Gardner v. Vanlandingham

Decision Date14 March 1934
Docket NumberNo. 31836.,31836.
PartiesVIRGINIA L. GARDNER, Administratrix, With the Will Annexed of the Estate of FRANK HAMMOND RIXEY, Appellant, v. JAMES M. VANLANDINGHAM, BELLE SLAUGHTER, IDA BARNES and JOE T. DOHERTY, Executor Under the Will and Testament of Lovie Vanlandingham and MARY W. VANLANDINGHAM, Appellant.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Appeal from Clinton Circuit Court. Hon. Guy B. Park, Judge.

REVERSED AND REMANDED (with directions).

Elmer E. Hall for Virginia L. Gardner, Administratrix; Franken & Timmons for Mary W. Vanlandingham.

(1) Estates given by will should be regarded as vesting immediately unless testator has, by clear words, manifested a contrary intention. The law favors vested estates, and where there is a doubt as to whether the remainder is vested or contingent, the courts will construe it as a vested estate. Chew v. Keller, 100 Mo. 368; Tindall v. Tindall, 167 Mo. 225; Heady v. Hollman, 251 Mo. 632; Warne v. Sorge, 258 Mo. 171; Green v. Irwin, 309 Mo. 306; Bishop v. Broyles, 324 Mo. 69, 22 S.W. (2d) 792; Palmer v. French, 326 Mo. 710, 32 S.W. (2d) 591; Trautz v. Lemp, 329 Mo. 58, 46 S.W. (2d) 135; 2 Underhill on Wills, p. 1299, sec. 861. (2) A gift in remainder by a will to the heirs of the testator creates a vested remainder in his heirs living at his death. In the absence of clear and unambiguous indications of a different intention derived from the context of the will, the class described as testator's heirs is to be ascertained at the death of the testator. The gift in the case at bar is to the heirs of the testator Vanlandingham, and therefore vested in them on his death. These heirs were his brothers, James M. Vanlandingham and Frank T. Vanlandingham, his sisters, Belle Slaughter and Ida Barnes, his nephew, Frank Hammond Rixey. They each, therefore, received an undivided one-fifth interest in fee simple remainder, which vested in them immediately upon the death of the testator. Baker v. Kennedy, 238 S.W. 790; Henderson v. Calhoun, 183 S.W. 586; Buckner v. Buckner, 255 Mo. 377; Chew v. Keller, 100 Mo. 368; Tindall v. Tindall, 167 Mo. 225; Green v. Irwin, 309 Mo. 306; Heady v. Hollman, 251 Mo. 632; Warne v. Sorge, 258 Mo. 171; Collins v. Whiteman, 283 Mo. 392; In re Newman, 68 Cal. App. 420, 229 Pac. 898; In re Carter, 134 Atl. 581; Mitchell v. Vest, 157 Iowa, 336, 136 N.W. 1054; Baugham v. Trust Co., 181 N.C. 406, 107 S.E. 431; Gross v. Trust Co., 100 Conn. 332, 123 Atl. 907; Tatham's Estate, 250 Pa. 269, 95 Atl. 520; Brian v. Taylor, 129 Md. 145, 98 Atl. 532; Dorrence v. Green, 41 R.I. 444, 104 Atl. 12; Kellett v. Shepard, 139 Ill. 442, 34 N.E. 245; Oulton v. Kidder, 128 Atl. 674; McFadden v. McFadden, 107 S.C. 101, 91 S.E. 986; Brown v. Spring, 241 Mass. 565, 135 N.E. 701; Schlater v. Lee, 177 Miss. 701, 78 So. 700; Hill v. Hill, 90 Neb. 43, 132 N.W. 738; 40 Cyc. pp. 1675, 1677; Schofield v. Olcott, 120 Ill. 371, 11 N.E. 351; McHarry v. Kingman & Co., 111 Fed. 498; Weil v. King, 104 S.W. 380; Campbell v. Hinton, 150 Ky. 546, 150 S.W. 676. (3) The fact that the residuary estate of the testator consisted wholly of personal property, does not alter the rules governing the vesting of estates. The vesting of interests in personalty is subject to the same rules as real estate. Deacon v. Trust Co., 271 Mo. 688; State ex rel. v. Welch, 175 Mo. App. 308; Thomas v. Castle, 76 Conn. 447; In re Alviston's Estate, 117 Wis. 272; Heilman v. Heilman, 129 Ind. 59; Crawford v. Clark, 110 Ga. 732; Stallcup v. Cronley's Trustee, 117 Ky. 551; 40 Cyc. 1660. (4) The first sentence of item Fourth of the will of John A. Vanlandingham, which creates a vested remainder in his heirs, is as follows: "I direct