Gargasz v. Nordson Corp.
Decision Date | 30 October 1991 |
Docket Number | No. 90CA004912,90CA004912 |
Parties | GARGASZ, Appellant, v. NORDSON CORPORATION, Appellee. |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Geoffrey R. Smith, Avon Lake, for appellant.
Kenneth S. Stumphauzer, Lorain, for appellee.
Plaintiff-appellant, Ted. J. Gargasz, claims that he was wrongfully discharged by the defendant-appellee, Nordson Corporation. He appeals from the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Nordson Corp. The only issue on appeal is whether there exists any triable issues of fact.
Gargasz was employed by Nordson Corp. from June 11, 1979 until he was involuntarily terminated on October 27, 1987. At no time did the parties execute a written contract defining the duration or terms of their employment relationship. 1 While Gargasz held various positions with Nordson Corp., he was always a salaried employee working in the area of quality control. During his first six years of employment, Gargasz received satisfactory annual reviews and annual pay increases. During his last two years with Nordson Corp. he reported to different supervisors and his performance was rated at below acceptable standards.
Gargasz received a written warning, dated October 15, 1987, from his supervisor. In this letter Gargasz was reprimanded for taking unscheduled vacation time without prior approval. He was also warned that future infractions could result in his termination from Nordson Corp. Concerned that this letter was in his personnel file, Gargasz reviewed his personnel records on October 26, 1987. The following day Gargasz was fired by Nordson Corp.
Gargasz filed a complaint against Nordson Corp. for wrongful discharge. Nordson Corp. filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court granted on September 17, 1990. Gargasz appeals this decision raising the following assignment of error:
The Ohio Supreme Court has held that in the area of employment contracts, there exists "a strong presumption in favor of a contract terminable at will unless the terms of the contract or other circumstances clearly manifest the parties' intent to bind each other." Henkel v. Educational Research Council (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 249, 255, 74 O.O.2d 415, 418, 344 N.E.2d 118, 122. See also, Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co. (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 100, 102-103, 19 OBR 261, 263, 483 N.E.2d 150, 153, and fn. 1. Given that the employment agreement between Gargasz and Nordson Corp. was oral, with no terms of duration, we must start from the position that the employment agreement was terminable-at-will. Only if we find, after reviewing the facts most favorably for Gargasz, that reasonable minds could adduce additional terms or circumstances which overcome this presumption, will we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 4 O.O.3d 466, 472, 364 N.E.2d 267, 274. See, also, Civ.R. 56(C).
Gargasz claims that Nordson Corp. made additional representations which altered their employment-at-will relationship. In support of his position, Gargasz relies solely on a four-page policy manual written by Nordson Corp. and distributed to its employees. This manual, entitled "Rules for Employees" ("the Manual"), is a statement of Nordson Corp.'s policies relating to "discipline and proper standards of conduct" for employees. The issue in this case is whether reasonable persons could reach different results on how the Manual is to be interpreted and applied. Temple, supra. Because of the paramount importance of this one piece of evidence, it is necessary to discuss it in some detail.
Two pages of the Manual are devoted to listing twenty-three company rules, violation of which will result in some disciplinary action taken against an employee. At the end of this list, the Manual states that these rules "are not intended to be all inclusive" and that additional rules may be adopted by either the corporation or management. The following language immediately precedes the listed rules:
Relying on the doctrine of promissory estoppel, Gargasz first claims that Nordson Corp., through its Manual, made representations upon which he reasonably relied to alter his employment-at-will agreement. The doctrine of promissory estoppel was first applied to employment-at-will agreements by the Ohio Supreme Court in Mers, supra, 19 Ohio St.3d at 105, 19 OBR at 265, 483 N.E.2d at 155, when the court stated:
"[T]he doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable and binding to oral employment-at-will agreements when a promise which the employer should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the employee does induce such action or forbearance, if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."
Gargasz argues that the Manual promised all employees that the sequence of disciplinary procedures would be mandatory and strictly adhered to by Nordson Corp., and that before an employee would be discharged for violating an enumerated rule, the employee would first be given the benefit of a written reprimand and a short-term and long-term suspension. He contends that he was wrongfully discharged in violation of this stated procedure when he was discharged for insubordination, an enumerated rule, without receiving the benefit of either a warning or suspension.
In response, Nordson Corp. argues that its Manual did not apply to Gargasz as a salaried employee and a member of Nordson Corp.'s management. Nordson Corp.'s position is that the Manual applies only to hourly employees, of which Gargasz was not a member. In support of its position, Nordson Corp. points to references in the Manual that these rules were created by management and subject to change by management. Nordson Corp. argues that, by implication, these references to management exclude management personnel from those to whom the Manual is addressed. In response, Gargasz refers to the title of the Manual, "Rules for Employees," which is all encompassing.
On review, we find the positions of both parties to be untenable. We must therefore determine whether there exists any ground upon which the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. Joyce v. General Motors Corp. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 93, 96, 551 N.E.2d 172, 174; Taylor v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. (1987), 36 Ohio App.3d 62, 63, 520 N.E.2d 1375, 1376. In applying promissory estoppel, we...
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