Gau, Application of

• Decision Date: 17 February 1950
• Docket Number: No. 34942,34942
• Citation: 230 Minn. 235,41 N.W.2d 444
• Parties: Application of GAU et al. GAU et al. v. HYLAND et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 444

41 N.W.2d 444

230 Minn. 235

Application of GAU et al. GAU et al. v. HYLAND et al.

No. 34942.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Feb. 17, 1950.

Syllabus by the Court

1. In ascertaining the meaning in M.S.A. § 256.26, subds. 3, 6, and 8, of such legal terms as 'lien' and 'joint tenancy interests' and the application therein of such legal doctrines as those relative to subjecting real property to liens and the duration, priority, and enforcement thereof, resort may be had to well-settled rules of statutory construction, such as those that the legislature is deemed to use words with their well-settled meaning, that statutes are to be construed with reference to the common law relative to the same subject matter, and that the contemporaneous legislative history may be considered.

2. An old age assistance lien, which the statute cited Supra provides shall attach to all real property Owned by the recipient of such assistance, including joint tenancy interests, and shall continue until the debt secured thereby shall be satisfied, attaches, where the recipient is one of several owners of real property in joint tenancy, only to the joint tenancy interest of the recipient, and if the recipient dies before the other joint tenants the lien, by reason of the rules governing joint tenancies, terminates with his death and is unenforceable afterward.

f. Gordon Wright, Arthur T. Nelson, Roy E. Rendahl, Minneapolis, for appellants.

Michael J. Dillon, County Atty., Frank J. Williams, John K. Harvey, Asst. County Attys., Minneapolis, for respondents.

PETERSON, Justice.

This is a proceeding for the regislation of title in which registration was granted, subject to a lien under M.S.A. § 256.26 for old age assistance furnished to a predecessor in title of the applicants, which predecessor held in joint tenancy and predeceased her other joint tenant. Applicants appeal.

The question for decision is whether a lien for old age assistance furnished to a joint tenant owner of real property under a statute (§ 256.26) providing that the lien shall attach to all real property Then owned by the recipient, including joint tenancy interests, and shall continue until the liability for the amount thereof is satisfied, survives the death of such tenant and is enforceable against the real property after his death.

In 1902, Anna Hyland acquired title to the real property, which consisted of a house and lot in Minneapolis. In 1935, by conveyance to a third party and conveyance back she created a joint tenancy with her daughter, Margaret. In 1936, Anna applied for old age assistance, which was granted. Anna died in 1947. Margaret survived her. At the time of Anna's death she had been furnished old age assistance amounting to $2,019, for which a lien had been filed. After Anna's death, Margaret filed the instruments required by § 600.21 to show the fact of Anna's death, and the termination thereby of the joint tenancy as proof that she (Margaret) had become the sole owner of the property as the survivor. Thereafter Margaret conveyed the property to applicants. In the proceedings for the registration of title under the Torrens system, the court below granted registration, subject to a lien for the old age assistance furnished to Anna. Provision is made in M.S.A. c. 256 for the payment and administration of old age assistance. So far as here material, the statute provides that every person paid old age assistance shall first give the state a lien on all his property situated within the state (§ 256.26, subd. 3) ¹; that the lien shall attach to all real property then Owned by the recipient or thereafter acquired, including joint tenancy interests, and shall continue until the liability for the amount thereof is satisfied; that such lien shall take priority over other liens subsequently acquired, except in certain cases not here material; that in case of death of the recipient the debt secured by the lien shall be a claim against his estate after payment of expenses of administration, funeral expenses, expenses of last illness, debts having preference by the laws of the United States, and taxes (subd. 6) ²; and that such lien shall be enforced in the manner provided by law for the enforcement of mechanic's liens upon real property (subd. 8). ³ While there has been no express showing that Anna gave the state a lien for the old age assistance furnished to her, it has been assumed that such was the fact as one precedent to the grant thereof.

Applicants contend that, since the lien attached only to Anna's joint tenancy interest, it expired at her death, and that thereupon Margaret's title, as that of the surviving joint tenant, became one in fee free of the lien against Anna's interest as a joint tenant. The state contends that, notwithstanding the provision of § 256.26, subd. 6, to the effect that the lien shall attach to the real property then owned by the recipient of old age assistance, the lien survived Anna's death; and that, because the cited section provides that the lien shall continue until the liability for the debt secured thereby is paid, it is enforceable, after the termination by death of Anna's (the recipient's) interest, against the real property, notwithstanding the fact that by her death the entire interest therein vested in Margaret, the sole surviving joint tenant.

