Garrett v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 21 August 1987
• Docket Number: Civ. No. JH-86-582.
• Citation: 684 F. Supp. 407
• Parties: Larry GARRETT, individually and as father and next friend of James S. Garrett, a minor; and Paul R. Gaboury, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Christopher B. Gaboury, deceased, Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

684 F. Supp. 407

Larry GARRETT, individually and as father and next friend of James S. Garrett, a minor; and Paul R. Gaboury, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Christopher B. Gaboury, deceased, Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant.

Civ. No. JH-86-582.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

August 21, 1987.

Harold A. Sakayan, Gerald I. Holtz, and Margolis, Sakayan & Holtz, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs.

Robert E. Powell, Clement D. Erhardt, III, and Smith, Somerville & Case, Baltimore, Md., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOSEPH C. HOWARD, District Judge.

Plaintiffs have brought this diversity action against defendant Ford for personal injury and wrongful death based upon negligence, breach of warranty and strict liability in tort.

On August 29, 1985, James S. Garrett and Christopher B. Gaboury were rear seat passengers in a 1985 Ford Escort. The car, driven by Christina Kisamore, collided head on with a tractor trailer truck. At the time of the collision, both Garrett and Gaboury were wearing the lap seat belts which came as standard equipment in the rear seat of the Escort.

Garrett and Gaboury each suffered severe abdominal injuries allegedly caused by the lap belts they were using at the time of the accident. Gaboury died approximately five hours after the accident and Garrett is paralyzed from the waist down.

Pending before the Court is defendant Ford's motion for judgment on the pleadings, or in the alternative, for summary judgment.

I.

Ford's motion presents this Court with a problem of statutory construction involving the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (the Act). Pub.L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (now codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431). The Act stands as a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme contemplating detailed performance and safety standards for particular motor vehicle equipment. This legislation reflected a conviction to reduce traffic accidents and the deaths, injuries, and property damage which occur in such accidents. S.Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2709. Secondarily, the centralized, mass production, high volume character of the motor vehicle industry in the United States created the subsidiary purpose of establishing uniform national safety standards for motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment. Id. at 2720.

The safety standard involved in this case is Congress' 1974 amendment to the Act which addresses regulatory standards for occupant restraint systems. That amendment provides that:

Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (3), no Federal motor vehicle safety standard respecting occupant restraint systems may —

(A) have the effect of requiring, or

(B) provide that a manufacturer is permitted to comply with such standard by means of,

an occupant restraint system other than a belt system.

15 U.S.C. § 1410b(b)(2).

An occupant restraint system is defined as a "system the principle purpose of which is to assure that occupants of a motor vehicle remain in their seats in the event of a collision or rollover." 15 U.S.C. § 1410b(f)(3). More importantly, the term "belt system" is "an occupant restraint system consisting of integrated lap and shoulder belts for front outboard occupants and lap belts for other occupants." 15 U.S.C. § 1410b(f)(2).

Ford claims to have conformed with this safety standard in manufacturing the Escort, and contends that compliance with the federal standard preempts plaintiff's common law claims. Principally, defendants rely upon the supremacy clause contained in the Act which provides in part that:

Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard. Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing any State from enforcing any safety standard which is identical to a Federal safety standard.

15 U.S.C. § 1392(d).

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, point the section of the Act which provides that "compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any liability under common law." 15 U.S. C. § 1397(c).

II.

Because Ford's preemption argument has convinced other District Courts, this Court will consider it in some detail.

Ford argues that preemption can occur in several ways.

First, when enacting a federal statute, Congress may expressly state an intent to preempt state law. Second, even absent express preemptive language, Congress may otherwise indicate its intention to preempt state law by legislating so comprehensively that it has "left no room for the States to supplement federal law." Third, even absent an express or implied Congressional intent to preempt state law, state law will be preempted if the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."

(citations omitted). This Court finds none of the three preemption arguments to be persuasive.¹

Ford's first argument in favor of express preemption is undercut by Congress' explicit provision allowing for common law liability in the savings clause. If Congress had intended to expressly preempt state law it presumably would have done so; it certainly would not have included the savings clause.

Next, it is clear that Congress did not intend to legislate comprehensively and occupy the entire field of motor vehicle safety as Ford's second argument suggests. Not only did Congress expressly permit identical regulation, 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d), but the states may also regulate areas not specifically addressed by Congress, Chrysler Corp. v. Rhodes, 416 F.2d 319, 323 (1st Cir.1969).

Ford's third preemption argument also fails. The expressly declared purpose of the Act was to reduce deaths and injuries resulting from traffic accidents, 15 U.S.C. § 1381. Ford contends that Congress' purpose for the Act was to create uniformity in safety standards. While this was one of Congress' incidental concerns, it was not the primary one. Congress intended the Act to save the lives of automobile passengers through safety standards; not the dollars of automobile manufacturers through uniformity.

Defendant also has an additional problem; namely, the plain language of the supremacy clause contained in the Act. The clause specifically prohibits a state or a political subdivision of a state from establishing standards which conflict with the federal standards. The language does not, on its face, indicate any Congressional intent to preempt a common law claim.

Such a construction, that a common law claim is not state regulation, according to Ford, "plainly contradicts Supreme Court opinions." Furthermore, "numerous Supreme Court opinions hold ... that state court decisions and jury awards are no less state action than acts of the state legislature or executive branches." Ford, however, in its briefs only supports its position by citing two cases.

The first case, San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959), involves the National Labor Relations Act. The Supreme Court has articulated that different standards are involved to preserve the N.L. R.B.'s jurisdiction, see Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders International Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491, 502, 104 S.Ct. 3179, 3185-86, 82 L.Ed.2d 373 (1984) (even when the state law regulates conduct only arguably protected by federal law, a presumption of preemption applies). The second case is Sears, Roebuck & Co., v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 84 S.Ct. 784, 11 L.Ed.2d 661 (1964). Sears, however, dealt with the preemption of an Illinois unfair competition law which directly conflicted with federal patent law. The present case involves the preemption of a common law tort claim. Id. at 225, 84 S.Ct. at 784. It is undisputed that the Act's supremacy clause would preempt a state from enforcing laws which are not consistent with those contained in the Act.

Finally, Ford contends that three very recent cases control the disposition of the motion.

This Court disagrees with the reasoning in the first case cited by Ford, Vanover v. Ford Motor Co., 632 F.Supp. 1095 (E.D.Mo. 1986). Vanover relies on San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959), to establish the proposition that a common law claim can be preempted by the supremacy clause of the Act, 632 F.Supp. at 1096. Garmon involved a presumption of preemption which does not occur in the present case. In a case involving the N.L. R.B., like Garmon, even when the state law regulates conduct only arguably protected by federal law, a presumption of preemption applies. Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders International Union Local 54, 468 U.S. at 502, 104 S.Ct. at 3185-86. Without first establishing this crucial proposition, a conclusion of preemption cannot be reached.

Next, Ford cites Cox v. Baltimore County, 646 F.Supp. 761 (D.Md.1986). Judge Motz held that "there is nothing in the language of the Safety Act or its legislative history to suggest that the term `safety standard' is intended to encompass only standards adopted by a regulatory body." Id. at 763. Judge Motz inferred from this lack of language that a common law claim can be a regulatory standard and therefore preempted. Preemption, however, cannot be based on the lack of language. This inference is contrary to the savings clause which explicitly preserves all common law claims.

The Court continued that a common law claim which permits the recovery of damages for its breach sets a standard of regulation, 646 F.Supp. at 763....