Gen. Convention New Jerusalem v. MacKenzie

• Decision Date: 26 July 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-P-521.,05-P-521.
• Citation: 851 N.E.2d 455,66 Mass. App. Ct. 836
• Parties: The GENERAL CONVENTION OF The NEW JERUSALEM IN The UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INC., & others<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> v. Edward MacKENZIE & others.<SMALL><SUP>2</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 455

851 N.E.2d 455

66 Mass. App. Ct. 836

The GENERAL CONVENTION OF The NEW JERUSALEM IN The UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INC., & others¹ v. Edward MacKENZIE & others.²

No. 05-P-521.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued March 3, 2006.

Decided July 26, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Lawrence R. Kulig, Boston (Damon P. Hart with him) for the plaintiffs.

Nicholas B. Carter, Boston, for the defendants.

Present: GREENBERG, DUFFLY, & KATZMANN, JJ.

GREENBERG, J.

A by-law of the congregational³ Boston Society of the New Jerusalem, Incorporated (Swedenborgian) (the local church), directs that "[i]n the event that the [local church] shall cease to exist, all funds and holdings shall be transferred to the General Convention of the New Jerusalem in the United States of America" (the General Convention). The question put is whether, thus phrased, a "vote of disaffiliation" by a majority of the members of the local church establishes claims for relief against the local church on behalf of the General Convention to recover church assets. There are subsidiary issues concerning the validity of the General Convention's claims pursuant to the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),⁴ as well as claims for membership fraud and asset mismanagement, and claims pursuant to G.L. c. 93A against the local church and the other named defendants.

1. Background. We summarize the facts alleged in the amended complaint which, for purposes of reviewing the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), we accept as true.⁵ Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 98, 360 N.E.2d 870 (1977). We do not purport to make a determination whether the facts alleged, and which we recite, are credible or susceptible of proof at trial.

The General Convention alleges that the local church has been affiliated with the General Convention since 1818. Sometime after 2002, the individual defendants, Kennedy and MacKenzie, became associated with the local church and its pastor. It is alleged that through a variety of nefarious means orchestrated by MacKenzie, they seized control of the local church's assets, caused the church to admit members in violation of the church by-laws and religious precepts, and looted the church's assets.⁶ Finally, it is alleged that in October, 2003, Kennedy and MacKenzie improperly caused the local church to disaffiliate from the General Convention by fraudulently enrolling unqualified new church members to rig the vote for the disaffiliation. The General Convention's amended complaint includes several causes of action, the primary one for declaratory relief alleging that, because the local church has "ceased to exist" under its by-laws, the local church's assets are to revert to the General Convention to be held in trust until another church affiliated with the General Convention can be established.

Facing that question, a Superior Court judge, pursuant to motions to dismiss, ruled, among other things, that the phrase "cease to exist" does not mean disaffiliation and dismissed the amended complaint. He also ruled that the General Convention and other named plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their other claims. The motion judge also concluded that resolution of the claims for "fraud or other wrongdoing in the admission of new members . . . would necessarily intrude into matters of religious doctrine."

2. Jurisdictional issue. The threshold question facing the motion judge and this court today is whether this dispute properly belongs in the civil courts of the Commonwealth. We begin our discussion with the long-recognized principle that "the First Amendment [to the United States Constitution] prohibits civil courts from intervening in disputes concerning religious doctrine, discipline, faith, or internal organization." Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 72, 479 N.E.2d 113, cert. denied sub nom. Carroll v. Alberts, 474 U.S. 1013, 106 S.Ct. 546, 88 L.Ed.2d 475 (1985), and cases cited. The judge relied on the recent Supreme Judicial Court case of Callahan v. First Congregational Church of Haverhill, 441 Mass. 699, 708-709, 808 N.E.2d 301 (2004) (hereafter Callahan) for the proposition that consideration of some of the counts presented here would impermissibly encroach on church decisions that involve "matters of doctrine, canon law, polity, discipline, and ministerial relationships." Id. at 708, 808 N.E.2d 301, quoting from Williams v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 436 Mass. 574, 579, 766 N.E.2d 820 (2002). For its part, the General Convention correctly says that the Callahan case leaves room for the justiciability of property disputes that arise within both congregational and hierarchical churches. Callahan, supra at 700-701, 808 N.E.2d 301. In the recent case of Wooten v. Crayton, 66 Mass.App.Ct. 187, 845 N.E.2d 1213 (2006) (hereafter Wooten), we interpreted the Callahan case as not negating jurisdiction in all aspects of "a dispute between factions competing for control of a congregational church." Id. at 195, 845 N.E.2d 1213.

