Green v. Cottrell

• Decision Date: 10 November 2016
• Docket Number: No. SC15–1805.,SC15–1805.
• Citation: 204 So.3d 22
• Parties: Eric GREEN, Petitioner, v. Calvin COTTRELL, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

204 So.3d 22

Eric GREEN, Petitioner,

v.Calvin COTTRELL, et al., Respondents.

No. SC15–1805.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Nov. 10, 2016.

Charles Morris Auslander, John Granville Crabtree, and Brian Carson Tackenberg, Crabtree & Auslander, P.A., Key Biscayne, FL, for Petitioner.

Carl Raymond Peterson, Jr., Jolly, Peterson & Truckenbrod, P.A., Tallahassee, FL, for Respondents Sergeant D. Bryant, Danny E. Cook and Calvin Cottrell.

LABARGA, C.J.

Petitioner Eric Green seeks review of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Green v. Cottrell, 172 So.3d 1009 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), on the basis that it expressly and directly conflicts with Calhoun v. Nienhuis, 110 So.3d 24 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013), on a question of law. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. For the reasons discussed below, we quash the decision in Green and approve the holding in Calhoun, but not the analysis of the Fifth District in that case.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 22, 2012, inmate Eric Green filed a pro se complaint against four employees of the Santa Rosa County Jail: a shift lieutenant, two deputies, and a sergeant who was assigned as a hearing officer to consider disciplinary reports. Green alleged that on June 22, 2008, he was attacked at the jail by two inmates. According to Green, all of the inmates housed in his dormitory were classified as extreme high risk due to their aggressive and violent tendencies. The complaint alleged that prior to the attack, Green informed the deputies that he was experiencing conflict with the two inmates, and the situation had escalated to threats. Green asked to be removed from the dormitory where the two inmates were housed and placed in protective custody. Green's complaint asserted that one of the inmates had recently been involved in an attack on another inmate which resulted in injury, and the attacked inmate had since been placed in protective custody. One deputy allegedly stated that Green should not be worried, but that he would arrange for Green to speak with the shift lieutenant. According to the complaint, when Green reiterated his concerns to the lieutenant, the lieutenant stated that there was only one confinement unit, which had limited bed space and no available room. The lieutenant also advised that he could not relocate Green to another dormitory.

When Green returned to the dormitory, one of the inmates accused him of "snitching." Upon hearing the accusation, the other inmate said that he was going to beat Green. Green returned to his cell and attempted to lock himself inside, but the lock was secured in the open position. According to the complaint, Green pleaded with one of the deputies to release the lock because the inmates were coming to attack him, but the deputy failed to do so. Green retrieved a homemade "shank," placed it in his waistband, and fled from the cell. At that point, the inmates allegedly attacked Green, while the same deputy appeared to watch. Once the fight ceased, one of the inmates quickly left the area, while Green proceeded to chase the other inmate. Several deputies then appeared, and Green was escorted to an interview room. A deputy searched Green and discovered the shank in his waistband. He was subsequently taken to a hospital for treatment of his injuries, which included stitches for a lip laceration

. Upon his return to the jail, Green was placed in administrative confinement and given a disciplinary report for fighting. Two days later, the sergeant held a hearing on the disciplinary report, after which he sentenced Green to five days in disciplinary confinement.

Based upon the facts as alleged in the complaint, Green raised claims under Florida law of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the shift lieutenant and the two deputies. Green claimed that these jail employees had failed to exercise the reasonable care necessary to protect him from foreseeable harm after they were placed on notice that the inmates had made threats against him. Green also raised federal law claims against all four jail employees. The complaint included the following statement with regard to the exhaustion of administrative remedies:

The Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies by use of the grievance procedure that was available to him at S.R.C.J. to try and correct the violations. However, the Plaintiff was transferred back to Florida State Prison on or about June 30, 2008. Therefore, he was unable to receive a response or submit his grievances to the next level. Accordingly, the grievance process is considered exhausted.

Green sought damages for both physical and emotional injury.

