GEICO Advantage Ins. Co. v. Miles
| Decision Date | 01 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | 220004 |
| Parties | GEICO ADVANTAGE INSURANCE COMPANY AND GEICO CHOICE INSURANCE COMPANY v. LIOSHA MILES |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND David Eugene Cheek Sr., Judge
GEICO Advantage Insurance Company and GEICO Choice Insurance Company (collectively "GEICO") appeal a decision of the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond granting summary judgment to Liosha Miles ("Miles") on the issue of whether each of the two insurance policies at issue provided separate tranches of insurance for uninsured motorist ("UM") coverage and underinsured motorist ("UIM") coverage. GEICO asserts that the circuit court erred in its interpretation of Code § 38.2-2206 and the insurance policies, contending that the statute and each of the applicable policies provide only a single tranche of coverage applicable to both UM and UIM claims. For the reasons that follow, we agree with GEICO and reverse the judgment of the circuit court.
On April 18, 2019, Miles sustained extensive personal injuries in a single automobile accident caused by the negligence of two different drivers. One driver, Carlos Figuero, was insured under an automobile insurance policy issued by Integon General Insurance Company ("Integon") with a liability limit of $25,000. The second driver ("Doe") did not stop at the scene of the accident and was never identified, and thus, is considered an uninsured motorist pursuant to Code § 38.2-2206(B).
At the time of the accident, Miles was insured under two policies: she was the named insured under a GEICO Advantage policy covering her vehicle and also was a covered insured under her brother's GEICO Choice policy by virtue of her being a "resident relative" of the named insured. Each of the GEICO policies contained UM/UIM coverage with bodily injury limits of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per occurrence.[2] GEICO concedes that Miles' injuries from the accident resulted in damages that exceeded all available insurance coverage, "no matter how that is calculated."
On behalf of Figuero, Integon tendered its policy limit of $25,000. Claiming a $25,000 credit as a result of Integon's tender, GEICO Advantage tendered $25,000 related to Miles' claim against Figuero. GEICO Advantage also tendered an additional $25,000 related to Miles' claim against Doe, the unknown, and hence, uninsured motorist. Thus, GEICO Advantage tendered a total of $50,000 as a result of Miles' UM/UIM claims. As a result of these tenders, GEICO Advantage asserted that it had exhausted the limits of its policy's UM/UIM coverage.
Separately, GEICO Choice tendered $50,000 to Miles related to her claim against Figuero. GEICO Choice made no tender related to Miles' claim against Doe. As a result of its tender, GEICO Choice asserted that it had exhausted the limits of its policy's UM/UIM coverage.
Miles asserted that neither GEICO entity had exhausted its limits of UM/UIM coverage. Contending that each policy provided both a $50,000 limit for UM claims and another $50,000 limit for UIM claims, she asserted that the GEICO Advantage policy provided her $75,000 in coverage-$50,000 in UM coverage for her claims related to Doe and $25,000 ($50,000 less the $25,000 credit for Integon's tendering its coverage limits) in UIM coverage for her claims related to Figuero-and that the GEICO Choice policy provided her with $100,000 in coverage-$50,000 in UM coverage for her claims related to Doe and $50,000 in UIM coverage for her claims related to Figuero. Accordingly, Miles argued that GEICO Advantage owed her $25,000 more than its tenders and that GEICO Choice owed her $50,000 more than its tender.
Given her disagreement with GEICO, Miles filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the circuit court. She sought a declaration that each policy contained separate $50,000 limits for UM and UIM coverage. Given the prior tenders made by the GEICO entities for her claims related to Figuero, Miles also sought a declaration that GEICO Advantage owed her an additional $25,000 for her UM claims related to Doe and that GEICO Choice owed her an additional $50,000 for her UM claims related to Doe.
GEICO countered by arguing that each policy provided a single $50,000 limit for both UM and UIM claims. It asserted that there was a single UM/UIM endorsement in each policy and that UIM coverage is properly understood as a subset of UM coverage. GEICO also argued that Miles' proffered interpretation of the statute ran afoul of the limits on coverage imposed by Code § 38.2-2206(A).[3]
The parties stipulated that the facts were not in dispute and submitted the matter to the circuit court on cross-motions for summary judgment. The circuit court held a hearing on the cross-motions. At the close of the hearing, the circuit court announced it was granting Miles' motion for summary judgment and denying GEICO's cross-motion.
Subsequently, the circuit court entered an order granting judgment in favor of Miles and denying GEICO's cross-motion for summary judgment. The order stated that each GEICO entity had been "obligated to provide separate uninsured motorist (UM) and separate underinsured motor vehicle (UIM) coverages where a plaintiff is injured by the concurring negligence of one uninsured motorist and the operator of one underinsured motor vehicle." As a result, the circuit court concluded Miles was entitled to an additional $25,000 in coverage from GEICO Advantage related to her claims against Doe and an additional $50,000 in coverage from GEICO Choice related to her claims against Doe.
GEICO noted an appeal to this Court, advancing multiple assignments of error that can be distilled to one question: did the circuit court err in concluding that Code § 38.2-2206 requires insurers to provide separate coverage limits to cover both UM and UIM claims arising from a single accident as opposed to there being a single limit with UIM coverage being a constituent part of a policy's UM coverage limit? Recognizing that there is a split in the circuit courts on this question, we granted GEICO's petition to resolve the issue.
We review a circuit court's grant of summary judgment de novo. VACORP v. Young, 298 Va. 490, 494 (2020). Similarly, issues of statutory interpretation and the interpretation of insurance contracts present questions of law subject to de novo review in this Court. See Virginia Dep't of Tax'n v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 300 Va. 446, 454 (2022) (statutory interpretation); Copp v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 279 Va. 675, 681 (2010) ().
In addressing questions of statutory interpretation, "our primary objective is 'to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent,' as expressed by the language used in the statute." Cuccinelli v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 283 Va. 420, 425 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Amerson, 281 Va. 414, 418 (2011)). "[W]e determine the General Assembly's intent from the words contained in the statute." Williams v. Commonwealth, 265 Va. 268, 271 (2003) (citing Vaughn, Inc. v. Beck, 262 Va. 673, 677 (2001); Thomas v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 38, 41 (1998)). "[W]ords in a statute are to be construed according to their ordinary meaning, given the context in which they are used." City of Va. Beach v. Bd. of Supervisors, 246 Va. 233, 236 (1993) (quoting Grant v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 680, 684 (1982)). In applying these principles, we also consider "the evil sought to be corrected by the legislature" when it adopted the pertinent language. Southern Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 114, 117 (1964).[4]
The parties agree that the dispositive question in this appeal is whether Virginia law requires an insurance company to provide separate UM and UIM coverage in an automobile liability policy or if the UIM coverage is properly understood as a component part of the UM coverage.[5] To answer this question, we turn to the language of Code § 38.2-2206(A).
Affording the words chosen by the General Assembly their plain and ordinary meanings, we conclude that UIM coverage is a constituent part of UM coverage and does not represent a separate tranche of available coverage when UM coverage has been exhausted.
In reaching this conclusion, we first note that the statutory language makes clear that there is but one endorsement, not two, required by Code § 38.2-2206(A). The statute requires that every automobile liability policy issued in Virginia "contain[] an endorsement" insuring covered insureds against injuries and damages negligently caused by "the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle[.]" Id. (Emphasis added). In using the singular "an" to modify endorsement, the General Assembly required that every automobile liability insurance policy contain a single endorsement that provides coverage for...
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