Gate City Garage, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville

• Decision Date: 10 July 1953
• Citation: 66 So.2d 653
• Parties: GATE CITY GARAGE, Inc., et al. v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 653

66 So.2d 653

GATE CITY GARAGE, Inc., et al. v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE.

Supreme Court of Florida, en Banc.

July 10, 1953.

Rehearing Denied July 30, 1953.

Patterson, Freeman, Richardson & Watson, William A. Hallowes, III, and Damon G. Yerkes, Jacksonville, for appellant.

William M. Madison, Jacksonville, for appellee.

MATHEWS, Justice.

This is an appeal from a final decree of the Circuit Court of Duval County validating and issue of $3,265,000 of municipal parking revenue bonds. Chapter 24611, Sp.Laws of Florida 1947, as amended by Chapter 27635, Sp.Laws of Florida 1951, authorized the city to issue such bonds and the city has acted under this special statutory authority.

At the time each of the Special Acts above mentioned was enacted, the City of Jacksonville had in operation a system of controlling or regulating on-street parking by meters.

The regulation of motor vehicular traffic on the streets of the larger municipalities of the State is one of the major problems yet to be solved. Traffic congestion is on the increase. A greater portion of the commercial activities of municipalities is concentrated generally within a space of a few blocks. City halls, court houses, theaters, banks, office buildings, retail commercial establishments of every kind, are generally located in what is called 'downtown.' If those who use automobiles in order to attend to their business, cannot park them, then the value of such automobiles for such use becomes negligible. On-street parking in the larger municipalities affords some relief, but with increasing population and increasing use of automobiles, such on-street parking with the use of meters is wholly inadequate and congestion is now becoming more intolerable. In recognition of the conditions which existed in the City of Jacksonville, the Legislature in Section 1 of Chapter 24611, supra, made the following declaration and determination:

'Section 1. The Legislature hereby determines and declares that excessive curb parking of motor vehicles on roads and streets in the City of Jacksonville and the lack of adequate off-street parking facilities in said City create congestion, obstruct the free circulation of traffic, diminish property values, and endanger the health, safety and general welfare of its citizens; that the provision of conveniently located off-street parking facilities attractive in cost and the simultaneous control of curb parking by said City are therefore necessary to alleviate such conditions; and that the establishment of off-street automobile parking facilities is deemed to be a proper public or municipal purpose of said City.' (Emphasis supplied.)

In addition to the declaration and determination by the Legislature in the Acts above set forth, the City Countil of the City of Jacksonville, by Ordinance No. CC-192, Art. I, 1.01(B), made the same declaration, findings and determination.

The authority of the city to issue bonds, provide for the payment of principal and interest of such bonds, to acquire property and maintain off-street automobile parking facilities as a part of the plan or system is fully covered by Chapter 24611, Sp. Laws of Florida, 1947, as amended by Chapter 27635, Sp.Laws of Florida 1951.

The appellants, who are proper parties, question the validity of the Special Acts involved.

In approaching this subject we should recognize the clear distinction between Acts of the Legislature vesting power and authority in a municipality, and ordinances of the municipality enacted pursuant to such legislative authority.

The Legislature has plenary power over municipalities, subject only to restraints or prohibitions of the organic law. State v. Johns, 92 Fla. 187, 109 So. 228; City of Orlando v. Evans, 132 Fla. 609, 182 So. 264; State v. City of Miami, 103 Fla. 54, 137 So. 261.

The municipality can exert only those powers granted to or vested in it by the Legislature, and such other powers as may be necessary to properly exercise or carry out the power specifically granted. City of Daytona Beach v. Dygert, 146 Fla. 352, 1 So.2d 170, 133 A.L.R. 1237; State v. City of Miami, 155 Fla. 180, 19 So.2d 790, 1 A.L.R.2d 132. The fountainhead and source of all municipal power or authority is the Legislature. Therefore, the first and most important consideration in this case is the validity of the statutes.

