Gaulton v. Reno Paint and Wallpaper Co.

• Decision Date: 20 March 1979
• Citation: 177 Conn. 121,412 A.2d 311
• Parties: Gregory GAULTON et al. v. RENO PAINT AND WALLPAPER COMPANY et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 311

412 A.2d 311

177 Conn. 121

Gregory GAULTON et al. v. RENO PAINT AND WALLPAPER COMPANY et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 15, 1978.

Decided March 20, 1979.

William R. Davis, West Hartford, with whom were Nicola E. Rubinow and, on the brief, Francis Wynn, Hartford, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Philip S. Walker, Hartford, with whom was Francis H. Morrison, III, Hartford, for appellee (defendant O'Brien Paint Corp.).

Before COTTER, C. J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and PETERS, JJ.

BOGDANSKI, Associate Justice.

In September of 1971, the plaintiffs, Gregory Gaulton, ppa, and Elizabeth and Peter Gaulton, his parents, filed suit against the Reno Paint and Wallpaper Company and the O'Brien Paint Corporation, seeking to recover damages for injuries allegedly caused to the minor plaintiff, in utero, as the result of the use the plaintiff mother of interior latex paint manufactured by the O'Brien Paint Corporation. A substituted complaint, dated October 5 1977, contained four counts: strict liability in tort; breach of warranty; negligence; and recovery for the medical expenses incurred by the plaintiff father. The action against the defendant Reno Paint and Wallpaper Company was withdrawn prior to trial.

The trial consumed over two months and involved the presentation of complex technical evidence as well as extensive expert testimony in the fields of medicine, chemistry and biology. At the conclusion of the evidence, the defendant filed special interrogatories and requested that they be submitted to the jury. Counsel for the plaintiffs examined the interrogatories ¹ and argued his objections to the court. Because the parties were unable to agree, the court reserved decision on the interrogatories. Subsequently, at the completion of its charge, the court informed the jury that they would be asked to answer four interrogatories which would be submitted along with the verdict forms.

The interrogatories as submitted to the jury by the court were directed solely to the first count of strict liability in tort and read as follows: "1. Do you find that the O'Brien paint purchased by Mrs. Gaulton and used in July of 1969 was defective under the rule of strict liability? 2. Do you find that this O'Brien paint was unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer, under the rule of strict liability? 3. Do you find that the O'Brien paint used by Mrs. Gaulton in July of 1969 caused injury to the plaintiff, Gregory Gaulton, because it was in a defective condition and unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer under the rule of strict liability? 4. If the answer to the preceding interrogatory is 'yes,' do you find that the risk of such injury was, or should have been, known by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight by the defendant, The O'Brien Corporation, on or before July 1969?"

The plaintiffs' counsel objected to the interrogatories submitted by the court on the grounds that the court had failed to give prior notice of its intention to submit them and that copies were not made available to counsel for examination and comment prior to argument, as was done with the verdict forms. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs made a motion to set aside the verdict which was denied by the court.

On appeal the plaintiffs contend that (1) the case was not appropriate for the use of interrogatories; (2) the form and content of the interrogatories were improper; (3) the procedure used by the court in submitting them was improper; and (4) the court erred in denying their motion to set aside the verdict.

I

The plaintiffs contend that the theories of liability submitted to the jury, ² i. e., strict liability in tort and negligence, though legally distinct, were factually so similar that there was no need for interrogatories to distinguish between those causes of action. They argue that the interrogatories required the jurors to pay special attention to the questions presented therein and that this amounted to an "attempt (by the court) to channel the thought process of the jurors." The plaintiffs seem to be saying, in essence, that the use of the interrogatories, in and of itself, invaded the function of the jury, and, as such, constituted reversible error.

The plaintiffs concede, as they must, that the use of interrogatories has long been accepted practice in this state, and that their use to avoid the implications of a general verdict has long been favored by this court. In Freedman v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 81 Conn. 601, 71 A. 901 (1909), this court observed (p. 612) that the purpose of interrogatories was to elicit "a determination of material facts, (and) to furnish the means of testing the correctness of the verdict rendered, and of ascertaining its extent." The court in Freedman also stated (p. 612, 71 A. p. 905): "The power of the trial court to submit proper interrogatories to the jury . . . does not depend upon the consent of the parties or the authority of statute law. In the absence of any mandatory enactment, it is within the reasonable discretion of the presiding judge to require, or to refuse to require, the jury to answer pertinent interrogatories, as the proper administration of justice may require." The court emphasized (p. 614, 71 A. p. 905) that "(w)hen and to what extent this should be done, and when and how counsel may request interrogatories to be propounded, it is, to a great extent, in the absence of any statute or rule upon the subject, the duty of the trial court, in the exercise of a reasonable discretion to determine."

The court in Freedman noted further (p. 613, 71 A. P. 905) that "(i)t has been the common practice in this state, when a complaint contains several counts for distinct causes of action, for the court to direct the jury, in case of a verdict for the plaintiff, to designate upon which count it was found." Almost a half century later, in the case of Sheeler v. Waterbury, 138 Conn. 111, 82 A.2d 359 (1951), this court held (pp. 114-15, 82 A.2d p. 361) that although "(t)he submission of interrogatories ordinarily rests within the court's discretion . . . (t)his rule is subject to the exception that where the complaint contains two or more counts . . . the defendant has the right to save himself from the implication of a general verdict by seeking from the jury answers to apt and proper interrogatories." The court concluded that "in such a situation, it is the duty of the court to grant the defendant's request" and held that the failure of the court to do so in that case constituted reversible error.

The use of special interrogatories is particularly appropriate in cases involving complicated factual determinations or complex legal issues. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Brooks, 548 F.2d 615, 617 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 550 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 855, 98 S.Ct. 173, 54 L.Ed.2d 126 (1977); American Oil Co. v. Hart, 356 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1966); Wilson v. Homestead Valve Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 792 (3d. Cir. 1954); Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969). In Basko, the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, applying Connecticut law in a product liability case, concluded (p. 430) that the question of causation and the questions of whether the product was defective or unreasonably dangerous should be submitted to the jury by the use of interrogatories and expressly so directed the trial court receiving the case on remand.

In view of the above we conclude that the use of interrogatories in the present case was not improper.

II

The plaintiffs next contend that the interrogatories were improper in form and content in that they required the jury to reach legal conclusions, thereby exceeding the proper scope of their function. They also claim that the "repeated use" in the interrogatories of "legal terms" had a confusing effect on the jury. We find that neither claim has merit.

It is undisputed that the function of the jury is to find the facts and that in so doing, the jury must apply to the evidence before them the rules of law provided by the court in its charge. It is also well settled that the proper function of interrogatories is to provide a means by which the jury may record the findings of fact which form the basis for their verdict. Freedman v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., supra. We note, in this regard, that determinations of whether a particular product is "defective" or "unreasonably dangerous" are factual determinations and, as such, are clearly within the province of the jury. Slepski v. Williams Ford, Inc., 170 Conn. 18, 23, 364 A.2d 175 (1975); Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., supra. We conclude therefore that the interrogatories submitted by the court provided a proper basis for determining the correctness of the general verdict...