Garner v. Kan. Dep't of Revenue

• Decision Date: 23 December 2022
• Docket Number: 124,127
• Citation: 522 P.3d 319
• Parties: Jack GARNER, Appellant, v. KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

522 P.3d 319

Jack GARNER, Appellant,

v.KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee.

No. 124,127

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

Opinion Filed December 23, 2022.

Michael S. Holland II, of Holland and Holland, of Russell, for appellant.

Charles P. Bradley, of Legal Services Bureau, Kansas Department of Revenue, for appellee.

Before Warner, P.J., Hurst, J., and Timothy G. Lahey, S.J.

Hurst, J.:

The Kansas Department of Revenue suspended Jack Garner's driver's license for driving under the influence, and after judicial review the district court upheld that suspension. Garner now appeals, challenging the arresting officer's reasonable suspicion for performing the stop on his vehicle that led to his driver's license suspension. Finding that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to believe Garner had violated the law, this court reverses the district court's decision to uphold the suspension of Garner's driver's license and remands with instructions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The relevant facts are straightforward. On July 27, 2020, at about 9:20 p.m., the arresting officer was on patrol in WaKeeney when he observed Garner's truck stopped at a stop sign. The officer had the window of his patrol car down and was around 200 or 300 feet away from Garner's truck when he heard a car engine "roar" and tires screech. He described the sound as "not just a little screech like you would accidentally hit it, but it was, you know, someone laying into the gas." The officer looked back toward Garner and observed him "spinning [the truck's] tires all the way around until it got ... directly onto 13th Street and straightened up." He testified that he observed Garner spinning his tires for "several feet."

While the arresting officer heard Garner's tires screech and witnessed the tires spinning, he did not see any typical driving infractions. The officer did not observe Garner leave his lane of travel, fishtail, or commit a speeding violation, but he decided to stop Garner's truck exclusively based on "[excessive] acceleration of the tires." The officer claimed Garner's acceleration violated K.S.A. 8-1547, which provides: "No person shall start a vehicle which is stopped, standing or parked unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety." This traffic stop eventually led to Garner's arrest for driving under the influence. The facts supporting Garner's arrest for driving under the influence are not relevant to this appeal.

Under the statutory requirements, Garner was served with the officer's certification and notice of driver's license suspension, and the Kansas Department of Revenue (KDOR) affirmed the suspension of Garner's driver's license. Garner petitioned for review of KDOR's administrative suspension order in Trego County District Court, arguing, among other things, that the traffic stop based on his screeching tires was unconstitutional because the officer lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop. The district court conducted a de novo bench trial and upheld KDOR's administrative suspension order, finding the officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop based on Garner's violation of K.S.A. 8-1547. Garner appeals.

DISCUSSION

The sole issue presented here is whether the district court erred in holding that the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop of Garner. Helpfully, the parties agree on the relevant facts but disagree on whether those facts provided the officer with a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that Garner violated K.S.A. 8-1547.

Standard of Review

Appeals from the administrative suspension of driver's licenses are subject to review under the Kansas Judicial Review Act. K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 8-259(a) ; K.S.A. 77-601 et seq. ; Rosendahl v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue , 310 Kan. 474, 480, 447 P.3d 347 (2019). On appeal, Garner, as the party asserting the error, carries the burden of proving the invalidity of KDOR's suspension of his driver's license. See K.S.A. 77-621(a)(1) ; see also K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 8-1020(q) ("Upon review, the licensee shall have the burden to show that the decision of the agency should be set aside.").

This court reviews the district court's factual findings in upholding KDOR's suspension of Garner's license for "substantial competent evidence" but reviews de novo its legal conclusions. Creecy v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue , 310 Kan. 454, 469, 447 P.3d 959 (2019) ; Casper v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue , 309 Kan. 1211, 1213, 442 P.3d 1038 (2019). Substantial competent evidence is both relevant and substantive, and provides a substantial basis of fact from which the issues can reasonably be resolved. In reviewing the district court's factual findings, this court will not reweigh the evidence, redetermine the credibility of witnesses, or redetermine questions of fact. Creecy , 310 Kan. at 469, 447 P.3d 959. However, this court conducts its legal analysis of those facts anew, without reliance on or deference to the district court's legal analysis.

