Gaynor-Stafford Industries, Inc. v. Water Pollution Control Authority of Town of Stafford

• Decision Date: 10 April 1984
• Docket Number: GAYNOR-STAFFORD
• Citation: 474 A.2d 752,192 Conn. 638
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: , 21 ERC 1878 INDUSTRIES, INC. v. WATER POLLUTION CONTROL AUTHORITY OF the TOWN OF STAFFORD et al.

Page 752

474 A.2d 752

192 Conn. 638, 21 ERC 1878

GAYNOR-STAFFORD INDUSTRIES, INC. v. WATER POLLUTION CONTROL AUTHORITY OF the TOWN OF STAFFORD et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 13, 1984.

Decided April 10, 1984.

Thomas A. Rouse, Hartford, with whom were Barry S. Feigenbaum, Hartford, and, on brief, Martin H. Sokolow, Jr., Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff).

Edward Muska, Hartford, for appellees (defendants).

Before PETERS, PARSKEY, SHEA, GRILLO and MENT, JJ.

SHEA, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff, Gaynor-Stafford Industries, Inc., pursuant to General Statutes § 7-250, ¹ appealed to the Superior Court from a benefit assessment levied on its property by the defendant, ² the Stafford water pollution control authority (hereinafter WPCA). The trial court upheld the benefit assessment, and the plaintiff has appealed from that judgment. The plaintiff maintains that the court erred in finding (1) that the assessment was authorized by General Statutes § 7-249a; ³ (2) that General Statutes § 7-249a is constitutional; (3) that the benefit assessment was properly conducted in accordance with General Statutes § 7-249; ⁴ and, (4) that participation by a member of the WPCA in the determination of the assessment was not prohibited because of disqualification for financial interest.

There is no substantial dispute concerning the facts: In 1967, Stafford was ordered by the water resources commission (the predecessor of the department of environmental protection) to develop a pollution abatement system for the Willimantic River. A preliminary study was done in 1968 to determine the amount of sewage created by the town, including a study of the flow of wastewater created by various industries in the town. In reliance upon the figures presented in the preliminary study, a wastewater treatment plant with a capacity to process 2,000,000 gallons of sewage per day was designed.

The town applied for federal and state financial assistance for construction of the designed facility, and received approval from the federal government in September, 1970. Construction was completed in 1974 with the total cost of construction exceeding $2,500,000. The town's portion of the capital cost of construction was $383,251.78.

In 1979, the town was informed that in order to retain the federal grant given the town it would have to institute an industrial cost recovery plan to recover that portion of the town's share of capital cost attributable to the treatment of industrial wastewater. ⁵ A consultant was hired by the WPCA to prepare a report, and on June 3, 1980, the water pollution control authority voted to approve the report and levy assessments according to the recommendation contained in the report.

I

In its first claim of error, the plaintiff maintains that the method of assessment adopted by the WPCA was not authorized by General Statutes § 7-249a, one of the statutes relied upon by the trial court in upholding the assessment.

When construing statutes we have frequently stated that where the language is clear and unambiguous the statute will be applied as its terms direct. See Duguay v. Hopkins, 191 Conn. 222, 228, 464 A.2d 45 (1983); Mobil Oil Corporation v. Westport, 182 Conn. 554, 558, 438 A.2d 768 (1980); In re Petition of State's Attorney, Cook County, Illinois, 179 Conn. 102, 107, 425 A.2d 588 (1979).

General Statutes § 7-249a is expressly limited in scope and application to the recovery of federal funds used for the cost of construction of sewerage systems "to the extent that such cost is attributable to the treatment of such industrial users' wastes." A benefit assessment is authorized only when the sewerage system was constructed "with federal financial assistance under the provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Controls Act Amendments of 1972, P.L. 92-500." ⁶ Neither requirement was fulfilled in this case. The assessment formula adopted by the WPCA recovers the local funds used for constructing the sewerage system, not the federal funds. Furthermore, the sewerage system was constructed with federal financial assistance under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 466 through 466n (1970 Sup.), not with funds contributed under the 1972 act. ⁷ The trial court erred, therefore, in finding that the WPCA's method of assessment was authorized by General Statutes § 7-249a. ⁸

II

The judgment upholding the assessment may, nonetheless, be affirmed if the assessment was proper, as the trial court found, under General Statutes § 7-249. The plaintiff claims that the assessment was not proper under General Statutes § 7-249 because the WPCA relied upon construction cost as part of the method for formulating the assessment; the WPCA limited the assessment to industries discharging more than 25,000 gallons of waste per day in 1968; and the assessment exceeds the special benefit conferred. In order to address each claim, we must first set out the formula adopted by the WPCA.

