Garrison v. Mollers North America, Inc.

• Citation: 820 F. Supp. 814
• Decision Date: 21 April 1993
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 89-597-JLL.
• Parties: Herbert R. GARRISON, Jr., Individually, and as Executor of the Estate of Herbert R. Garrison and Faye J. Mills as next friend of Kristen Lynne Garrison, a Minor and Kimberly Lynne Garrison, a Minor, Plaintiffs, v. MOLLERS NORTH AMERICA, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Moellers Mashinenfabrik Gmbh U. Co., a West German Corporation, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

820 F. Supp. 814

Herbert R. GARRISON, Jr., Individually, and as Executor of the Estate of Herbert R. Garrison and Faye J. Mills as next friend of Kristen Lynne Garrison, a Minor and Kimberly Lynne Garrison, a Minor, Plaintiffs, v. MOLLERS NORTH AMERICA, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Moellers Mashinenfabrik Gmbh U. Co., a West German Corporation, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 89-597-JLL.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

April 21, 1993.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Donald L. Gouge, Jr., Heiman, Aber and Goldlust, Wilmington, DE, and Peter M. Patton, Galfand, Berger, Lurie, Brigham & March, Philadelphia, PA, of counsel, for plaintiffs.

Francis J. Murphy, and Carolee Burton Kunz, Murphy & Welch, Wilmington, DE, and Peter R. Engelhardt, Summit, NJ, of counsel, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

LATCHUM, Senior District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

On October 27, 1989, plaintiff Herbert R. Garrison, Jr., in his individual capacity and in his capacity as executor on behalf of the estate of his late father Herbert R. Garrison, Sr., and plaintiff Faye J. Mills, in her capacity as next friend on behalf of her minor daughters, Kristen Lynne Garrison and Kimberly Lynne Garrison, brought this wrongful death action against defendants, Mollers North America ("Mollers NA") and Moellers Maschinenfabrik GMBH U. Co. ("Moellers Germany").¹ (D.I. 1.) The decedent, Herbert R. Garrison, Sr., was employed by the General Chemical Corporation as an electrical specialist in the maintenance department at the company's plant in Claymont, Delaware. On November 11, 1987, the plant foreman, Mr. Paul Gerdeman, asked the decedent to examine the Mollers PFS palletizer.² Although the palletizer was performing its task, the slip sheet placer mechanism was moving erratically. Initially, the decedent observed the operation of the palletizer from a safe distance in an attempt to diagnose the problem. After studying the palletizer for a few moments, the decedent placed his head into the palletizer beneath its large metal arms to obtain a better view of the slip sheet placer. The palletizer was still energized. The arms of the palletizer descended, struck the decedent, and killed him.

The case was tried before a jury from January 11, 1993 to January 13, 1993. The jury returned a general verdict, accompanied by answers to interrogatories, on behalf of the plaintiffs. (D.I. 103.) Specifically, the jury found that the plaintiffs had suffered $937,500.00 in compensatory damages and further found the defendants 75% negligent and the decedent 25% comparatively negligent. Id. Thereafter, the Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 entered a judgment against defendants in the amount of $703,125.00, reducing the $937,500 of compensatory damages found by the jury by 25% to account for the comparative negligence of the decedent. (D.I. 106.)

The defendants have moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 for a judgment as a matter of law, or, alternatively, for a new trial or remittitur. (D.I. 108.) The Court will discuss these alternative requests seriatim.

II. DISCUSSION

A. DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

A post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contests the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the jury's verdict. A question as to the sufficiency of the evidence concerns the allocation of functions between judge and jury, and is thus procedural. In essence, the Rule 50(b) motion requests that the reviewing court enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of the movant because there is insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to have found to the contrary, and therefore, the trial court should not have submitted the case to the jury for decision. Accordingly, even in a diversity case, such as the case at bar, where state law supplies the substantive rule of decision, a Rule 50(b) motion presents a question of federal law., Rotondo v. Keene Corp., 956 F.2d 436, 438 (3d Cir.1992), citing Woods v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 347 F.2d 760, 768 (3d Cir.1965).

