Gasque v. King, CUM CV-04-565
| Decision Date | 07 February 2005 |
| Docket Number | CUM CV-04-565 |
| Parties | Brian Gasque, Petitioner v. Dennis King, CEO, Spring Harbor Hospital, Respondent |
| Court | Maine Superior Court |
February 7, 2005
SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION
This case comes before the Court on Respondent Dennis King and Spring Harbor Hospital's Motion to Dismiss Petitioner Brian Gasque's application for a writ of habeas corpus.
On July 20, 2004, Brian Gasque (Gasque) was notified that Spring Harbor had filed an application in Cumberland County District Court seeking Gasque's involuntary commitment to its psychiatric facility. Gasque immediately contacted the District Court, and was told Attorney Rubin Segal had been appointed to represent him at his commitment hearing. Although Gasque immediately contacted Segal, Gasque first met his attorney August 3, 2004, the day before his commitment hearing, and the two had limited conversations before the hearing was held. Gasque maintains he was unprepared for the hearing, including for the questions he was expected to answer, the information he was required to provide, and his statutory right to chose an examiner or expert witnesses to testify on his behalf. The District Court committed Gasque to Spring Harbor for a period not to exceed 120 days. Gasque did not appeal this decision.
Instead on September 10, 2004, Gasque applied for a writ of habeas corpus under a provision of Maine's mental health hospitalization statutes, 34-B M.R.S.A. § 3804 (2004). Gasque maintained he was deprived of due process protections when he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the commitment hearing. Spring Harbor opposed Gasque's petition, arguing Gasque's right to effective counsel was not established and was adequately protected. The issue of what standards should be used to measure effective assistance of counsel for those facing involuntary commitment to psychiatric hospitals was and is an issue of first impression in Maine.
Two days before a hearing on this issue in Superior Court, Gasque was discharged from Spring Harbor Hospital. On October 21 2004, Spring Harbor filed this Motion to Dismiss Gasque's habeas corpus petition as moot. Gasque opposed the dismissal arguing that the issue of whether he was afforded effective assistance of counsel at his involuntary commitment hearing falls under certain exceptions to the doctrine of mootness.
In Maine, "courts should decline to decide issues which by virtue of ... circumstances have lost their controversial vitality." State v. Jordon, 1998 ME 174, ¶ 10 716 A.2d 1004, 1006. A case or controversy will be found moot when a court finds that not enough practical effects flow from resolving the litigation to justify the expense of limited judicial resources. Id. Nonetheless, even if a case is moot, the court may reach its merits if:
Monroe v. Town of Gray, 1999 ME 190, ¶ 5, 743 A.2d 1257, 1258 (citing Halfway House v. City of Portland, 670 A.2d 1377, 1380 (Me. 1996). The Law Court has stipulated that these three exceptions may also apply in the context of a habeas corpus petition. Leigh v Superintendent, AMHI, 2003 ME 22, ¶ 7 n.9, 817 A.2d 881, 884.
Because petitioner Gasque's application for a writ of habeas corpus to secure his release is technically moot, because Spring Harbor released him, the question now becomes whether any of the three exceptions to dismissal for mootness apply.
Under the doctrine of collateral consequences, a case, although technically moot, may be reviewed "where sufficient collateral consequences result from the appealed matter so as to justify relief." In re Walter R., 2004 ME 77, ¶ 9, 850 A.2d 346, 349. Thus, when a man with fourteen previous arrests was arrested, found incompetent to stand trial, and committed to AMHI, his incompetency determination was found to have no "collateral consequences" once he was released from AMHI and criminal charges were dropped, and the appeal of his habeas petition was held moot. Leigh v. Superintendent, AMHI, 2003 ME 22, ¶ 8 n.9, 817 A.2d 881, 884. However, the Law Court found an involuntary commitments pursuant to 34-B M.R.S.A. § 3864 were "similar to a criminal conviction, in that they not only result in a loss of liberty, but they also carry collateral consequences." In re Walter R., 2004 ME 77, ¶ 10, 850 A.2d 346, 349. One collateral consequence of the petitioner's involuntary commitment hearing "is the fact that if he faces a second commitment proceeding, the term of commitment will be up to one year." Id. (citing 34-B M.R.S.A. § 3864(7)).
