State v. City of Miami

• Decision Date: 13 October 1931
• Parties: STATE v. CITY OF MIAMI.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

137 So. 261

103 Fla. 54

STATE v. CITY OF MIAMI.

Florida Supreme Court

October 13, 1931

En Banc.

Proceeding between the State of Florida and the City of Miami involving the validation of certain issues of refunding bonds of the City of Miami. From a decree validating the bonds, the State of Florida appeals.

Decree affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court.

SYLLABUS

Under section 8 of article 8 of the Constitution, the Legislature has power to establish and to abolish municipalities, to provide for their government, to prescribe their jurisdiction and powers, and to alter or amend the same at any time.

The power of the Legislature over municipalities in this state is supreme.

It is within the power of the Legislature to annex new territory to a municipality effective with or without an approving vote of the electorate.

The power to tax is one of the most important powers conferred on a municipality. Its very existence depends on the proper exercise of this power.

The city of Cocoanut Grove and the towns of Buena Vista and Silver Bluff acquired no contract rights win the city of Miami by their annexation thereto under the law. What they did acquire was a mere gratuity or privilege; in other words a political right or concession revocable at the pleasure of the grantor.

Constitutional provision protecting the inviolability of contracts has reference only to those contracts involving property rights and has no application whatever to political rights and privileges.

Notwithstanding the tax uniformity clause (section 5 of article 9 of the Constitution), it is competent for the Legislature to provide reasonable classifications of property for purposes of municipal taxation, so long as such classifications are not arbitrary, unreasonable, and unjustly discriminatory, and apply similarly to all under like conditions and do not deprive persons of property without just compensation or without due process of law or do not deny to any person the equal protection of the laws or do not violate any other provision of organic law.

Classifications for purposes of legislation may be made with reference to similarity of situation, circumstances, requirements, and convenience to best subserve the public interest; the test as to validity of such classifications being good faith, not wisdom.

Section 6 of article 9 [as amended in 1930] of the Constitution does not require a vote of the freeholders to issue refunding bonds designed to extend the time for payment of the original indebtedness, no new debt having been created.

Section 6 of article 9 of the Constitution as amended in 1930 in no way affects the supremacy of the Legislature over municipalities.

When two or more municipalities are combined, the resulting municipality includes the persons and places of the several municipalities, and it has the same property and owes the same debts which they all had and owed. The identity of the component elements, in other words, is lost and becomes absorbed into the new creation. Appeal from Circuit Court, Dade County; Paul D Barns, Judge.

COUNSEL

Vernon Hawthorne, State Atty., of Miami, for the State.

J. W Watson, Jr., of Miami, and Masslich & Mitchell, of New York City, for appellee.

OPINION

TERRELL J.

This appeal is from a decree validating four issues of refunding bonds of the city of Miami, issued pursuant to authority vested in it by Senate Bill No. 152-X, Special Laws of Florida, First Extraordinary Session 1931.

The record discloses that the territorial limits of the city of Miami were extended in 1925 as provided by sections 1921 and 1922, Revised General Statutes of 1920 (sections 3054 and 3055, Compiled General Laws of 1927), to include the city of Cocoanut Grove and the towns of Buena Vista and Silver Bluff, and that by chapter 11617, Laws of Florida, Extraordinary Session of 1925, the corporate limits of the city of Miami were defined to embrace the territory in said city and towns so annexed. It was also provided that taxes for the payment of indebtedness of the city incurred prior to enlargement and of the city and town thereto annexed should be levied upon such taxable property lying within the said boundaries as would have been liable to taxation therefor under the laws in force prior to their annexation to the city of Miami. This act further declared that it was not its intention to change any existing legal requirements as to such taxation.

Pertinent to the questions brought here for our determination, section 1922, Revised General Statutes of 1920 (section 3055, Compiled General Laws of 1927), contains the following proviso: 'Provided, however, that the real estate or other property which may be within any territory so annexed at the time of any such election shall not be liable for, nor taxed to pay any bond indebtedness of the city or town to which it may be annexed existing at the time of any such election: and Provided, further, that the real estate or other property which may be within the city or town to which such annexation may be made shall not be liable for, or taxed to pay any bond indebtedness of any such city or town so annexed which may be existing at the time of such election.'