that my wife, Lovie Vanlandingham, shall have the use and benefit of all the rest residue and remainder of my estate, real, personal, and mixed, wherever situated during the period of her natural life and at her death I direct that residue of my estate be divided equally among my heirs." That this creates a vested reminder in the heirs of testator living at his death, is shown by the cases cited under Point 2. The use of the words "at her death" in said sentence, referring to the death of the life tenant, refers to the time the enjoyment of the estate is to commence in possssion, and such words do not create a contingent remainder. Chew v. Keller, 100 Mo. 368; 40 Cyc. 1670; 4 Kent (11 Ed.) 230n; Doe v. Considine, 6 Wall. 458, 18 L. Ed. 869; McArthur v. Scott, 113 U.S. 340, 28 L. Ed. 1015; In re Groninger's Estate, 268 Pa. 184, 110 Atl. 465; Lingo v. Smith, 174 Iowa, 461, 156 N.W. 402; Neilson v. Brett, 99 Va. 673, 40 S.E. 32; Norton v. Mortensen, 88 Conn. 28, 89 Atl. 882; Cushman v. Arnold, 185 Mass. 165, 70 N.E. 43; Mowry v. Taft, 36 R.I. 427, 90 Atl. 815; Blamire v. Geldart, 16 Ves. Jr. 314, 33 Eng. Reprint, 1004. (5) The bequest to the remaindermen in the first sentence of said item Fourth, is in the form of a direction to divide the residuary estate at the death of the life tenant. A bequest in the form of a direction to pay or divide at a future period, vests immediately, if the payment or division be postponed for the convenience of the estate, or to let in some other interest. The postponement in the case at bar was for the benefit of the life tenant so that she could receive the income from the property during her lifetime. The remainder to the heirs of testator, therefore, vested immediately in them upon his death, although the bequest is in the form of a direction to divide the property upon the death of the life tenant. Collier's Will, 40 Mo. 325; Deacon v. Trust Co., 271 Mo. 669; Plummer v. Roberts, 315 Mo. 660; Knight v. Pottgieser, 176 Ill. 368, 52 N.E. 934; Schofield v. Olcott, 120 Ill. 362, 11 N.E. 357; Dee v. Dee, 212 Ill. 358, 72 N.E. 429; Carter v. Carter, 234 Ill. 507, 85 N.E. 292; Armstrong v. Barber, 239 Ill. 389, 88 N.E. 246; Mettler v. Warner, 243 Ill. 600; Haviland v. Haviland, 130 Iowa, 611, 105 N.W. 354; Blain v. Dean, 160 Iowa, 708, 142 N.W. 418; Atchison v. Francis, 165 N.W. 587; Heilman v. Heilman, 129 Ind. 59, 28 N.E. 310; Aldred v. Sylvester, 184 Ind. 542, 111 N.E. 914; McLaughlin v. Penney, 65 Kan. 523, 70 Pac. 341; Johrden v. Pond, 126 Minn. 247, 148 N.W. 112; Cushman v. Arnold, 185 Mass. 165, 70 N.E. 43; Blume v. Kimball, 222 Mass. 412, 110 N.E. 1036; Bates v. Spooner, 75 Conn. 501, 54 Atl. 305; White v. Smith, 87 Conn. 663, 89 Atl. 272; Weller v. Kolb, 128 Md. 221, 97 Atl. 542; Martin v. Cook, 129 Md. 195, 98 Atl. 489; Moulton v. Chapman, 108 Me. 417, 81 Atl. 1007; Bryant v. Plummer, 111 Me. 511, 90 Atl. 171; Rock Paper Mill Co. v. Fisk, 47 Mich. 212, 10 N.W. 344; Post v. Hebert's Ex., 27 N.J. Eq. 540; Potter v. Nixon, 81 N.J. Eq. 338, 86 Atl. 444; Freud v. Freud, 110 Atl. 451; Marshall's Estate, 262 Pa. 145, 105 Atl. 63; In re Groninger's Estate, 268 Pa. 184, 110 Atl. 465; Pierce v. Fulmer, 165 Ala. 344, 51 So. 728; Crossley v. Leslie, 130 Ga. 782, 61 S.E. 851; Kaser v. Kaser, 68 Ore. 153, 137 Pac. 187; In re Leckie, 20 Ont. Week N. 478; Cropley v. Cropley, 19 Wall. 167, 22 L. Ed. 109; McArthur v. Scott, 113 U.S. 340, 28 L. Ed. 1015; McCauley's Estate, 257 Pa. 377, 101 Atl. 827; Rood on Wills, secs. 590, 591; Underhill on Wills, sec. 866; 1 Jarman on Wills (6 Ed.), 798; Hawkins v. Wills, p. 231; 40 Cyc. pp. 1657, 1667, 1679. (6) A vested remainder in fee is bequeathed in the first sentence of item Fourth of the will of John A. Vanlandingham in clear terms.

