Gaston v. NNN Inv. Advisors

Decision Date03 May 2023
Docket Number4D22-2906
PartiesANGEL E. GASTON, Appellant, v. NNN INVESTMENT ADVISORS, LORRIE GEOFFREY, and RICHARD GRONDIN,
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit Palm Beach County; Scott Kerner, Judge; L.T. Case No 50-2022-CA-007374-XXXX-MB.

Angel E. Gaston, Tavares, pro se.

No appearance for appellees.

CONNER, J.

Angel E. Gaston ("Gaston") appeals the circuit court's dismissal with prejudice of his indigent prisoner complaint pursuant to mandatory prescreening under section 57.085(6), Florida Statutes (2022). The circuit court found his claims were either time barred or reasonably appeared to be intended to harass Defendants/Appellees NNN Investment Advisors ("NNN"), Lorrie Geoffrey, and Richard Grondin (collectively, "Defendants"). Of the four claims Gaston raised in his complaint, we affirm the circuit court's dismissal of three of them. Gaston concedes on appeal that the circuit court properly dismissed his claim for unjust enrichment, and we therefore affirm as to that claim without further comment. We also affirm as to Gaston's claims for civil conspiracy to defraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress, as he failed to preserve his arguments on appeal by raising them before the circuit court. However, we reverse the circuit court's dismissal with prejudice of his breach of contract claim, as the circuit court erred in finding that the complaint was reasonably intended to harass Defendants under section 57.085(6)(d).

Background

Gaston filed a civil complaint against Defendants for breach of contract, civil conspiracy to defraud, unjust enrichment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The complaint alleges as follows.

Gaston worked for NNN as a real estate associate and independent contractor pursuant to an employment and commission contract. The contract provided for a 50/50 split on commissions earned by NNN where Gaston was the procuring cause of the sale.

In 2017, Gaston negotiated and was the procuring cause of the sale of a building for a substantial sum. Due to "an unforeseen hospitalization," Gaston was unable to attend the closing. He alleged he was unable to notify Defendants of his hospitalization until after being discharged.

When Gaston reached out to Defendants after his hospitalization he learned that due to his absence in the days leading up to the closing, as well as at the closing itself, Defendants had decided to reduce his share of the commission. Additionally instead of a lump sum payment, Defendants stated his reduced commission would be paid in monthly installments over the course of a year.

Upset by this decision, Gaston began "repeatedly demanding payment of [his] commission," which led to criminal charges against him. Eventually, Defendants sent Gaston a letter of termination, stating that they would not be paying him any portion of the commission.

Although not alleged in the complaint, the appellate record reveals that Gaston's demands for payment and aggressive behavior towards Defendants resulted in Gaston being charged and convicted of aggravated stalking and threats or extortion. Gaston was sentenced to prison for the charges. Gaston filed his civil complaint while in prison.

The complaint was accompanied by an affidavit of indigency. The clerk of court determined that Gaston was indeed indigent and a prisoner, which prompted the circuit court to sua sponte prescreen his complaint pursuant to section 57.085(6).

Pursuant to this prescreening, the circuit court found that three of Gaston's four counts (civil conspiracy to defraud, unjust enrichment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress) failed to state a claim because those counts were time-barred by the four-year statute of limitations. The circuit court also found that his count for unjust enrichment was barred by his allegations of an express contract, and his count for intentional infliction of emotional distress was further barred by the absence of a physical injury. Accordingly, the circuit court dismissed those counts with prejudice.

As to the breach of contract count, the circuit court found that a five-year statute of limitations applied, but it could not determine from the face of the complaint whether the alleged breach occurred more than five years prior to the filing of the complaint. The circuit court then analyzed whether the breach of contract count was subject to dismissal pursuant to section 57.085(6)(d), as "frivolous, malicious, or reasonably appear[ing] to be intended to harass one or more named defendants." As part of this analysis, the circuit court reviewed the docket and certain docket entries in Gaston's criminal case. The circuit court did not take judicial notice of any of the criminal records.

The circuit court noted that Gaston pled guilty to charges of aggravated stalking and threats or extortion. Citing the probable cause affidavit, the circuit court further observed that Gaston's charges stemmed from his conduct toward Defendants after they declined to pay him the full commission. The probable cause affidavit detailed Gaston's excessive and disturbing communications with Defendants.

Based on the circuit court's review of records in the criminal case, combined with "the significant passage of time since the events of 2017 and the filing of the complaint in August 2022 and that he appears destined for prison due to twice violating his probation (albeit for conduct unrelated to [D]efendants)," the circuit court concluded that the complaint "reasonably appears to be intended to harass." Accordingly, the circuit court dismissed all claims with prejudice.

Appellate Analysis

"The standard of review for the dismissal of a complaint is de novo." Green v. Cottrell, 204 So.3d 22, 26 (Fla. 2016); see also James v. Goryl, 62 So.3d 1225, 1225 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011).

Section 57.085 was enacted to address the prevalence of frivolous civil suits by indigent inmates. Fla. Parole Comm'n v. Spaziano, 48 So.3d 714, 718 (Fla. 2010) (citing Ch. 96-106, preamble, at 92, Laws of Fla.). "The premise of [section 57.085] was that indigent inmates had abused the cost waiver [statute] by filing numerous frivolous lawsuits." Reed v. Mims, 711 So.2d 169, 170 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). To effectuate this intent, section 57.085 requires circuit courts to screen indigent inmate complaints to determine whether the action is legally sufficient to state a cause of action. See § 57.085(6), Fla. Stat. (2022). As part of this review, the circuit court "shall" dismiss any claims that (among other things) are found to be frivolous, malicious, or intended to harass. See § 57.085(6)(d), Fla. Stat. (2022). "Actions not found to be frivolous or malicious or otherwise subject to dismissal under the act will proceed, but with the requirement that the prisoner prepay filing fees and related costs or be subject to a lien on his or her inmate trust account." Spaziano, 48 So.3d at 718.

"Although section 57.085 must be interpreted so as to accomplish its intended purpose, it must also be applied flexibly so as to allow access to courts for those with legitimate claims." Reed, 711 So.2d at 172. "Thus, where it appears that a pleading's deficiencies can be cured by an amendment, a reasonable opportunity for amendment should be allowed." Id. (reversing and remanding for plaintiff to be provided with leave to file an amended complaint); see also James, 62 So.3d at 1226 ("Because [plaintiff] may be able to correct these defects, we reverse the dismissal of his complaint with prejudice and remand to allow him to file an amended complaint."). Such is the case even where it seems unlikely that the plaintiff will be able to prevail. Chartrand v. Parsons, 164 So.3d 117, 117 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) ("Under the best of circumstances, [plaintiff] would have difficulty meeting his burden of proof .... Due to his incarceration. . . these are not the best of circumstances for [him]....While facing an uphill battle, [he] should at least be given an opportunity to amend his complaint ....").

In reviewing a complaint under section 57.085(6) to determine if it should be dismissed, the motion to dismiss standard applies. See Toney v. C. Courtney, 191 So.3d 505 507 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (applying standard to a dismissal with prejudice under section 57.085(6)); James, 62 So.3d at 1226 (same). Under this standard, the circuit "court must accept the facts alleged therein as true and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn from those facts must be drawn in favor of the pleader." Schneiderman v. Baer, 334 So.3d 326, 330 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (quoting MEBA Med. &Benefits Plan v. Lago, 867 So.2d 1184, 1186 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)). Additionally, "[a] court may not go beyond the four corners of the complaint and exhibits attached...

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