As settled by Callahan, judicial intervention may extend only to matters that do not involve religious "doctrine, canon law, polity, discipline, and ministerial relationships." Callahan, supra at 708, 808 N.E.2d 301, quoting from Williams v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 436 Mass. at 579, 766 N.E.2d 820. Callahan, who had been the interim minister of the First Congregational Church of Haverhill, alleged that the defendant church breached its employment contract with him by not following its "own written procedures in carrying out [its] investigation and disciplinary proceedings" against him. Callahan, supra at 712-713, 808 N.E.2d 301. The court, however, refused to enter that thicket because "a church must be free to decide for itself what its obligations to its ministers are, without being subject to court interference." Ibid., quoting from Williams v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 436 Mass. at 581, 766 N.E.2d 820. Further, the court observed that the "assessment of an individual's qualifications to be a minister, and the appointment and retirement of ministers, are ecclesiastical matters entitled to constitutional protection against judicial or other State interference." Id. at 715, 808 N.E.2d 301, quoting from Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. at 72-73, 479 N.E.2d 113.

Here, the General Convention, acting through its former church leaders, asks, in its counts alleging membership fraud, for judicial review of the church's admission and recognition of new members. We may not undertake this analysis because of the absolute First Amendment protection recognized by Callahan and the long tradition of separation of church and State which preceded and informed the case. In this regard, the motion judge's reliance on Callahan was correct.

That conclusion, however, does not end our inquiry. The First Amendment does not prohibit the courts from deciding a property dispute involving a church as long as the courts do not intrude upon issues of church doctrine. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979), quoting from Maryland & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368, 90 S.Ct. 499, 24 L.Ed.2d 582 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[A] State may adopt any one of various approaches for settling church property disputes so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith").⁷ Therefore, as long as the court refrains from delving into matters of church doctrine, polity, and internal operation, the First Amendment does not prohibit the court from exercising jurisdiction over property disputes.

As we have noted, the amended complaint sets out numerous causes of action, the most important of which is a declaratory judgment claim (count I) that the local church's by-laws require that, upon disaffiliation, the church's assets are to revert to the General Convention to be held in trust until another church affiliated with the General Convention can be established. We conclude this count presents an issue that is not barred from the court's consideration by the First Amendment. To the extent it is permitted by the First Amendment, church by-laws are to be interpreted in the same manner as any ordinary contract. See Mitchell v. Albanian Orthodox Diocese in America, Inc., 355 Mass. 278, 282, 244 N.E.2d 276 (1969).

Our conclusion is fortified by our recent decision in Episcopal Diocese of Mass. v. Devine, 59 Mass.App.Ct. 722, 728, 797 N.E.2d 916 (2003), where we upheld the exercise of jurisdiction over a claim to enforce a diocese's own determination with respect to the parish church. We reiterated that although the First Amendment does not grant judicial authority to intervene in nonsecular disputes within a church, "[t]he State has an obvious and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes, and in providing a civil forum where the ownership of church property can be determined conclusively." Ibid., quoting from Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602, 99 S.Ct. 3020.

3. The by-laws. As the basis for dismissal of count I of the amended complaint, the motion judge concluded that the "plain language" of art. X, § 3, of the by-laws governing transfer of the local church's assets to the General Convention applies only if the local church shall "cease to exist," but not if it disaffiliates from the General Convention.⁸ On this basis, he ruled that no claim for relief exists because the assets remain under the lawful control of the newly elected lay leaders. For its part, the General Convention argues that the ruling is erroneous because the judge misconstrued the by-laws. There is an additional contention, not argued below, that even if the by-laws do not explicitly provide for a reversion to the General Convention, a trust should be implied to accomplish the same result. We need not reach...