Section 3 of Chapter 24611, Laws of Florida, Special Acts, 1947, is as follows:

'The City of Jacksonville is hereby authorized to acquire, construct or cause to be constructed, own, maintain and operate off-street automobile parking facilities, and all such improvements and buildings as said City may deem necessary or desirable in connection therewith; * * * to acquire by purchase, gift, lease, bequest, devise, grant, or condemnation in the manner from time to time provided for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, such property, real or personal, or any interest therein, above, at or below the surface of the earth, as it may deem necessary or desirable for such purpose; and said City may charge and collect reasonable fees or rentals for the use or enjoyment of such parking facilities, and may prescribe reasonable rules and regulations for the use and operation thereof.'

Section 4 of Chapter 24611, Sp.Laws of Florida 1947, as amended by Chapter 27635, Sp.Laws of Florida 1951, provides as follows:

'Section 4. The City of Jacksonville is hereby authorized to finance the planning, design, acquisition of property for, construction, alteration, enlargement, maintenance or operation of off-street automobile parking facilities by any one or any combination of the following methods:

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'(b) Revenue Certificates or Bonds payable solely out of revenues derived from such parking facilities in the manner provided by its Charter; or Revenue Certificates or Bonds payable out of revenue derived from such parking facilities and all or such part of on-street parking meter revenues as may be pledged by ordinance as additional security for the payment of such Revenue Certificates or Bonds in the manner provided by its Charter;

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'(d) Parking fees and special charges derived from the use of such parking facilities by motorists, lessees, concessionaries or others;

'(e) General fund appropriations to the extent deemed necessary or desirable for such purpose;

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'(g) Parking meter revenues; and * * *.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 8 of Chapter 24611, Sp.Laws of Florida 1947, as amended by Chapter 27635, Sp.Laws of Florida 1951, provides in part as follows:

'Section 8. Revenue Certificates or Bonds payable solely out of revenue derived from off-street automobile parking facilities, or Revenue Certificates or Bonds payable out of revenue derived from such parking facilities and all or such part of on-street parking meter revenues as may be pledged by ordinance as additional security for the payment of such revenue certificates or bonds, as authorized to be issued by Section 4 of this Act, may be issued without submitting the issuance of same to a referendum as provided by any other law affecting the City of Jacksonville; * * *.'

It is urged by the appellants that the plan to acquire and establish off-street parking facilities and to issue bonds payable solely from a pledge of net revenues to be derived from such facilities and the pledge of the gross revenues to be derived from its on-street parking meters as additional security to the extent necessary, violates Sections 1 and 12 of the Declaration of Rights and Section 10 of Article 9 of the Constitution of Florida, F.S.A., in that the plan violates the guarantee of each person of the right to, and the use of, his property; that it amounts to taking private property by public authorities for a use or purpose other than public, and is the taking of a person's property against his will and making it available to another private individual for that person's gain and profit.

Although the legislative determination that the entire plan, including the taking of property by eminent domain, is for a public purpose may not be conclusive upon the Courts, such declaration is very persuasive, and when taken in connection with the purpose sought to be accomplished conditions as they actually exist, of which the Court will take judicial notice, or facts and conditions shown to exist by the pleadings and the facts contained in the record, the Courts may readily determine that the primary purpose, aim and objective of the plan is to serve a public and a municipal purpose.

Two essential powers of government are involved in this case. It is necessary that the city acquire some property from private individuals and the acquirement of such property involves the power of eminent domain. The city is not authorized to exercise this great power unless it is for a public purpose.

In order to carry out the plan it is necessary that public money be used for the acquisition of the land and for the construction of the improvement. If it is not for a public purpose then the City would have no authority to appropriate public funds or to issue bonds to acquire money for the contemplated improvement.

The other governmental power involved in this case is the police power. The regulation of traffic on the streets, the elimination of congestion and hazards to life and property, the safety and convenience of the travelling public constitute a vital part of the police power of municipalities.

The appellants contend that the whole plan is not for a public purpose but is for a private purpose. This question was considered and decided adversely to the appellants in the case of State v. City of Miami Beach, Fla., 47 So.2d 865. In that case the principal and interest of the bonds were payable solely from the revenues derived by the city from the operation of the proposed off-street parking and also the metered on-street parking. One of the questions raised in that case was that the purpose of...