Carolina Furniture Co., Inc. v. Rhodes, Inc.
Decision Date | 19 November 1984 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. CV181-158. |
Parties | CAROLINA FURNITURE COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff, v. RHODES, INC. and Kincaid Furniture Company, Incorporated, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
J. Patrick Claiborne, William J. Cooney, H. William Sams, Jr., Augusta, Ga., for plaintiff.
John A. Chandler and James R. McGibbon, David E. Hudson, Augusta, Ga., John M. Murchison, Jr., Charlotte, N.C., for defendants.
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Carolina Furniture Company, Inc. (hereinafter "Carolina") owns and operates a retail furniture store in Augusta, Georgia. Defendant Rhodes, Inc. (hereinafter "Rhodes") owns and operates a number of retail furniture stores, including one store located in Augusta, Georgia. Defendant Kincaid Furniture Company, Incorporated (hereinafter "Kincaid") is a manufacturer of furniture with its principal place of business in Hudson, North Carolina.
Plaintiff's complaint is composed of three counts. In Count I, plaintiff alleges that the defendants conspired with each other and with other Kincaid distributors to restrain trade and commerce in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1). Counts II and III relate only to defendant Rhodes. In Count II, plaintiff alleges that defendant Rhodes, knowingly and maliciously and with intent to injure the plaintiff, interfered with plaintiff's contract to purchase the Kincaid line of furniture from defendant Kincaid and from other Kincaid distributors. In Count III plaintiff alleges that Rhodes engaged in a deceptive trade practice in violation of the Georgia Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Ga.Code Ann. § 10-1-372(a)(8)), when, in the course of its business, it disparaged the goods, services, and business of plaintiff by false and misleading representations of fact. Both defendants to this action have filed motions for summary judgment that are ripe for adjudication.
Before reaching the merits of the defendants' motions, the limited scope of this Court's inquiry must be clearly defined. Summary judgment may only be entered if it is apparent that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P.
The party seeking summary judgment bears the exacting burden of demonstrating that there is no actual dispute as to any material fact in the case. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, at 990-91 (5th Cir.1981). In assessing whether the movant has met this burden, the courts should view the evidence introduced and all factual inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id. All reasonable doubts about the facts should be resolved in favor of the non-moving litigant. Casey Enterprises v. American Hardware Mutual Insurance Co., 655 F.2d 598 at 602 (5th Cir.1981). A court must not decide any factual issues it finds in the record, but if such are present, the court must deny the motion and proceed to trial. Environmental Defense Fund v. March, 651 F.2d at 991; Lighting Fixture & Electric Supply Co. v. Continental Insurance Co., 420 F.2d 1211, 1213 (5th Cir.1969). Summary judgment may be inappropriate even where the parties agree on the basic facts, but disagree about the factual inferences that should be drawn from these facts. Id. If reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then the court should deny summary judgment. Croley v. Matson Navigation Co., 434 F.2d 73, 75 (5th Cir.1970); Marsden v. Patane, 380 F.2d 489, 491 (5th Cir.1967).
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 491, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962). In light of the governing standards as set forth above and having acknowledged "that summary judgment is extreme relief which should be approached very cautiously," Parsons v. Ford Motor Co., 669 F.2d 308, 312 (5th Cir.1982), I will now address the defendants' motions.
Based on the defendants' statements of undisputed material facts and the plaintiff's responses thereto, the following facts emerge as undisputed:
An examination of the record indicates that one further fact is not legitimately in dispute. Although plaintiff Carolina asserts in its response to Kincaid's statement of undisputed material facts that a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether Kincaid and Rhodes entered into their agreement, whatever the substance of that agreement might have been, prior to the time that Carolina began to buy Kincaid furniture directly from Kincaid in July of 1979, it appears that plaintiff's assertion is founded on an error made by Rhodes in an interrogatory answer. That error has been corrected, and plaintiff has cited no independent facts to suggest than an understanding under which Rhodes was to buy Kincaid furniture was not entered into prior to the time that Carolina began to buy Kincaid furniture directly from Kincaid. (See Deposition of George Alden Thornton, III, at 45-46; Rhodes' Supplemental Response to Plaintiff's Second Interrogatory No. 3.)
In its brief in opposition to the defendants' motions for summary judgment, the plaintiff characterizes its antitrust claim:
Plaintiff's action is based on the theory that the concerted refusal of Kincaid and certain other North Carolina wholesalers to sell to plaintiff, as a result of pressure from defendant Rhodes is a group boycott and constitutes a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. It is a horizontal restraint for businessmen on the same distribution level to conspire to refuse to sell to a particular customer.
Thus, plaintiff...
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