Jenkins v. Meares, 23242
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
| Citation | 302 S.C. 142,394 S.E.2d 317 |
| Decision Date | 23 May 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 23242,23242 |
| Parties | Willie Mae JENKINS, Appellant, v. Guy M. MEARES, Jr., and Richland Memorial Hospital, Respondents. . Heard |
Carl B. Epps, III, and Laura Callaway Hart, both of Turner, Padget, Graham & Laney, Columbia, for Richland Memorial Hosp.
Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., and Donald V. Richardson, III, of Richardson, Plowden, Grier & Howser, Columbia, for Meares.
Appellant Willie Mae Jenkins commenced this medical malpractice action against Respondents Guy M. Meares, Jr., and Richland Memorial Hospital, alleging that a gauze pad was negligently left in her abdomen following surgery on August 14, 1985. The Circuit Court ruled that the action is barred by the statute of limitations in S.C.Code Ann. § 15-3-545 (Supp.1989), as it existed prior to amendment in 1988.
We affirm.
Appellant stipulates that on August 22, 1985, she discovered the pad had been left inside her abdomen. At that time, § 15-3-545 provided a two-year statute of limitations, running from the date of discovery, for "foreign object" medical malpractice cases. The statute, enacted in 1977, read as follows:
Any action to recover damages for injury to the person arising out of any medical, surgical or dental treatment, omission or operation by any licensed health care provider as defined in Article 2 of Chapter 59 of Title 38 shall be commenced within three years from the date of the treatment, omission or operation giving rise to the cause of action or three years from date of discovery or when it reasonably ought to have been discovered, not to exceed six years from date of occurrence. When the action is for damages arising out of the placement and inadvertent, accidental or unintentional leaving of a foreign object in the body or person of any one or the negligent placement of any appliance or apparatus in or upon any such person by any licensed health care provider by reason of any medical, surgical or dental treatment or operation, such action shall be commenced within two years from date of discovery or when it reasonably ought to have been discovered; provided, however, that the provisions of this section shall apply only to causes of action which arise after June 10, 1977, and, as to causes of action which arise prior to June 10, 1977, the Statute of Limitations existing prior to June 10, 1977, shall apply. [Emphasis supplied].
As part of the 1988 Tort Reform Act, 1 § 15-3-545 was subsequently amended to, among other things, add a three-year minimum limitations period in "foreign object" cases which runs from the date of occurrence. The amended version reads, in part, as follows:
When the action is for damages arising out of the placement and inadvertent, accidental, or unintentional leaving of a foreign object in the body or person of any one or the negligent placement of any appliance or apparatus in or upon any such person by any licensed health care provider acting within the scope of his profession by reason of any medical, surgical, or dental treatment or operation, the action must be commenced within two years from date of discovery or when it reasonably ought to have been discovered; provided, that, in no event shall there be a limitation on the commencement of the action less than three years after the placement or leaving of the appliance or apparatus.
S.C.Code Ann. § 15-3-545(B) (Supp.1989) [Emphasis supplied].
1. Should the amended version of § 15-3-545 be applied retroactively?
2. Does the pre-amendment version of § 15-3-545 violate equal protection?
RETROACTIVITY
Our decisions recognize a presumption that statutory enactments are to be given prospective rather than retroactive effect. An exception to this presumption arises when the enactment is remedial or procedural in nature, such as a statute of limitations. Goff v. Morgan Mills, 279 S.C. 382, 308 S.E.2d 778 (1983); Hercules, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 274 S.C. 137, 262 S.E.2d 45 (1980). These are merely rules of construction, however, and are subject to the paramount rule that the intent of the legislature determines whether a statute will have prospective or retroactive application. See South Carolina Nat'l Bank v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 297 S.C. 279, 376 S.E.2d 512 (1989).
Here, the General Assembly has clearly manifested its intent that the entire Tort Reform Act, including the amendment to § 15-3-545, be applied prospectively. Section 10 of the Act provides: "This act takes effect upon approval by the Governor [April 8, 1988] and applies to those causes of action arising or accruing on or after the effective date of this act." Appellant's claim, having accrued prior to the effective date, does not receive the benefit of the more liberal limitations period under the amended § 15-3-545.
Appellant contends that the following provision in the amended version of § 15-3-545 was intended to make the amendment retroactive to 1977: "The provisions of this section apply only to causes of action which arise after June 10, 1977, and, as to causes of action which arise prior to June 10, 1977, the statute of limitations existing prior to June 10, 1977, applies." S.C.Code Ann. § 15-3-545(C) (Supp.1989). This language is identical to that contained in the original version of § 15-3-545. Clearly, it was included in the amended version so as to continue the exemption of claims arising prior to 1977; it was not intended to give...
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...on some rational basis. Sunset Cay, LLC v. City of Folly Beach, 357 S.C. 414, 428, 593 S.E.2d 462, 469 (2004); Jenkins v. Meares, 302 S.C. 142, 146-47, 394 S.E.2d 317, 319 (1990). The rational basis standard, not strict scrutiny, is applied in this case because the classification at issue d......
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