After being informed that it was required to devise an equitable method of cost recovery, the town contracted with a consultant to make a study and submit an equitable method of cost recovery to the WPCA. The consultant's report, following federal guidelines published by the environmental protection agency ⁹ and binding upon Stafford when it accepted federal financial aid, ¹⁰ listed all users of the treatment facility who, in 1968, were discharging more than 25,000 gallons of wastewater per day into the Willimantic River. ¹¹ Of the four major polluters, the plaintiff's plant contributed the largest daily flow in 1968, 900,000 gallons of wastewater per day.

The report then established the fractional share of the treatment plant's total capacity intended to be used by each of the four users contributing more than 25,000 gallons of waste per day. The town's share of capital costs was then multiplied by each users' fractional share of the waste treatment plant's total capacity in order to determine the amount of the assessment. ¹² The WPCA adopted the formula and figures submitted and assessed each industrial user accordingly.

A

The plaintiff claims that the method of assessment adopted by the WPCA was improper because it was based upon construction costs and applied only to industrial users who were contributing more than 25,000 gallons of wastewater to the river in 1968.

General Statutes § 7-249 contains broad provisions, permitting the WPCA to "give consideration to the area, frontage, grand list valuation and to present or permitted use or classification of benefited properties and to any other relevant factors." In this case, the WPCA relied upon the fractional share of the waste treatment plant's total capacity set aside for the individual industrial users' needs. Certainly, each industry's need to have available a method of treating its quantity of waste is a "relevant factor" when determining the special benefit conferred by construction of a waste treatment facility.

The WPCA limited the assessment to polluters contributing more than 25,000 gallons of wastewater per day to the river. We recently upheld a similar formula for determining who would be assessed. In Mobil Oil Corporation v. Westport, 182 Conn. 554, 438 A.2d 768 (1980), the town determined that all properties within a radius of 500 feet were benefited by the construction of a parking lot. We held that where the formula adopted bears a reasonable relationship to the benefits conferred the method of assessment would be upheld. See Mobil Oil Corporation v. Westport, supra, 182 Conn. 561, 438 A.2d 768. We find nothing unreasonable about the formula adopted here by the WPCA.

Nor was it improper for the WPCA to rely upon the construction costs as a multiplier for determining the amount of the assessment. General Statutes § 7-249 permits the WPCA to "include a proportionate share of the cost of any part of the sewerage system, including ... construction costs, interest charges during construction ... or any other expense incidental to the completion of the work." The method for determining the amount of the assessment adopted by the WPCA is quite similar to the "front-foot rule"--a method of assessing approved by this court even though the dollar figure is derived by dividing the cost of construction "by the total frontage of land in the city upon the streets in which sewers might be constructed." Bassett v. New Haven, 76 Conn. 70, 73, 55 A. 579 (1903); see also Katz v. West Hartford, 191 Conn. 594, 603, 469 A.2d 410 (1983). We agree with the trial court that the WPCA adopted a permissible method for assessing special benefits.

B

The plaintiff also claims that the defendants did not comply with § 7-249 because the assessment exceeds the special benefit. The trial court found, however, that the assessment did not exceed the benefit.

Whether an assessment exceeds the special benefit is a question of fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review: "whether the facts set out in the memorandum of decision are supported by the evidence ...." Pandolphe's Auto Parts, Inc. v. Manchester, 181 Conn. 217, 221, 435 A.2d 24 (1980). The trial court's determination is amply supported by the evidence presented at trial.

An expert witness testifying on behalf of the defendants, who had visited the property several times, testified that the plaintiff's property was increased in value by $172,500 due to the construction of the waste treatment plant and its ability to treat the 900,000 gallons of waste created by the plaintiff's plant. He introduced a chart showing comparable sales and further testified that the "highest and best use" for the building was textile manufacturing. Although the plaintiff introduced conflicting testimony, the trial court was not obligated to accept the plaintiff's version of the facts. ¹³ The resolution of conflicting testimony is within the exclusive province of the trial court. Gallicchio Bros., Inc. v. C & S Oil Co., ...