Lawson & Hale for respondents.

(1) In construing a will the intention of a testator should never be lost sight of, and that intention should be gathered from a reading of the entire will, in light of the circumstances surrounding testator at the time of its execution. Long v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 57 S.W. (2d) 1073; Eckle v. Ryland, 256 Mo. 441; Armour v. Frey, 226 Mo. 666; Cornet v. Cornet, 248 Mo. 215; McCoy v. Bradbury, 290 Mo. 658. (2) The clause of the will under consideration gave to the widow, Lovie Vanlandingham, a life estate in the residue, with contingent remainder to the heirs of testator living at the termination of the life estate. Such construction is necessary because (a) There is no direct disposition of the remainder, and the bequest to the remaindermen arises solely from implication and inference. The case comes clearly within the "pay over and distribute" rule. The presumption in such case is that the remainder is contingent, and the remaindermen are to be determined as of the date of the death of the life tenant. Owen v. Eaton, 56 Mo. App. 569; Riley v. Kirk, 253 S.W. 53; Fulton v. Fulton, 179 Iowa, 948, 162 N.W. 253; Crapo v. Price, 190 Mass. 317, 76 N.E. 1043; Brown v. Wright, 194 Mass. 540, 80 N.E. 612; In re Crane, 164 N.Y. 71, 58 N.E. 47; In re Faust, 145 N.Y. Supp. 842; In re Duffy, 152 N.Y. Supp. 894; Bowen v. Hackney, 136 N.C. 187, 48 S.E. 633; Richey v. Johnson, 30 Ohio St. 288; Barr v. Denny, 79 Ohio St. 358, 87 N.E. 267; Rosengarten v. Ashton, 228 Pa. 389, 77 Atl. 562; Grantham v. Jinnette, 177 N.C. 229, 98 S.E. 724; Evans v. Godbold, 27 S.C. Eq. (6 Rich.) 26; Forrest v. Porch, 100 Tenn. 391, 45 S.W. 676; Craig v. McFadden, 191 S.W. 203; In re Bailey, 209 N.Y. Supp. 137. (b) The provision that in the event of the death of any of testator's heirs, "then the share they would have received if living shall descend to their issue" indicates an intention to give a contingent remainder. Eckle v. Ryland, 256 Mo. 450; Dickerson v. Dickerson, 211 Mo. 494; Dohn v. Dohn, 110 Ky. 884, 62 S.W. 1033; Bates v. Gillett, 132 Ill. 287, 24 N.E. 611; Schaeffer v. Schaeffer, 54 W. Va. 681, 46 S.E. 150; Crapo v. Price, 190 Mass. 317, 76 N.E. 1043; Denison v. Denison, 89 N.Y. Supp. 126, 76 N.E. 1093; Trust Co. v. Harris, 20 R.I. 408, 39 Atl. 750; Rosengarten v. Ashton, 228 Pa. 389, 77 Atl. 562; Straus v. Post, 67 Md. 465, 10 Atl. 74; Richey v. Johnson, 30 Ohio St. 288; Whitesides v. Cooper, 115 N.C. 570, 20 S.E. 295; In re Albiston, 117 Wis. 272, 94 N.W. 169; ...

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