Tillett v. State, 5525
| Decision Date | 11 December 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 5525,5525 |
| Citation | 637 P.2d 261 |
| Parties | Will TILLETT, Appellant (Defendant), v. STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
L. R. Garrett, Lovell, for appellant.
Steven F. Freudenthal, Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Crim. Div., Allen C. Johnson, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Sharon A. Lyman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee.
Before ROSE, C. J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROONEY and BROWN, JJ.
This appeal involves a challenge to appellant Will Tillett's conviction for interfering with a police officer as that crime is defined by § 6-8-602, W.S.1977. 1 A jury found Mr. Tillett guilty of the above charge on October 15, 1980, and sentence was entered on April 24, 1981. He frames the issues surrounding his conviction as follows:
1. Do words, name-calling and argument with police officers constitute interfering with police officers?
2. When a criminal statute requires that an act be done knowingly and willfully, are inferences contrary to direct testimony sufficient to prove an act was done knowingly and willfully and must the State prove the act was knowing and willful?
3. Did the information charge a criminal offense by charging appellant with interfering with police officers when the statute under which appellant was charged stated that it was a crime to interfere with peace officers?
4. Did the court err when it gave jury Instruction Number 7 over appellant's objection without adding the words, "This does not mean to obstruct or impede an officer."?
5. Did the court err in not giving appellant's offered Instruction A?
6. Did the court err in giving Instruction Number 12?
The only issue of substance concerns the sufficiency of the evidence supporting appellant's conviction. The other issues lack merit and will be addressed in a summary fashion.
We will affirm.
On January 22, 1980, Wyoming Highway Patrol Officers Wollack and Clavette stopped appellant's car for speeding on Wyoming State Highway 37. The record reflects that both automobiles were parked very close to the outer edge of the traveled pavement.
After the cars had been stopped, appellant Will Tillett left his vehicle and approached the patrol car. Officer Clavette had also exited his car. Tillett was asked by the officer to display his driver's license, but he refused to do so when he learned that the officer intended to cite him for speeding. When this request was made, appellant's driver's license was in his hand. At this juncture, appellant demanded that the radar gun be locked in and the patrol car impounded because these were items of evidence in the case. While making these demands in an angry tone, Mr. Tillett also hopped onto the hood of the patrol car. Officer Clavette once again asked appellant for his driver's license, and he again refused to surrender it, asserting that both officers were communistic and were behaving like the Gestapo. Finally, upon being informed by Officer Clavette that he would be arrested if he did not produce the license, Mr. Tillett complied. The officer then returned to the patrol car for the purpose of issuing the citation.
Officer Wollack had also exited the patrol car because of Tillett's obstreperous conduct and because he was worried about his partner's safety. Thereupon the appellant also expressed his opinions to Officer Wollack, who then asked Mr. Tillett to return to his car for his own safety as well as that of the officers and the traveling public.
Rather than comply with the officer's request, appellant raised his voice even louder and continued describing the officers as communistic and Gestapo-like. He also made threatening gestures at Officer Wollack. On at least two separate occasions, Officer Wollack asked appellant to return to his car, but appellant would not comply. Not until Wollack informed Tillett that he was under arrest, did he finally offer to return to his car. At this point, the officer informed Tillett that it was too late, and he undertook to handcuff appellant. A struggle ensued, whereupon Officer Clavette once again exited the vehicle in order to assist Officer Wollack and the appellant was thereupon taken into custody. He was then transported to the sheriff's office, where he was issued a citation for speeding and charged with interfering with a police officer.
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we have said many times that we will accept as true the evidence of the prosecution, leaving out of consideration evidence of the defendant in conflict therewith and giving to the State those inferences which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from it. McCarty v. State, Wyo., 616 P.2d 782 (1980); Reinholt v. State, Wyo., 601 P.2d 1311 (1979). We review appellant's challenge under these guidelines.
By reason of § 6-8-602, note 1 supra, the State was not only required to show that appellant knowingly and willfully interfered with Officer Wollack but also that the officer was engaged in the lawful performance of his duty at the time of the incident in question.
The use of actual, direct or threatened force is not indispensable to the commission of the crime of interfering with a police officer. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law, 14th Edition, § 592, p. 305 (1981); State v. Leigh, 278 N.C. 243, 179 S.E.2d 708 (1971); State v. Merrifield, 180 Kan. 267, 303 P.2d 155 (1956). Mere remonstrances or criticisms of an officer are, however, not ordinarily sufficient to sustain a charge of interference. McCook v. State, 145 Ga.App. 3, 243 S.E.2d 289 (1978); State v. Snodgrass, 117 Ariz. 107, 570 P.2d 1280 (1977); State v. Allen, 14 N.C.App. 485, 188 S.E.2d 568 (1972). The Supreme Court of the United States in District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1, 70 S.Ct. 468, 94 L.Ed. 599 (1949) described these propositions in the following manner:
"Although force or threatened force is not always an indispensable ingredient of the offense of interfering with an officer in the discharge of his duties, mere remonstrances or even criticisms of an officer are not usually held to be the equivalent of unlawful interference. * * * " 339 U.S. at 6, 70 S.Ct. at 470.
It has also been said that, while mere remonstrances are not enough, verbal abuse alone may become sufficient to constitute the crime where its intensity, or the totality of several acts is such as to amount to an interference with an officer in the performance of his duty. Pope v. State, Tenn.Cr.App., 528 S.W.2d 54 (1978); State v. Tages, 10 Ariz.App. 127, 457 P.2d 289 (1969); Annot., 44 A.L.R.3d 1018.
Appellant claims that his actions in this case amounted to no more than mere remonstrances directed at the officers, and therefore he could not have been guilty of interference. While we adopt the rule that mere remonstrances or criticism will not satisfy a charge of interference under § 6-8-602, we cannot agree with appellant that his conduct in this case falls within the ambit of that rule. Not only did appellant verbally criticize Officer Wollack, the record also reflects that he made threatening gestures to the officer and refused to return to his car when requested. In our view, such conduct on the part of the appellant amounted to interference as contemplated by § 6-8-602. It is quite probable that, had appellant merely criticized the officers and ended it there, he would never have been arrested. Unfortunately, he chose to go farther than the law allows.
Mr. Tillett goes on to contend that even if his conduct were to be thought about as being sufficient to sustain the charge, the State failed to prove that he knowingly interfered, or that Officer Wollack was discharging a duty at the time. We disagree with both of these contentions.
The requisite intent to commit an act can be inferred from the facts and totality of the circumstances existing at the time the criminal act is complete. Jones v. State, Wyo., 568 P.2d 837 (1977), Stuebgen v. State, Wyo., 548 P.2d 870 (1976). Appellant is considered by law to have intended the natural consequences of his act. Under these rules, it becomes obvious...
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