Gattis v. Kilgo

• Decision Date: 22 November 1905
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: GATTIS . v. KILGO et al.

52 S.E. 249

140 N.C. 106

GATTIS .

v.KILGO et al.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Nov. 22, 1905.

Libel—Communications—Qualified Privilege.

The publication of proceedings of a college board of trustees in the investigation of charges against one connected with the college, which pamphlet was intended for circulation among the patrons of the college and among those likely to become such, was qualifiedly privileged, and therefore could not be made the basis of an action for libel, in the absence of proof of malice.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 32, Cent. Dig. Libel and Slander, § 133.]

Appeal from Superior Court, Wake County; Moore, Judge.

Action by Thomas J. Gattis against J. C. Kilgo and others. From a judgment in favor of defendants, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Graham & Devin, Guthrie & Guthrie, Argo & Shaffer, C. B. Watson, A. A. Hicks, S. M. Gattis, and J. N. Holding, for appellant.

Robt. W. Winston, B. S. Boyster, T. T. Hicks, F. L. Fuller, and Aycock & Daniels, for appellees.

PER CURIAM. The court is of the opinion that the investigation of the charges against defendant Kilgo before the board of trustees of Trinity College was not absolutely, but qualifiedly, privileged, and so was the publication of the proceedings in the pamphlet known in the case as the "Blue Book, " which was intended for circulation among the patrons of the college and among those likely to become its patrons. Any statement or communication is conditionally privileged when made bona fide about something in which (1) the speaker has an interest or duty (2) the hearer has a corresponding interest or duty, and (3) when the statement or communication is made in protection of that interest or in performance of that duty. It must be uttered in the honest belief that it is true. The standard of privilege is the standard of the law.not of the individual, and the privilege depends, not on what the individual may have supposed to be his interest or duty, but upon what a judge decides, as matter of law, his interest or duty to have been. The court determines what is and what is not privileged. The effect of the privilege is to cast on the plaintiff the burden of showing malice on the defendant's part in uttering or publishing the alleged slanderous words. If one exceeds the privilege, its protection to him ceases, and the ordinary rules of liability apply. Whether he has exceeded it, and whether he was actuated by malice, are ordinarily questions for the jury. 1 Jaggard on Torts, 530, 531. Proceedings before school boards,...