It is first contended that sections 1921 and 1922, Revised General Statutes of 1920 (sections 3054 and 3055, Compiled General Laws of 1927), and chapter 11617, Laws of Florida, Extraordinary Session 1925, constituted a contract between the city of Miami and the property owners in Cocoanut Grove, Buena Vista, and Silver Bluff annexed thereunder, exempting them from taxation for Miami's then existing debt and that Senate Bill No. 152-X, Special Laws of Florida, First Extraordinary Session 1931, is illegal and void because it seeks to impair the obligation of said contract, in that it authorizes the issuance of bonds to refund the debts of the city of Miami and requires the levy of taxes on all taxable property of the enlarged city for the payment of said bonds.

The answer to the petition to validate shows that all bonds proposed to be refunded were issued by the city of Miami prior to the annexation of the city of Cocoanut Grove and the towns of Buena Vista and Silver Bluff, and that all acts and deeds required to be done as a prerequisite to annexation including the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the freeholders cast at an election called and held to approve such annexation were done and performed.

Under section 8 of article 8 of the Constitution, the Legislature has power to establish and to abolish municipalities, to provide for their government, to prescribe their jurisdiction and powers, and to alter or amend the same at any time. In State v. Burr, 79 Fla. 290, 84 So. 61, it was held by this court that under section 8 of article 8 the jurisdiction and powers conferred by statute upon municipalities may be altered or amended at any time by the Legislature. It may, therefore, be said that the power of the Legislature over municipalities in this state is supreme.

Bearing this constitutional provision in mind, the question confronting us may be crystallized in these words: Can the city of Cocoanut Grove and the towns of Buena Vista and Silver Bluff, having been annexed to the city of Miami in 1925 under the acts as above cited, now claim immunity from taxation to refund the bonded debt of the parent city incurred prior to such annexation?

We think this question must be answered in the negative. It is within the power of the Legislature to annex new territory to a municipality effective with or without an approving vote of the electorate. Nabb v. Andreu, 89 Fla. 414, 104 So. 591. The power to tax is one of the most important powers conferred on a municipality. In fact, its very existence depends on the proper exercise of this power. Conditions change and values in municipalities often shift rapidly. To hold that the power to tax and other powers vested in a municipality are fixed and cannot be changed would in many instances result in grievous and inequitable burdens were it not for power vested in the Legislature under the Constitution to alter or amend them at any time.

We do not think, therefore, that the city of Cocoanut Grove and the towns of Buena Vista and Silver Bluff acquired any contract rights with the city of Miami by their annexation thereto in the manner herein referred to. What they did acquire was a mere gratuity or privilege; in other words, a political right or concession revocable at the pleasure of the grantor. Moore v. City of Pittsburgh, 254 Pa. 185, 98 A. 1037, a case in point, supports this view and holds further that its constitutional provision protecting the inviolability of contracts has reference only to those contracts involving property rights and has no application whatever to political rights and privileges. We think this view is undoubtedly the correct one.

This view is further supported by the Supreme Court of the United States speaking through Mr. Justice Clifford in Laramie County v. Albany, 92 U.S. 307, 311, 23 L.Ed. 552, where the court said: Municipal corporations 'are the auxiliaries of the State in the important business of municipal rule, and cannot have the least pretension to sustain their privileges or their existence upon any thing like a contract between them and the legislature of the State, because there is not and cannot be any reciprocity of stipulation, and their objects and duties are utterly incompatible with every thing of the nature of compact.' The following authorities support this view: Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514, 25 L.Ed. 699; Township of Orvil v. Borough of Woodcliff, 61 N. J. Law, 107, 38 A 685; Joesting v. Baltimore, 97 Md. 589, 55 A. 456; Galloway v. City of Memphis, 116 Tenn. 736, text 748, 751, 94 S.W. 75; Johnson...