Here, Spring Harbor argues that the collateral consequence exception only comes into play when an underlying judgment is appealed, but not on a habeas corpus petition. Spring Harbor cites Staples v. Sate, for the premise that habeas relief may not be sought except when the petitioner is under some form of restraint. 274 A.2d 715 (Me. 1971)( the Maine habeas petition of prisoner incarcerated in Nevada). This is clearly not the case. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 2000 ME 44, ¶ 4, 747 A.2d 1191, 1192 (). Alternatively, Spring Harbor argues there are no collateral consequences to Gasque's involuntary commitment.
Gasque argues that the collateral consequences of allowing his commitment to stand are significant because statutory provisions limit a first involuntary commitment to four months, but allow subsequent commitments to extend for up to a full year.[1]
Here, the Law Court has spoken directly to the collateral consequences of involuntary commitments under 34-B M.R.S.A. § 3864, finding that the collateral consequences exception applies when patients are subject to a longer commitment period in a second commitment proceeding.[2] In re Walter R., 2004 ME 77, ¶ 10, 850 A.2d 346, 349. The Law Court also noted that, given the evidence of the patient's mental history, "the possibility that he will face another mental health proceeding is not remote." Here, Gasque faces the identical collateral consequences of a first involuntary commitment as the patient in Walter, and presents evidence of a decades-long mental health history, that includes several suicide attempts and shows he could easily face a commitment hearing in the future.[3]
To determine whether an issue is important enough to fall under the public interest exception, the court will consider "whether the issue is private or public; whether court officials need an authoritative decision for future proceedings; and the likelihood of the issue repeating itself in the future." In re Walter R., 2004 ME 77, ¶ 12, 850 A.2d 346, 350 (citing Young v. Young, 2002 ME 167, ¶ 9, 810 A.2d 418, 422).
Spring Harbor argues the issue of what constitutes effective assistance of counsel in an involuntary commitment hearing is a matter of only private interest to Gasque. Spring Harbor also argues the matter is of "marginal" interest to the bar, and that the issue of ineffective counsel at commitment hearings is unlikely to recur in the future.
Gasque maintains the matter is of public interest, and was expressly said to be so by the Law Court. In In re Walter R., the Law Court stated issues of due process protections in an involuntary commitment hearing "are public issues because the State's interest in protecting the mentally ill is a public concern." 2004 ME 77, ¶ 12, 850 A.2d 346, 350. Gasque also maintains that an authoritative decision is needed because there is presently no case law of any kind in Maine on the issue of effective counsel in a civil commitment proceeding. Gasque also argues that the liberty interest at stake is great, and analogous to that of a criminal defendant facing incarceration. Finally, Gasque maintains that the sheer number of involuntary commitment hearings that take place in Maine every year, coupled with the active involvement of organizations like the Disability Rights Center of Maine, indicates that the issue of effective counsel at civil commitment hearings is highly likely to recur in the future.[4] This Court agrees that Gasque's petition meets the criteria for a public interest exception to the doctrine of mootness.
A third exception to the doctrine of mootness may be found when an issue "may be repeatedly presented to the trial court, yet escape appellate review because of its fleeting or indeterminate nature." Young v. Young, 2002 ME 167, ¶ 8, 810 A.2d 418, 422). "In order to qualify, the activity generating the issue by its very nature must be so short in duration that the issue will never be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration of the action. Sordyl v. Sordyl, 1997 ME 87, ¶ 7, 692 A.2d 1386, 1387 (citation omitted). "In addition, there must be a `reasonable expectation' or `demonstrated probability' that the same controversy will recur involving the same complaining party." Id. (citations omitted). Thus when an unwanted pregnancy was a significant factor in litigation, but was unlikely to extend throughout the time needed for appellate review, and was likely to be repeated, the litigation fell under this exception, and was not moot. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973).
Spring Harbor argues the issue is...
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