Garza v. State
| Decision Date | 07 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | NUMBER 13-16-00245-CR |
| Parties | CHARLES GARZA, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On appeal from the 347th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.
Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Hinojosa
Appellant Charles Garza appeals his conviction for possessing, with intent to deliver, between four and 200 grams of methamphetamine, a first-degree felony. SeeTEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112 (a), (d) (West, Westlaw though 2017 1st C.S.). After finding that appellant is a habitual felony offender, the jury sentenced appellant to forty years' confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (West, Westlaw though 2017 1st C.S.). In six issues appellant argues: (1) the trial court erred by admitting discovery and a judgment from a civil asset forfeiture case; (2) the trial court erred by admitting the audio statement of a testifying witness; (3) the trial court erred by re-opening evidence after the jury began deliberating; (4) the State violated appellant's due process rights by suppressing favorable, material evidence; (5) the trial court submitted an erroneous punishment jury charge, resulting in a sentence unsupported by necessary findings; and (6) the trial court proceedings were infected with cumulative error, warranting a new trial. We affirm.
In October 2013, Corpus Christi Police Department SWAT officers executed a no-knock warrant at the home of Henry Velasquez. During the search, the officers encountered several individuals in different areas of the home. Appellant was located in one of the bedrooms with Rodolfo "Rudy" Ramos and Richard Ambriz. In the bedroom where appellant was located, the officers found a safe on the bed which contained approximately 27 grams of methamphetamine, a box of sandwich bags, a spoon, a light bulb, some change, and a digital scale. Officers were told by Ramos that the safe belonged to appellant. Appellant previously lived in the home and the room he was in was his former bedroom. Officers ultimately linked the safe and its contents to appellant. Velasquez and his girlfriend were located in another bedroom. In that room there was adrawer full of money and a shoe box containing 172.84 grams of cocaine. Velasquez pleaded guilty to the possession of the cocaine and received a fifteen-year sentence. He testified that he was not selling the methamphetamine and the safe did not belong to him.
Appellant was charged by indictment with first-degree possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE Ann. § 481.112 (a), (d). The State also gave notice that it would seek to punish as him a habitual felony offender. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d). Count 1 of the indictment alleged that on or about October 3, 2013, in Nueces County, Texas, appellant did then and there knowingly possess, with intent to deliver, a controlled substance, namely, cocaine, in an amount of four grams or more but less than 200 grams; and count 2 of the indictment alleged that appellant, on or about October 3, 2013, in Nueces County, Texas, did then and there knowingly possess, with intent to deliver, a controlled substance, namely, methamphetamine, in an amount of four grams or more but less than 200 grams.
The State moved to dismiss the first count of the indictment. Subsequently appellant was found guilty of the second count of the indictment. The jury then found that appellant was a habitual felony offender and assessed his punishment at forty years' imprisonment. This appeal followed.
By his first two issues, appellant contends that the trial court erred by admitting inadmissible evidence, specifically: (1) discovery and a judgment from a civil asset forfeiture case; and (2) the audio statement of a testifying witness.
An appellate court reviewing a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence must utilize an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Prystash v. State, 3 S.W.3d 522, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). In other words, the appellate court must uphold the trial court's ruling if it was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Weatherred, 15 S.W.3d at 542; Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). In addition, the appellate court must review the trial court's ruling in light of what was before the trial court at the time the ruling was made. Hoyos v. State, 982 S.W.2d 419, 422 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Hardesty v. State, 667 S.W.2d 130, 133 n. 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
Appellant argues that the trial court erred by admitting the agreed judgment and additional documents from his civil asset forfeiture case on the grounds that the documents were irrelevant, prejudicial, settlement negotiations or plea discussions, and unauthenticated hearsay.
Appellant argues that the exhibit containing the civil asset forfeiture documents, specifically the agreed judgment, was inadmissible as a settlement negotiation or plea discussion. See TEX. R. EVID. R. 408, 410.
Rule 408 of the Texas Rules of Evidence states:
Id. Here, the State's use of the evidence was to establish a link between the appellant and the recovered money. Specifically, they were corroborating the testifying officer's statement that the money was found on appellant's person. Their intention, therefore, was to use the forfeiture documents, which were created to facilitate the agreed judgment, to prove the validity of a disputed claim, which is specifically prohibited under rule 408. See TEX. R. EVID. R. 408; see also Casamento v. State, No. 05-91-00294-CR, 1992 WL 224567, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 11, 1992, no pet.) (mem. op. not designated for publication) ( that the use of a civil forfeiture judgment was admissible in criminal case for purposes of impeachment where the defendant took the stand and testified that he had no association to the money involved in the forfeiture proceeding). Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the civil forfeiture documents.2
Because we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, we must now evaluate for harm. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2. Generally, if the trial court's ruling merely offends the rules of evidence, the erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence is non-constitutional error for purposes of a harm analysis. See Celis v. State, 354 S.W.3d 7, 38 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2011), aff'd 416 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Non-constitutional errors that do not affect substantial rights must be disregarded. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). Inadmissible evidence can be rendered harmless if other evidence at trial is admitted without objection and it proves the same fact that the inadmissible evidence sought to prove. Anderson v. State, 717 S.W.2d 622, 628 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc). The State sought to use the inadmissible civil forfeiture documents to establish a link between appellant and the contraband, specifically to show that the cash that was seized belonged to appellant. Appellant argues that the jury may have taken the documents as an admission of guilt because the documents state that the money was his. Appellant argues that his defense strategy focused on the lack of links between himself and the contraband. The information in exhibit 60 allowed the State to present the link between appellant and the contraband as an admission of guilt by appellant. Appellant's argument that the documents were inadmissible states that admission of the exhibit "undoubtedly operated as an admission of guilt in the jury's eyes, distinguishing [appellant] from the other two potential defendants and resulting in a guilty verdict."
The State, however, brought this same information in through its testifying officer without objection:
In a hearing outside the presence of the jury, appellant objected to Officer Larock's testimony and his objection was overruled; no running objection to the evidence was requested nor received. Subsequently, when the testimony was presented to the jury, appellant did not object. See Clay v. State, 361 S.W.3d 762, 766-67 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.) ( that where appellant failed to obtain a running objection to the evidence and did not object to the evidence each time it was offered, he did not preserve error). "It is defense counsel's responsibility to object every time allegedly inadmissible evidence is offered, and when counsel objects to certain inadmissible testimony, but then permits similar evidence to come in without objection, the complaint is deemed cured." Brown v. State, 692 S.W.2d 146, 151 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st...
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