On June 24, 2014, the circuit court dismissed the complaint. The court concluded that Green's state law claims were time-barred under section 95.11(5)(g), Florida Statutes (2007), which provides a one-year time limit for "an action brought by or on behalf of a prisoner, as defined in s. 57.085, relating to the conditions of the prisoner's confinement." With regard to Green's federal law claims, the court noted that they were governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), and exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory. The court concluded that Green's transfer from the jail to Florida State Prison was insufficient to absolve him of the exhaustion requirement:

Here, Plaintiff's Complaint shows he filed a grievance prior to being transferred. But, it also shows that he did nothing to follow up or to appeal any lack of answer or negative decision.... Accordingly, the four corners of the Complaint itself show GREEN failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Where an inmate's failure to dismiss [sic] is "readily apparent from Plaintiff's pleadings and/or attachments," sua sponte dismissal of the action without prejudice is appropriate. Here, Plaintiff could have finished his administrative remedies anytime between the occurrence of the fight with two other inmates on June 22, 2008; and, the mailing of his complaint four years later on June 22, 2012. If he had received a negative response or no response at all, he had an appeal mechanism available to him by following up with the Santa Rosa County Jail. But, his pleading admits he did nothing, but simply "consider[ ] [his grievance] exhausted." Accordingly, dismissal of all claims is not only warranted, but required.

(Citations and parentheticals omitted.)

On appeal, Green challenged three of the circuit court's determinations: (1) that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing the federal law claims; (2) that the failure to exhaust was apparent from the face of the complaint; and (3) that the state law claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations period in section 95.11(5)(g). See Green, 172 So.3d at 1010. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the first two challenges without discussion. Id.

The district court also affirmed the circuit court's holding that the one-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(5)(g) governed Green's state law claims and rejected his assertion that the four-year time limit in section 768.28(14), Florida Statutes (2007), was applicable instead. Id. at 1010–11. The district court noted that section 768.28, enacted in 1973, applies to "[e]very claim against the state or one of its agencies or subdivisions for damages for a negligent or wrongful act or omission pursuant to this section...." Id. at 1011 (quoting § 768.28(14), Fla. Stat.). Conversely, section 95.11(5)(g), which was enacted in 1996, governs actions brought by or on behalf of a prisoner that relate to conditions of the prisoner's confinement. The First District concluded that the more recently enacted section 95.11(5)(g) was the more specific statute, and controlled over the earlier enacted section 768.28(14). Id. The district court disagreed with Calhoun, 110 So.3d 24, in which the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that the four-year statute of limitations in section 768.28(14) applied to a negligence action filed against a sheriff. See Green, 172 So.3d at 1010.

We granted review of Green based upon conflict with Calhoun.

ANALYSIS

Statute of Limitations Claim

The first issue presented by this case is which statute of limitations governs the state law claims raised in Green's complaint. Questions of statutory interpretation are matters of law that are reviewed de novo. See Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Phillips, 126 So.3d 186, 190 (Fla.2013) ; see also Hamilton v. Tanner, 962 So.2d 997, 1000 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) ("A legal issue surrounding a statute of limitations question is an issue of law subject to de novo review."). The standard of review for the dismissal of a complaint is also de novo. See Mlinar v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 186 So.3d 997, 1004 (Fla.2016).

The first statute, titled "Limitations other than for the recovery of real property," provides:

Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows:

....

(5) WITHIN ONE YEAR.—

....

(g) Except for actions described in subsection (8) [actions challenging correctional disciplinary proceedings], an action brought by or on behalf of a prisoner, as defined in s. 57.085, relating to the conditions of the prisoner's confinement.

§ 95.11(5)(g), Fla. Stat. By its plain terms, section 95.11(5)(g) applies solely to prisoners, as that term is statutorily defined,¹ and then only to actions that relate to conditions of their confinement. If either of these qualifications is not met, section 95.11(5)(g) does not apply.

The second statute provides, with certain exceptions not applicable here, a four-year limitations period for actions against government entities where sovereign immunity has been waived. See § 768.28(14), Fla. Stat. The limited waiver of sovereign immunity for tort actions is provided in section 768.28 :

(1) In accordance with s. 13, Art. X of the State Constitution, the state, for itself and for its agencies or subdivisions, hereby waives sovereign immunity for liability

...