Gaylord v. Gaylord
Decision Date | 24 October 2012 |
Docket Number | Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-571,Appellate Case No. 2011-186667 |
Parties | Sarah Jo Gaylord, Respondent, v. Jules Robert Duncan Gaylord, Appellant. |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Appeal From Georgetown County
Jan Bromell Holmes, Family Court Judge
AFFIRMED
G. Robin Alley, of Isaacs & Alley, LLC, of Columbia,
for Appellant.
Anne E. Janes and M. Elizabeth Snyder, both of Sherrill
& Janes, PA, of Surfside Beach, for Respondent.
Appellant Jules Robert Duncan Gaylord (Husband) argues the family court erred in (1) apportioning the marital estate between the parties; (2) finding the promissory notes executed in favor of Husband's mother were unenforceable; (3) dividing themarital property in a manner that was arbitrary, inequitable, and unreasonable; (4) qualifying Lee Camp as an expert in the appraisal of personal property; (5) ordering Husband to pay all of Respondent Sarah Jo Gaylord's (Wife) attorney's fees and costs; (6) finding Husband in willful contempt of court and providing the sole remedy through which Husband could purge himself of contempt was payment of $189,016.21 by Qualified Domestic Relations Order from his retirement accounts; and (7) awarding Wife $2,500 per month in permanent periodic alimony. In this appeal from a final order of divorce, We affirm.
1. As to whether the family court erred in apportioning the marital estate, we find no abuse of discretion because the family court properly considered all fifteen statutory factors and the apportionment was both fair and equitable. See Reiss v. Reiss, 392 S.C. 198, 211, 708 S.E.2d 799, 806 (Ct. App. 2011) ; S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-620(B) (Supp. 2011) ( ); Fitzwater v. Fitzwater, 396 S.C. 361, 369, 721 S.E.2d 7, 11 (Ct. App. 2011) .
2. As to whether the family court erred by finding the promissory notes executed in favor of Husband's mother were unenforceable, we find no error because the applicable three-year statute of limitations barred enforcement of the notes. See Coleman v. Page's Estate, 202 S.C. 486, 488-89, 25 S.E.2d 559, 559-60 (1943) (); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530(1) (2005) ( ); Jenkins v. Meares, 302 S.C. 142, 146, 394 S.E.2d 317, 319 (1990) ( ); 2008 S.C. Act. No. 204, §§ 2, 4-5 ( ). Husband also argues that the payment of interest on the notes tolled the statute of limitations. While the record does support Husband's assertion that he paid interest on the notes, he nonetheless failed to argue to the family court that the interest payments tolled the statute of limitations. The family court found a three-year statute of limitations applied to the notes; however, in Husband's Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion to alter or amend, his sole ground for challenging the family court's finding was that the correct statute of limitations was six years pursuant to section 36-3-118(b). Husband raised the issue that interest payments tolled the statute of limitations for the first time on appeal in his reply brief; therefore, we find the issue unpreserved for appellate review. See In re Michael H., 360 S.C. 540, 546, 602 S.E.2d 729, 732 (2004) () .
3. As to whether the family court erred by dividing the marital property in a manner that was arbitrary, inequitable, and unreasonable, we find no abuse of discretion because the family court used reasonable means to divide the marital property in an equitable manner. See Mosley v. Mosley, 390 S.C. 524, 532, 702 S.E.2d 253, 258 (Ct. App. 2010) ; Bauer v. Bauer, 287 S.C. 217, 219, 337 S.E.2d 211, 212 (1985) . As to the Tyson Drive property, the family court valued the property at $550,000, subject to completion, and found Wife's equitable interest in the property to be $275,000. Husband argues the family court's division of the Tyson Drive property was arbitrary because Wife is guaranteed $275,000, regardless of its actual value. Husband contends that the court should have ordered the Tyson Drive property to be auctioned. A review of the record shows that it was the parties' intent for Husband to complete the home so that Wife and their children could move in, but Husband failed to do so. In awarding Wife $275,000 for Tyson Drive, rather than half the value of the sale, the family court used reasonable means to remedy an inequity. Fitzwater, 396 S.C. at 369, 721 S.E.2d at 11 ( ). Further, an appraiser testified that the value of the Tyson Drive property, when completed, would be $550,000. Because the family court awarded Wife half of the appraised value of the home, the family court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Wife $275,000 for the Tyson Drive property. See Skipper v. Skipper, 290 S.C. 412, 414, 351 S.E.2d 153, 154 (1986) ( ).
4. As to whether the family court erred by qualifying Lee Camp as an expert in the appraisal of personal property, we find no abuse of discretion because evidence exists from which the family court could reasonably determine Camp's practical experience provided him sufficient knowledge to assist the court in valuing the marital property. See Gadson v. Mikasa Corp., 368 S.C. 214, 228, 628 S.E.2d 262, 269 (Ct. App. 2006) ; Rule 702, SCRE ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."); Gadson, 368 S.C. at 228, 628 S.E.2d at 270 ( ); id. ; High v. High, 389 S.C. 226, 236, 697 S.E.2d 690, 695 (Ct. App. 2010) .
5. As to whether the family court erred by ordering Husband to pay all of Wife's attorney's fees and costs, we find no abuse of discretion. See High, 389 S.C. at 249, 697 S.E.2d at 702 . The record indicates the family court properly considered each statutory factor and made findings of fact and conclusions of law supported by the evidence. See Farmer v. Farmer, 388 S.C. 50, 57, 694 S.E.2d 47, 51 (Ct. App. 2010) ...
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