Garren v. Southland Corp.
| Decision Date | 08 September 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 31210,31210 |
| Citation | 228 S.E.2d 870,237 Ga. 484 |
| Parties | Christine GARREN v. The SOUTHLAND CORPORATION. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Pierce, Ranitz, Berry, Mahoney & Forbes, C. James McCaller, Jr., Paul W. Painter, Jr., Savannah, for appellant.
Bouhan, Williams & Levy, James M. Thomas, Savannah, for appellee.
This case is before us on certiorari to the Court of Appeals. 138 Ga.App. 246, 225 S.E.2d 920 (1976). It is the second appearance on certiorari before this court (see 235 Ga. 784, 221 S.E.2d 571 (1976)).
Briefly, the facts are that plaintiff was formerly employed at one of defendant's 7-11 stores. Following her discharge, she sought other employment. A prospective employer called the defendant's office by telephone and inquired as to the reason for plaintiff's discharge. A secretary said that all she could do was pull plaintiff's personel file, which she did, and advised plaintiff's prospective employer that plaintiff 'was discharged for shortages.'
At trial, the evidence showed that the plaintiff's personnel record bearing the notation 'discharged-shortages' was made in the regular course of defendant's business, that the contents of a former employee's personnel records were not generally made available to third persons unless there was a supervisor on duty, and that when the telephone call in question came in, the supervisors were not in the office. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and the trial judge overruled the defendant's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for new trial.
In the first appearance before the Court of Appeals (135 Ga.App. 77, 217 S.E.2d 347 (1975)), the court held that an oral publication of a written defamation constitutes slander, not libel, and that plaintiff's evidence failed to show that the slander was published by one directed or authorized by the defendant corporation to speak the defamatory words.
Certiorari was granted on this issue of first impression in Georgia. We reversed, holding in accord with other jurisdictions that the oral publication of a written defamation constitutes libel. 235 Ga. 784, 221 S.E.2d 571 (1976). Having treated the case as involving libel rather than slander, we did not consider the Court of Appeals' ruling as to the defendant corporation's authorization to publish slander.
On remand (138 Ga.App. 246, 225 S.E.2d 920 (1976)), the Court of Appeals adhered to its earlier position, based upon many of the same authorities, and held (in division 3 of its opinion) that plaintiff's evidence failed to show that the libel was published by one directed or authorized to do so by the defendant corporation.
The rule has been, as noted by the Court of Appeals, that as regards slander a corporation is not liable for damages resulting from the speaking of defamatory words by one of its agents, even where the speaker in uttering such words was acting within the scope of his agency, unless it affirmatively appears that the agent was expressly directed or authorized by the corporation to speak the very words in question. Behre v. National Cash Register Co., 100 Ga. 213(1), 27 S.E. 986 (1896). Georgia follows the minority rule in this regard. 50 Am.Jur.2d, Libel and Slander, § 329 at p. 852; Anno. 150 A.L.R. 1338 at 1341.
That is to say, as regards slander, a corporation is not liable for the slanderous utterances of an agent acting within the scope of his employment, unless it affirmatively appears that the agent was expressly directed or authorized to slander the plaintiff. See Russell v. Dailey's, Inc., 55 Ga.App. 641, 199 S.E. 665 (1938). Although this may be the best rule as to slander, this is a libel case and no case has been cited and none has been found applying a corollary rule in cases of libel. 1
On the contrary, the usual rules of respondent superior (the principal is liable for the torts of his employee committed while acting within the scope of his employment) are applicable in libel cases. See division 2 of Behre v. National Cash Register Co., supra.
In Howe Machine Co. v. Souder, 58 Ga. 64(5) (1877), the court held that a corporation is liable for a libelous...
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