Garfias v. State

• Decision Date: 26 February 2014
• Docket Number: No. PD–1544–12.,PD–1544–12.
• Citation: 424 S.W.3d 54
• Parties: Christopher GARFIAS, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

424 S.W.3d 54

Christopher GARFIAS, Appellant

v.The STATE of Texas.

No. PD–1544–12.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 26, 2014.

Brian Salvant, for Christopher Garfias.

Christopher Garfias, pro se.

OPINION

KEASLER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KELLER, P.J., MEYERS, PRICE, and HERVEY, JJ., joined.

Christopher Garfias was charged with aggravated robbery by threat and aggravated assault causing bodily injury and was convicted of both counts by jury. On appeal, Garfias argued that these multiple convictions violate his constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy. The Second Court of Appeals agreed, and vacated his sentence for aggravated robbery.¹ Because we do not agree that the Double Jeopardy Clause was violated in this case, we will reverse the court of appeals' judgment.

BACKGROUND

In the early morning of March 1, 2006, Christopher Garfias went to a gas station in Hurst, Texas. The store attendant that morning was Shahid Shahid, who admitted Garfias inside. At some point later, Shahid heard a gunshot and the sound of breaking glass. He saw Garfias outside the store with a gun in his hand. Garfias reentered the store and pointed his gun at Shahid, who asked him not to shoot. Garfias shot Shahid four times at close range.

Garfias was indicted for aggravated robbery by threat, a first-degree felony, ² and for aggravated assault causing bodily injury, a second-degree felony.³ The indictment read as follows:

CHRISTOPHER GARFIAS, ... on or about the 1st day of March 2006, did

THEN AND THERE INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY, WHILE IN THE COURSE OF COMMITTING THEFT OF PROPERTY AND WITH INTENT TO OBTAIN OR MAINTAIN CONTROL OF SAID PROPERTY, THREATEN OR PLACE SHAHID SHAHID IN FEAR OF IMMINENT BODILY INJURY OR DEATH, AND THE DEFENDANT USED OR EXHIBITED A DEADLY WEAPON, TO–WIT: A FIREARM,

COUNT TWO: AND IT IS FURTHER PRESENTED IN AND TO SAID COURT THAT THE DEFENDANT ... DID INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY CAUSE BODILY INJURY TO SHAHID SHAHID BY SHOOTING HIM WITH A FIREARM AND THE DEFENDANT DID USE OR EXHIBIT A DEADLY WEAPON DURING THE COMMISSION OF THE ASSAULT, TO–WIT: A FIREARM[.]

Garfias pleaded not guilty and was convicted on both counts by the jury. After hearing additional evidence, the jury assessed his punishment at sixty years' confinement for the aggravated robbery conviction and life imprisonment for the aggravated assault conviction.⁴ The trial judge ordered that the sentences run concurrently.

Garfias did not argue either before or during trial that the Double Jeopardy Clause was implicated by the multiple offenses for which he had been charged. He raised this argument for the first time on appeal, alleging multiple punishments had been imposed upon him for the same offense.⁵ In addressing this claim, the court of appeals employed the “same elements test” established in Blockburger v. United States.⁶ The court determined that because aggravated robbery and aggravated assault, as charged in the indictment, each required proof of at least one element that the other did not, a double-jeopardy violation was not apparent on the face of the record and thus Garfias had not preserved his complaint on appeal.⁷

This Court granted Garfias's petition for discretionary review, vacated the court of appeals' judgment, and remanded the appeal.⁸ We indicated that while the court of appeals had conducted a proper Blockburger analysis, the question of whether multiple punishments violated double jeopardy did not end there.⁹ An accused may be punished for two offenses even though they would be regarded as the same under a Blockburger analysis if the Legislature had otherwise made clear its intention that he should be. ¹⁰ We remanded the case to the court of appeals for that court to examine other indicia of legislative intent.¹¹

On remand, the court of appeals examined the similarity between aggravated assault and aggravated robbery under the Texas Penal Code.¹² The court stated that because of the similarity between how these offenses could have been charged under the evidence of this case, the Legislature could not have intended for the offenses to be punished multiply.¹³ Despite finding that aggravated robbery by threat and aggravated assault causing bodily injury are two separate offenses with different underlying gravamina, the court of appeals ultimately concluded that the Legislature could not have intended to allow multiple punishments in this case.¹⁴ Based on this holding, the court vacated Garfias's conviction for aggravated robbery and affirmed his conviction for aggravated assault.¹⁵ This Court granted review to determine whether the court of appeals erred in considering how the offenses could have been charged in making a double jeopardy determination, and whether, in the alternative, the facts of this case present two discrete events that do not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause in the first instance.