Governing Legal Principles

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects persons from unreasonable government seizure and provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ...." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights likewise prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, § 15. "[A] traffic stop, even one leading to administrative rather than criminal proceedings, is a seizure" under the Fourth Amendment and section 15. Jarvis v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue , 312 Kan. 156, 171, 473 P.3d 869 (2020) ; see State v. Jimenez , 308 Kan. 315, 322, 420 P.3d 464 (2018) ("A routine traffic stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment."); Martin v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue , 285 Kan. 625, 636, 176 P.3d 938 (2008) ("A traffic stop is not magically converted to a ‘nonseizure’ when it leads to a civil or administrative rather than a criminal proceeding.").

An officer's decision to seize someone by pulling them over constitutes a valid seizure under the Fourth Amendment if the officer has "specific and articulable facts that create a reasonable suspicion the seized individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime or traffic infraction." State v. Cash , 313 Kan. 121, Syl. ¶ 2, 483 P.3d 1047 (2021) ; see K.S.A. 22-2402 ; Strickert v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue , 58 Kan. App. 2d 1, Syl. ¶ 3, 462 P.3d 649 (2020). When an officer lacks those specific, articulable facts, the seizure may violate the Fourth Amendment, assuming no exception applies. In such cases if the traffic stop is unconstitutional, the court may set aside KDOR's administrative suspension of a person's driver's license. See K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 8-1020(o) - (p) ; Jarvis , 312 Kan. at 167-69, 473 P.3d 869 ; Whigham v. Dept. of Revenue , 312 Kan. 147, 152, 473 P.3d 881 (2020).

The parties’ entire dispute revolves around this court's interpretation of K.S.A. 8-1547, the statute the officer alleged supported Garner's traffic stop. When interpreting a statute, if the Legislature's intent in enacting the statute is ascertainable, this court must defer to that intent. Montgomery v. Saleh , 311 Kan. 649, 654-55, 466 P.3d 902 (2020). The Kansas Supreme Court has explained that:

"When a statute is plain and unambiguous, an appellate court should not speculate about the legislative intent behind that clear language, and it should refrain from reading something into the statute that is not readily found in its words. [An appellate court] will only review legislative history or use canons of construction if the statute's language or text is ambiguous. [Citations omitted.]" In re M.M. , 312 Kan. 872, 874, 482 P.3d 583 (2021).

Contrary to Garner's assertion, the question of what conduct violates K.S.A. 8-1547 appears to be an issue of first impression in Kansas. Garner mistakenly asserts that the Kansas Supreme Court has previously determined this issue in his favor. See City of Altamont v. Finkle , 224 Kan. 221, 579 P.2d 712 (1978). While the defendant's conduct in Finkle was much like Garner's conduct here, the legal issue in that case was distinguishable from the issue here. In Finkle , the court held that the complaint charging Finkle with "exhibition of speed" was defective because it failed to charge an offense "with enough clarity and detail to inform the defendant of the criminal act with which he is charged." 224 Kan. 221, Syl. ¶ 1, 579 P.2d 712. The court in Finkle did not address whether the conduct at issue could be prosecuted if properly charged, but determined the charging document was defective. Moreover, the Finkle court examined an ordinance similar to K.S.A. 8-1565, a statute prohibiting racing on highways—not the statute at issue in this case. 224 Kan. at 222, 579 P.2d 712. Cases like Finkle —analyzing or interpreting K.S.A. 8-1565 —do not help the analysis in this case.

Garner also wrongly relies on the district court's decision in his DUI criminal case that arose from the same traffic stop. Not only is the district court's full decision not in the record on appeal, it is immaterial to this current analysis because Garner relies on the district court's discussion of whether he committed an "exhibition of speed or acceleration" as prohibited by K.S.A. 8-1565 —which is not the issue currently on appeal—and it involves a different legal standard and burden of proof. Garner's present appeal claims only that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Garner for violating K.S.A. 8-1547. The district court's analysis of Garner's violation of a different statute ( K.S.A. 8-1565 ) is not relevant to this court's current analysis.

K.S.A. 8-1547 provides: "No person shall start a vehicle which is stopped, standing or parked unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety." Neither this court nor the Kansas Supreme Court have...