Gardner v. North Little Rock Special School District

• Citation: 257 S.W. 73,161 Ark. 466
• Decision Date: 10 December 1923
• Docket Number: 30
• Parties: GARDNER v. NORTH LITTLE ROCK SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT
• Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas

257 S.W. 73

161 Ark. 466

GARDNER v. NORTH LITTLE ROCK SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT

No. 30

Supreme Court of Arkansas

December 10, 1923

Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, Second Division; R. M. Mann Judge; reversed.

Judgment in favour of plaintiff.

Mehaffy Donham & Mehaffy, for appellant.

The plaintiff was discharged without cause. 147 Ark. 178; 152 Ark. 215; Ottinger v. School District, 157 Ark. 82.

Coleman Robinson & House, for appellee.

The finding of the trial court will not be disturbed where there is any evidence to support it. 147 Ark. 178. The contract between plaintiff and the board was void. C. & M. Dig., § 9030.

MCCULLOCH C. J. HART, J., dissenting.

OPINION

MCCULLOCH, C. J.

The plaintiff, E. B. Gardner, is by profession engaged in educational work, and on May 17, 1919, the defendant, North Little Rock Special School District, entered into a written contract with him whereby he was employed as superintendent of schools in said district for a period of two calendar years beginning on July 1, 1919, at a stated salary, payable at the end of each month. Plaintiff entered upon the discharge of his duties on the date specified in the contract for the commencement of his term of employment, and continued in the service until he was discharged by a resolution of the board of directors of the district, adopted June 21, 1920. The discharge was without plaintiff's consent, and he instituted this action, after the expiration of his term, to recover the amount of his salary, alleging that his discharge was wrongful and without fault on his part, and that he had been unable to obtain other employment during the remainder of the term of his contract with defendant.

The defendant in its answer tendered several defenses, one a denial that the district had made a valid contract with plaintiff for a term of two years; another that, at the time of the execution of the contract, there were not available funds in the district to pay the salary of plaintiff, together with other school expenses, during the full period covered by the contract, and that for that reason the contract was void under the statutes of this State; and finally, on the ground that the discharge of plaintiff was not wrongful for the reason that he was "guilty of insubordination; that he refused to work in harmony with the board; that, instead of cooperating with the board and accepting its policies, plaintiff tried to dominate and control the board, and, to that end, devoted his efforts in stirring up strife among the patrons of the school and inciting the teachers against the board, and in political activities with a view to electing members of the board who would agree with him, with the result that the efficient conduct of the schools was impossible under plaintiff as superintendent, and plaintiff, by such conduct, became unfit to be superintendent and his influence damaging and detrimental to the interests of the schools."

The case was tried, by consent, before the court sitting as a jury, and the finding was in favor of the defendant.

The first question which presents itself is whether or not the directors of the district were empowered to enter into a contract with a school superintendent for a term of more than one year. This question was not expressly raised in the proceedings, but the denial of the execution of the contract itself is sufficient to raise the question of the legal power of the district to enter into the contract.

The statute governing single school districts, and conferring authority upon the directors of such districts in the management and control of school affairs, authorizes the directors to "employ a superintendent of the schools, who may also be principal of any graded or high school that said board may establish." Crawford & Moses' Digest, § 8942. It will be noted that there is nowhere found in the statute any express restriction upon the authority of the district in employing a superintendent, so far as concerns the length of the term. If any such restriction exists, it must therefore be an implied one. In the case of Gates v. School District, 53 Ark. 468, 14 S.W. 656, this court held that the statute just referred to, conferring authority upon the board of directors to employ a superintendent of schools, does not limit the authority to an employment during the term of office of such directors, and that the statute does not forbid the board to make a contract with the superintendent for a term beginning after some members of the board go out of office. The question of employment for a longer term than one year was not involved in that case, but the term fixed by the employment did, in fact, extend beyond the term of office of some of the directors then in office, and the reasoning of the court leads inevitably to the conclusion that the statute does not restrict the power of the board to the employment of a superintendent for a single year. In disposing of the question involved, the court said:

"Public interest might suffer from unwise contracts covering an extended term in future; they might suffer equally for want of power to make a contract when a good opportunity offered. But with the question of policy we have no concern, except in so far as it aids in ascertaining legislative intent. There is nothing in the act that implies that the Legislature intended either more or less than it said. We therefore conclude that the act furnishes an accurate expression of legislative intent, and that there is no law that forbids the school board to make a contract for a superintendent for a term beginning after some members of the board go out of office."

We are of the opinion that the authorities sustain the view that the statute authorizing such an employment by a board of school directors or trustees, without any restrictions as to the length of term of the employment and duration of the contract, is not limited to the period of one year, nor to such a time as is within the term of office of all the members of the board at that time.

In a case note to Manley v. Scott, 108 Minn. 142, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 652, the prevailing rule on this subject is stated as follows:

"Where there is no limit placed on the exercise of the power conferred upon school trustees or boards to contract with and employ teachers, a contract by such trustee or board employing a teacher for a term to commence or to continue after the expiration of the term of such trustee or board, is valid and binding upon their successors in office."

Cases are there cited to sustain the text, and we think the rule is sound.

The same doctrine is stated in 24 R. C. L., p. 579, as follows:

"In the absence of an express or implied statutory limitation, a school board may enter into a contract to employ a teacher or any proper officer for a term extending beyond that of the board itself, and such contract, if made in good faith and without fraudulent collusion, binds the succeeding board. It has even been held that, under proper circumstances, a board may contract for the services of an employee to commence at a time subsequent to the end of the term of one or more of their number and subsequent to the reorganization of the board as a whole, or even subsequent to the terms of the board as a whole. The fact that the purpose of the contract is to forestall the action of the succeeding board may not, of itself, render the contract void. But a hiring for an unusual time is strong evidence of fraud and collusion, which, if present, would invalidate the contract."

The proper rule seems to be that, unless the statute prescribes a time limit upon the duration of such a contract, the board may make a contract for a reasonable length of time, and the reasonableness of the contract is to be determined by all the circumstances. The mere fact that there are partial changes in the personnel of the board during the life of the contract does not of itself render it unreasonable in duration of time. Whether or not a contract extending beyond the incumbency of all of the members of the board then in office would be unreasonable we need not determine, for no such state of facts exists with respect to the contract now before us. In the present case the contract was made immediately before the school election in May, 1919, and the term extended up to July 1, 1921. The terms of two of the directors then in office expired with the election in May, but if the contract with plaintiff had been for only one year, the board, as constituted prior to the school election in 1920, which was a majority as it existed when this contract was made, could have made a new contract for another year, so the making of this contract did not extend the employment beyond the terms of even a majority of the members of the board, and, under the decision in the Gates case, supra, the contract was valid. The fact that it was within the power of a majority of the board who would remain in office past the time when the second year of the term might be contracted for affords a reason, if no other existed, for holding that the contract was not unreasonable. Our conclusion is that the contract was valid, and that there was no defense on that ground.

It has been suggested that the execution of the contract immediately before the school election in 1919 warrants the inference that there was fraud and collusion between the plaintiff and the board of directors, but we do not think that that circumstance alone shows any collusion. The board as it then existed had the right to act within its statutory powers, even though such action anticipated the action of members of the board who were to be elected at the approaching election.

It is next contended that the employment for more than one year was in violation of ...