ANALYSIS

Garfias failed to raise his double jeopardy claim to the trial court. However,such a claim may be raised for the first time on appeal when (1) the undisputed facts show the double-jeopardy violation is clearly apparent from the face of the record, and (2) enforcement of the usual rules of procedural default serves no legitimate state interest.¹⁶ We must therefore first determine whether the undisputed facts show that a double jeopardy violation is clearly apparent in this case.

There are three types of double jeopardy claims: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.¹⁷ A multiple-punishments violation can arise either in the context of lesser-included offenses, where the same conduct is punished under a greater and a lesser-included offense, and when the same conduct is punished under two distinct statutes where the Legislature only intended for the conduct to be punished once.¹⁸ Garfias asserts that the latter has occurred in this case.

The Legislature has the power to establish and define crimes and few, if any, limitations are imposed upon this power by the Double Jeopardy Clause.¹⁹ Thus the true inquiry in a multiple-punishments case is whether the Legislature intended to authorize the separate punishments. ²⁰ There are two ways in which legislative intent can be ascertained: by analyzing the elements of the offenses in question, or by identifying the appropriate “unit of prosecution” for the offenses.²¹ This Court has held that an “elements” analysis is appropriate when the offenses in question come from different statutory sections,²² while a “units” analysis is employed when the offenses are alternative means of committing the same statutory offense.²³ In this case, Garfias complains of convictions stemming from different statutory sections, so we must embark on an “elements” analysis to determine whether multiple-punishments principles have been violated.

The starting point of an “elements” analysis in the multiple-punishments context is the Blockburger test, used to determine whether each of the offenses requires proof of an element that the other does not.²⁴ In doing so, courts must focus on the elements alleged in the charging instrument—not on the offense as defined in the Penal Code.²⁵ Under this so-called cognate-pleadings approach, double-jeopardychallenges can be made even against offenses that have different statutory elements, if the same facts required to convict are alleged in the indictment. ²⁶

But as we indicated in our prior opinion, the Blockburger test is only a starting point—it is a rule of statutory construction, not the exclusive indicator of a double-jeopardy violation.²⁷ The Blockburger test cannot allow two punishments for a single course of conduct when the Legislature intended to authorize only one.²⁸ To facilitate this analysis, in Ervin v. State, we set forth a list of non-exclusive factors designed to help courts in the absence of clear guidance from the Legislature:

whether offenses are in the same statutory section; whether the offenses are phrased in the alternative; whether the offenses are named similarly; whether the offenses have common punishment ranges; whether the offenses have a common focus; whether the common focus tends to indicate a single instance of conduct; whether the elements that differ between the two offenses can be considered the same under an imputed theory of liability that would result in the offenses being considered the same under Blockburger; and whether there is legislative history containing an articulation of an intent to treat the offenses as the same or different for double-jeopardy purposes.²⁹

We have indicated that the “focus” or “gravamen” of a penal provision should be regarded as the best indicator of legislative intent when determining whether a multiple-punishments violation has occurred.³⁰ For example, in Bigon v. State, we analyzed whether convictions for both felony murder and intoxication manslaughter violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.³¹ The fact that both offenses were result-oriented and shared the same focus—the death of an individual—was a key factor in our decision that the Legislature did not intend to permit multiple punishments in that case.³²

One other factor reviewing courts should consider when making an “elements” analysis is the determination of the allowable unit of prosecution for the offenses in question. Although such a determination is a necessary step when a multiple-punishments claim deals with two offenses from the same statutory section, we have stated that, even in an “elements” analysis, such a determination can be indicative of legislative intent.³³

As we indicated in our prior opinion, the court of appeals correctly held that the Blockburger test reveals that the offenses of aggravated robbery by threat and aggravated assault causing bodily injury, as charged in Garfias's indictment, each containan element that the other...