Garza v. State

• Decision Date: 04 March 2020
• Docket Number: S-19-0108
• Citation: 458 P.3d 1239
• Parties: Christian J. GARZA, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Wyoming, Respondent.
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

458 P.3d 1239

Christian J. GARZA, Petitioner,

v.The STATE of Wyoming, Respondent.

S-19-0108

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

March 4, 2020

Representing Petitioner: Alex F. Freeburg, Freeburg Law LLC, Jackson, Wyoming

Representing Respondent: Bridget Hill, Wyoming Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney General; Joshua C. Eames, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Timothy P. Zintak, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Zintak.

Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

DAVIS, Chief Justice.

[¶1] A jury found Christian Garza guilty of misdemeanor interference with a peace officer after he verbally refused to provide a blood sample pursuant to a search warrant. After the district court affirmed his conviction, Mr. Garza filed a petition for writ of review in this Court. We granted the petition and now affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2] Mr. Garza presents two issues, which we restate as:

1. Was the jury presented with sufficient evidence to find Mr. Garza guilty of misdemeanor interference with a peace officer?

2. Did the circuit court err in rejecting Mr. Garza’s proposed jury instruction concerning the type of verbal conduct that may constitute interference with a peace officer?

FACTS

[¶3] In the early morning hours of December 3, 2017, Deputy Bradley Goering of the Teton County Sheriff’s Office was patrolling Highway 22 in Teton County and stopped a vehicle driven by Christian Garza. After talking to and observing Mr. Garza, Deputy Goering arrested him on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol and read him Wyoming’s implied consent advisement. Mr. Garza said he wanted an attorney and refused consent to any type of testing. Deputy Goering then transported him to the county jail and applied for a search warrant.

[¶4] After obtaining the search warrant, Deputy Goering presented it to Mr. Garza. He explained that the warrant was signed by a judge, that it authorized him to take Mr. Garza to the hospital to have his blood drawn, and that at that point it was no longer consensual. Mr. Garza asked to have his attorney there and to make a telephone call, and Deputy Goering advised him that he was not entitled to have an attorney present and that he could make his telephone call when they returned from the hospital. Deputy Goering then advised Mr. Garza that if he refused or obstructed the blood draw in any way, he would be charged with interference. He went on, "You’re welcome to fight this in court, but you don’t get to fight it now."

[¶5] Deputy Goering transported Mr. Garza to the hospital and was met there by his backup officer, Officer Thomas Quinn of the Jackson Police Department. Because Mr. Garza was under arrest, his hands and legs were restrained and remained so inside the hospital. The two officers and Mr. Garza entered a small examination room, and Deputy Goering directed Mr. Garza to a chair. While Deputy Goering completed paperwork, a hospital worker prepared for the blood draw. When the hospital worker approached Mr. Garza and asked him which arm he would like the blood drawn from, Mr. Garza stated, "I’m not allowing you to take any blood from me." Deputy Goering then asked, "You’re going to refuse to give any blood?" and Mr. Garza nodded. Deputy Goering again advised him that the warrant was signed by a judge and that Mr. Garza would be charged with interference with a peace officer if he refused. Mr. Garza maintained his position that he would not comply and wanted to speak to an attorney, and he added that he felt discriminated against and did not trust the officers or the hospital worker.

[¶6] On March 16, 2018, the State filed an information charging Mr. Garza with misdemeanor interference with a peace officer, and on April 11, 2018, a one-day jury trial was held. Deputy Goering and Officer Quinn testified, and their body camera recordings from the county jail and hospital were admitted into evidence, as was the search warrant. After the State rested, Mr. Garza moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the court denied. The case then went to the jury, and it returned a guilty verdict. Mr. Garza renewed his motion for a judgment of acquittal, and the court again denied the motion.

[¶7] On that same day, the circuit court issued its judgment and sentence. It sentenced Mr. Garza to 365 days in county jail, with all but 75 days suspended, and imposed a $1,000 fine. It also ordered that Mr. Garza serve three years of unsupervised probation. Mr. Garza appealed to the district court, and that court affirmed. He then petitioned this Court for a writ of review, which we granted.

DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[¶8] In reviewing Mr. Garza’s sufficiency of the evidence claim, we

decide whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of a charged crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt on the evidence presented. In doing so, we assume that the State’s evidence is true, disregard any evidence favoring the defendant, and give the State the benefit of every favorable inference that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. We will not reweigh the evidence or re-examine witness credibility. Because direct evidence of intent is rare, and circumstantial evidence is most often the only proof available, we have held that intent may be proven by circumstantial evidence alone.