1. In answering the question presented for decision, it is our duty to discover and effectuate the legislative intention manifested by the language of the statute. Section 256.26, subds. 3, 6, and 8, providing for the creation and enforcement of old age assistance liens, uses familiar legal terms and expressions such as 'lien' and 'joint tenancy interests' and applies well-established legal doctrines, such as those that the lien shall attach to real property--that is, real property Owned by the recipient--and those relating to the duration, priority, and enforcement of liens. Our problem is to ascertain what ordinarily is meant by such terms. In so doing we may invoke the aid of well-settled rules of statutory construction which shed light upon the question, such as those that the legislature is deemed to use words with their well-settled meaning, that statutes are to be construed with reference to the common law relative to the same subject matter, and that the contemporaneous legislative history may be considered. Stabs v. City of Tower, 229 Minn. ---, 40 N.W.2d 362; State v. Bolsinger, 221 Minn. 154, 21 N.W.2d 480; Foley v. Whelan, 129 Minn. 209, 17 N.W.2d 367; Washburn v. Van Steenwyk, 32 Minn. 336, 349, 20 N.W. 324, 326; 6 Dunnell, Dig. & Supp. § 8968; 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, §§ 259, 322.

2. The language of the statute must be construed in the light of well-settled rules governing joint tenancy, the severance thereof, leins upon the interest of one of the joint tenants, and the like.

A joint tenancy is characterized by four unities, viz.,--unity of interest, unity of title, unity of time, and unity of possession. If all these continue unsevered, the survivor of the joint tenants becomes the sole owner upon the death of the others. If, however, any one of the unities is destroyed, the jointure is severed, with the consequence that what was a joint tenancy becomes a tenancy in common. Greiger v. Pye, 210 Minn. 71, 297 N.W. 173; Papke v. Pearson, 203 Minn. 130, 280 N.W. 183. The jointure may be severed either Voluntarily, as by a conveyance of the interest of a joint tenant, Greiger v. Pye and Papke v. Pearson, supra; or by a partition by the joint tenants, 14 Am.Jur., Cotenancy, § 14; or Involuntarily, as by an execution sale of the interest of a tenant. 14 Am.Jur., Cotenancy, § 14, supra.

In order to effect a severance of the jointure, the effect of the act or transaction, whether it is voluntary or involuntary insofar as the joint tenant is concerned, must be to divest him of his estate in joint tenancy. Coke upon Littleton (published in 1628), § 286, p. 184b; 2 Blackstone, Commentaries, p. 185; 2 Tiffany, Real Property, 3d Ed., § 425. See, Opinion of Judge of Appeals Grant, in Power v. Grace (1932) 2 Dom.L.R. 793, 795 et seq. It became settled at an early date that the creation of a mere 'charge' (as we shall show presently, a lien is only a charge) or 'burden' upon the interest of one of the joint tenants, did not effect a severance of the jointure. This is the rule according to the citations from Coke and Tiffany, Supra. Accordingly, a Lien upon the interest of one of the joint tenants does not effect a severance of the jointure. Zeigler v. Bonnell, 52 Cal.App.2d 217, 126 P.2d 118 (judgment lien); Van Antwerp v. Horan, 390 Ill. 449, 61 N.E.2d 358, 161 A.L.R. 1133, and Annotation (judgment lien and levy under judgment without sale thereunder); People's Trust & Savings Bank v. Haas, 328 Ill. 468, 160 N.E. 85 (judgment lien); Midgley v. Walker, 101 Mich. 583, 60 N.W. 296, 45 Am.St.Rep. 431 (judgment lien); Musa v. Segelke & Kohlhaus Co., 224 Wis. 432, 272 N.W. 657, 111 A.L.R. 168, and Annotation (judgment lien); 2 Tiffany, Real Property, 3d Ed., § 425, supra.

Because the interest of a joint tenant terminates at his death, a lien thereon does also and is unenforceable afterward. Zeigler v. Bonnell; Van Antwerp v. Horan; People's Trust & Savings Bank v. Haas Midgley v. Walker; and Musa v. Segelke & Kohlhaus Co., all supra; 1 Washburn, Real Property, 5th Ed., p. 680, clause 15. In the Zeigler case, supra, the court said, 52 Cal.App.2d 220, 126 P.2d 119: '* * * The judgment lien of respondent (creditor) could attach only to the interest of his debtor (a joint tenant) * * *. That interest terminated upon * * * (his) death. After his death there was no interest to levy upon.'

The rule is thus stated in 14 Am.Jur., Cotenancy, § 107: '* * * The mere docketing of a judgment against a joint tenant, even though a lien results therefrom, does not result in a severance of a joint estate. Accordingly, the death of the judgment debtor before anything more is...