Garvin v. Baker
Decision Date | 30 May 1952 |
Parties | GARVIN et ux. v. BAKER, Mayor, et al. (two cases). |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Mizell & Carmichael, West Palm Beach, for appellants.
Russell O. Morrow, West Palm Beach, for appellees.
There are two appeals from separate judgments in two mandamus suits between the same parties and relating to the same subject matter. An opinion in one case could not be written without referring to some of the matters in the other case and it is more expedient to write one opinion controlling both cases.
With reference to mandamus proceedings there are certain well-established fundamental principles and these principles are applicable to each of these cases.
The granting of the writ of mandamus is largely discretionary in the Court of original jurisdiction. It is not a matter of right. See State ex rel. Elston Bank & Trust Co. v. Sholtz, 122 Fla. 333, 165 So. 670; Tampa Water Works Co. v. State ex rel. Tampa, 77 Fla. 705, 82 So. 230.
The writ of mandamus will not be allowed in cases of doubtful right. The legal right of the relator to an order compelling the performance of some particular act must be clear and complete. See Campbell v. State ex rel. Garrett, 133 Fla. 638, 183 So. 340; State ex rel. Long v. Carey, 121 Fla. 515, 164 So. 199.
These cases involve the refusal of the Board of City Commissioners of Lake Worth to approve certain plats or maps of property within the City of Lake Worth so that the same could be filed and recorded with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Palm Beach County. Where the law confers discretionary authority upon officials or boards and makes the exercise of such discretion a prerequisite to action taken, such action or discretion will not be controlled by mandamus unless the discretion conferred is abused and illegally violates the rights of complaining parties. Nelson v. Lindsey, 151 Fla. 596, 10 So.2d 131. Mandamus will lie to compel an administrative board to act but it will not lie to control the discretion of such board. City of Miami Beach v. State ex rel. Ross, 141 Fla. 407, 193 So. 543; State ex rel. Long v. Carey, supra.
After a motion filed by the appellees to quash the alternative writ was denied, they filed their return and the case proceeded to trial. The testimony was taken and thereafter the Court entered the following Final Judgment:
'This cause was duly tried before the Court.
It will therefore be observed that the able Circuit Judge did not pass upon any zoning law with reference to the depth or length of lots, but he did pass upon the authority of the City by ordinance to require streets to be conformable as nearly as practicable to existing streets. The Court held that the City had not abused its discretion in requiring the streets shown upon the plat to have a width of sixty feet in conformity with other street with which it connected. There was no error in this finding by the Circuit Judge, or in the entry of the final judgment.
It requires no citation of authority to eatablish the fact that a wide street changing into a narrow street, or a narrow street changing into a wide street, constitutes a hazardous traffic condition. Accidents are happening upon the highways every day where the width of a road or street is suddenly changed, or a wide road runs into a narrow bridge. The changing of the width of streets and roads involves the public welfare and safety to a high degree, and public authorities having jurisdiction of such matters have a duty to perform in order to protect the public from hazardous and dangerous traffic conditions.
After the entry of the final judgment on the 14th of March, 1951, the appellants on the 22nd of March, 1951, filed a motion for leave to amend the alternative writ in which they sought to show that subsequent to the entry of the final judgment, their plat had been revised and amended and had again been presented to the Board of Commissioners of the City of Lake Worth, and that the Board had again refused to approve the said plat. The notification of such refusal was contained in a letter to the attorney for the appellants, reading as follows:
'If you should desire additional information, you may feel free to contract this office, the City Attorney or the Building Inspector.
'Yours very truly,
s/W. F. Clark
W. F. Clark
City Manager'
On the 27th day of March, 1951, the Circuit Judge made an order upon the motion for leave to file an amended writ of mandamus, reading as follows:
'This cause was duly presented by counsel for the parties upon the plaintiffs' motion for leave to file an amended writ of mandamus, which motion was filed March 22, 1951.
'Apparently a consideration of an amended alternative writ of mandamus now sought to be issued after the Final Judgment would present entirely new questions of law and of fact which were not determined during the trial of the case on the merits.
'It would therefore appear more appropriate that these new matters be considered in a new suit.
'Thereupon, it is ordered that the plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend alternative writ of mandamus be denied, without prejudice.'
The entry of the above order is assigned as error. There was no showing in the motion for leave to amend that the revised plat was not contrary to the ordinance of the City of Lake Worth, or that the ordinance of the City of Lake Worth was unreasonable and arbitrary, or that the appellants sought any additional information from the City Attorney or the Building Inspector with reference to the ordinance mentioned in the above quoted letter. Granting of leave to amend under the circumstances shown by this case was in the sound judicial discretion of the trial Judge, and there was no abuse of his discretion. There is no merit in this assignment of error.
Appellants contend that the refusal of the Board of City Commissioners to approve the plat or map is equivalent to taking their property without due process of law. There is no merit in this...
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