Bittleston v. State , 2019 WY 64, ¶ 17, 442 P.3d 1287, 1292 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting Jones v. State , 2019 WY 45, ¶ 28, 439 P.3d 753, 762 (Wyo. 2019) ).

[¶9] Mr. Garza does not dispute the facts in this case, but instead contends that his respectful refusal to comply with a search warrant is not the type of verbal conduct that can constitute interference with a peace officer. In support, he points to our decision in Matthews v. State , 2014 WY 54, 322 P.3d 1279 (Wyo. 2014). In Matthews , the defendant entered a conditional guilty plea by which he preserved three issues for review, including the question of whether his refusal to comply with a search warrant after being arrested for driving under the influence could constitute interference with a peace officer. Matthews , ¶ 16, 322 P.3d at 1281. The trial court had not decided this issue, holding that in Mr. Matthews’ case there were issues of fact to be determined at trial. Id. We held that the issue was not properly the subject of a conditional plea because "the interference charge could not be ruled upon without development of the underlying facts at trial." Id . ¶ 17, 322 P.3d at 1281. In so holding, we added in a footnote:

Based on the record before us, it does not appear that the officer’s request for Mr. Matthews to comply with the warrant, and Mr. Matthews’ negative response, is sufficient to constitute interference; however, this determination will have to await a full development of the record at trial.

Matthews , ¶ 17 n.2, 322 P.3d at 1282 n.2.

[¶10] Mr. Garza seizes on the first clause of our footnote in Matthews as controlling and contends that his case is no different. His reliance is misplaced. First, the footnote in Matthews is dicta, and thus should not be relied upon as substantive authority. In re Claim of Prasad , 11 P.3d 344, 348 (Wyo. 2000) (citing Bales v. Brome , 53 Wyo. 370, 380, 84 P.2d 714, 717 (1938) ); Jordin v. State , 2018 WY 64, ¶ 15, 419 P.3d 527, 532 (Wyo. 2018). Furthermore, in Matthews , we did not suggest that a defendant’s refusal to comply with a search warrant could not constitute interference as a matter of law. Instead, we recognized that interference is a fact sensitive question that must be decided by a trier of fact. See Brown v. State , 2005 WY 37, ¶ 21, 109 P.3d 52, 58 (Wyo. 2005) ("The criminality of Brown’s behavior toward Officer Hood was for the trier of fact to decide."); Newton v. State , 698 P.2d 1149, 1151 (Wyo. 1985) (whether speech resulted in obstruction, interference or impediment is a question of fact); Tillett v. State , 637 P.2d 261, 265 (Wyo. 1981) (finding interference under the facts).

[¶11] We turn then to the question of whether the jury could have rationally found Mr. Garza guilty of interference on the facts before it. Misdemeanor interference is statutorily defined as follows:

A person commits a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or both, if he knowingly obstructs, impedes or interferes with or resists arrest by a peace officer while engaged in the lawful performance of his official duties.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(a) (LexisNexis 2019).

[¶12] We have said that " ‘to interfere’ is defined as to check or hamper the action of the officers or to do something which hinders or prevents or tends to prevent the performance of his legal duties." Tillett , 637 P.2d at 265 n.2 (approving jury instruction). Interference does not require the "use of actual, direct or threatened force." Id. at 264 (citing Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law, 14th Edition, § 592, p. 305 (1981)). "[A] peace officer may be obstructed, interfered with or impeded in the lawful performance of his official duties in violation of § 6-5-204(a) by speech, passive or otherwise ...." Newton , 698 P.2d at 1151. We have also observed:

Each of the three words, "obstructs," "impedes" and "interferes," is a word of common usage and accepted meaning by those of ordinary intelligence. Dictionary synonyms include such words as "hinder," "intermeddle," "deter," "hamper," "prevent," "delay," "thwart" and "inhibit." All of these are words of recognized meaning by those of ordinary intelligence.

" * * * [T]he statute was made purposefully broad to cover actions which might not be otherwise unlawful, but which obstructed or hindered law enforcement officers in carrying out their duties. * * * " Hudson v. State , 135 Ga.App. 739, 218 S.E.2d 905, 907 (1975).

The legislative intent to prohibit that which would interfere with law enforcement officers as they go about their duties is manifest.

Newton , 698 P.2d at 1152.

[¶13] We have little...