Rule 50(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "articulates the standard for the granting of a motion for judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a) advisory committee's note. In pertinent part Rule 50(a)(1) states:

If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard with respect to an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to have found for that party with respect to that issue, the court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party on any claim ... that cannot under the controlling law be maintained without a favorable finding on that issue.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). If the court denies a party's Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence, Rule 50(b) permits that party to renew its motion for judgment as a matter of law within 10 days after the entry of judgment. According to the text of Rule 50(b), the justification for permitting the renewal of a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) is that in denying the party's Rule 50(a) motion "the court is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion." Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b).³

A post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b) should be granted only when there is no legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to have found for the non-moving party. In considering a post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b), a reviewing court "must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Keith v. Truck Stops Corp. of America, 909 F.2d at 745; see also Kelly v. Matlack, Inc., 903 F.2d 978, 981 (3d Cir. 1990) (same). The reviewing court must give the non-moving party, "as the verdict winner, the benefit of all logical inferences that could be drawn from the evidence presented, resolve all conflicts in the evidence in his favor, and in general, view the record in the light most favorable to him." Williamson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1348 (3d Cir.1991) reh'g, en banc, denied, 1991 U.S.App. LEXIS 16758 (3d Cir.1991), appeal dismissed w.o. opinion, 947 F.2d 939 (3d Cir.1991). If "`the record contains the minimum quantum of evidence from which a jury might reasonably afford relief'," Keith, 909 F.2d at 745, quoting Smollett v. Skayting Dev. Corp., 793 F.2d 547, 548 (3d Cir.1986), then the reviewing court must deny the motion. Thus, "where there is sufficient conflicting evidence, or insufficient evidence to conclusively establish the movant's case, judgment as a matter of law after the verdict should not be awarded." 5A Moore, et al., supra, ¶ 50.072 at p. 50-78. The reviewing court should not grant a judgment as a matter of law merely because its view of the evidence differs with that manifest in the jury's verdict. Such action on the part of the reviewing court would constitute a usurpation of the jury's province as factfinder. Newman v. Exxon Corp., 722 F.Supp. 1146, 1147 (D.Del.1989), affirmed w.o. opinion, 904 F.2d 695 (3d Cir.1990) ("Although a court in viewing the evidence of record may have reached a different conclusion from that reached by the jury, that alone is not reason to enter judgment n.o.v.").

Application of these principles to the case at bar militates against the imposition of judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs' primary theory of recovery was that the defendants' PFS palletizer was defectively designed. The defendants contend that there was insufficient evidence in the record for a reasonable jury to make such a finding of defective design. In support of their contention, the defendants point to the various safety features of the PFS palletizer and its heretofore unblemished safety record of 570,000 hours of actual operating time without a single mishap. The PFS palletizer has two methods for emergency shut down in the event of an accident. First, the equipment operator, stationed at a distance from the PFS palletizer in the control room, can de-energize the machine by depressing the emergency stop button on the control panel. Second, any person standing near the palletizer can de-energize the palletizer by inserting the safety pin into a hole located at the base of the palletizer. In the event that the safety pin is not readily accessible, a ferrous metal object, such as a wedding band or a coin, can be placed near the vicinity of the hole to de-energize the palletizer. The PFS palletizer at the General Chemical Corporation plant in Claymont, Delaware, also was installed with various warning signs, guard rails, and painted caution lines. Workers and maintenance employees were also given instruction on the operation of the palletizer and were required by the Claymont, Delaware plant's work rules to never place themselves in the way of moving parts of an energized machine. Finally, the defendants' expert, Mr. Jack Raymus, testified that the PFS palletizer is a safe machine and that the back of the palletizer creates a natural barrier which effectively obstructs a person from placing himself in the path of the palletizer's large moving arms.

The plaintiffs contend that these safety features of the PFS palletizer are defective. Plaintiffs' experts, Mr. Harry Eiermann and Dr. Stephen Wilcox, testified that these safety features suffer from a fundamental flaw. All of the above safety features are operator dependent. Accordingly, their effectiveness is conditioned upon the performance of people. These safety features do not take into account inherent human limitations such as inattentiveness, fatigue, and habituation.⁴ Given the natural limitations of people, the only way to avoid accidents is to guard the moving arms of the palletizer by surrounding them with a cage barrier, such as that supplied on the German...