penalty in a capital case, the defendant may enter a plea of guilty before the court and waive trial by jury as provided in Article 1.13, and in such case under no circumstances may the death penalty be imposed.

An amendment in 1967 inserted "nolo contendere, or not guilty" in the last sentence following "enter a plea of guilty." In 1973 Art. 1.14 was changed to read, as it does today, that a defendant may waive any rights secured him by law except the right of trial by jury in a capital felony case. Defendants could now plead not guilty in a trial before the court rather than pleading not guilty only to a jury.

Art. 26.14, V.A.C.C.P. is a companion provision to Art. 1.14. Prior to 1931 a defendant could not waive trial by jury in a felony case under Art. 11, predecessor to Art. 1.14, whether he pled guilty or not guilty. Art. 502, V.A.C.C.P. (1925), the predecessor to Art. 26.14 stated:

Where a defendant in a case of felony persists in pleading guilty, if the punishment is not absolutely fixed by law, a jury shall be impaneled to assess the punishment, and evidence submitted to enable them to decide thereupon.

This plea of guilty required by prior law to be taken before a jury has always been considered a jury trial. Miller v. State, 412 S.W.2d 650 (Tex.Cr.App.1967); see Art. 11 (1925) and Art. 1.14.

In 1965 Art. 26.14 was amended to read as it does today;

Where a defendant in a case of felony persists in pleading guilty or in entering a plea of nolo contendere, if the punishment is not absolutely fixed by law, a jury shall be impaneled to assess the punishment and evidence may be heard to enable them to decide thereupon, unless the defendant in accordance with Arts. 1.13 or 37.07 shall have waived his right to trial by jury. [Emphasis added]

The emphasized portion was the only change in the statute. Art. 1.13 is entitled "Waiver of trial by jury" and discusses pleas before the court. Clearly any plea before a jury has always been considered to be a jury trial.

Case law and Art. 26.14 itself, particularly when read in light of the added language, have consistently held that a plea of guilty before a jury is a trial by jury and does not constitute waiver of trial by jury. Miller, supra; Beard v. State, 146 Tex.Cr.R. 96, 171 S.W.2d 869 (Tex.Cr.App.1943); Rocha v. State, 148 Tex.Cr.R. 237, 186 S.W.2d 267 (Tex.Cr.App.1945).

As appellant points out, the plea of guilty before a jury essentially becomes a trial on punishment since entry of a plea of guilty before a jury establishes a defendant's guilt except where evidence demonstrates his innocence. Anderson v. State, 118 Tex.Cr.R. 194, 42 S.W.2d 1012 (1931); Vance v. State, 122 Tex.Cr.R. 157, 54 S.W.2d 118 (1932): Darden v. State, 430 S.W.2d 494 (Tex.Cr.App.1968). The introduction of evidence is not to determine guilt but is to enable the jury to intelligently exercise discretion in determining the appropriate punishment. Grounds v. State, 140 Tex.Cr.R. 209, 144 S.W.2d 276 (1940); Darden, supra.

Appellant acknowledges that "the statutory history does not demonstrate that the proscription against jury waiver in Art. 1.14, in any of its stages, has ever prevented a defendant from pleading guilty to a jury." In Beard, supra, and Rocha, supra, the defendants pled guilty before a jury and were assessed the death penalty. However, appellant contends that "the 1973 changes governing the classification of capital crimes and the procedural scheme for implementing the death penalty call for a new construction of the meaning of 'trial by jury' under Article 1.14." Specifically, appellant contends that trial by jury under Art. 1.14 does not permit a defendant to plead guilty before a jury because this plea constitutes, in effect, a waiver of jury trial.

Appellant reasons that the capital murder statute and Art. 37.071, V.A.C.C.P. are formulated only for bifurcated trials and that past decisions uniformly hold that pleas of guilty to the jury are not bifurcated trials. Ring v. State, 450 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Basaldua v. State, 481 S.W.2d 851 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). Appellant contends that the logical extension of this reasoning is that, because Art. 37.071 authorizes only bifurcated capital cases and a guilty plea is not bifurcated, a defendant may not plead guilty in a capital case.

Art. 37.07 has been thought to apply only to bifurcated trials and only to pleas of not guilty before a jury. Eads v. State, 598 S.W.2d 304 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Basaldua, supra. ¹ Art. 37.071 is a mandatory procedure in a capital case once a finding of guilt is had, whether that be by guilty plea to a jury or by a not guilty plea to a jury. ²

"(I)n the wake of Furman the legislature has adopted a 'category of cases' view and has adopted a mandatory procedure to be followed in capital cases where the extreme penalties of death or life imprisonment are involved...." Batten v. State, 533 S.W.2d 788 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). The Texas capital murder sentencing scheme requires that a jury determine punishment, regardless of the plea. See Bullard v. State, 548 S.W.2d 13, 18 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). Art. 26.14 also applies in the present case and must be read in conjunction with Art. 37.071 since this is a capital case with two possible punishments. Consistent with our prior decisions we hold that a plea of guilty before a jury in a capital case constitutes trial by jury. Morin v. State, --- S.W.2d ----, No. 69,028 (delivered September 14, 1983); Williams v. State, 522 S.W.2d 483 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Rojas v. State, 404 S.W.2d 30 (Tex.Cr.App.1966). No waiver of jury trial is involved in the present case.

Additionally, we note that the procedure employed in this case has the indicia of a bifurcated trial. Appellant pled guilty before the jury. The State presented evidence and the trial court submitted a charge to the jury instructing them to find appellant guilty. After the jury signed the verdict finding appellant guilty a separate hearing was held at...