General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. State

• Decision Date: 23 May 2005
• Docket Number: No. S04G1945.,S04G1945.
• Citation: 613 S.E.2d 641
• Parties: GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION v. STATE of Georgia.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

613 S.E.2d 641

GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION v. STATE of Georgia.

No. S04G1945.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

May 23, 2005.

William D. Barwick, Thomas M. Byrne, Valerie Strong Sanders, Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, LLP, Atlanta, for Appellant.

Andrew Thomas Jones, Gary Drew Bergman, Prosecuting Attorneys Council of Georgia, William T. McBroom, III, Dist. Atty., Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., for Appellee.

THOMPSON, Justice.

In General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. State of Georgia, 268 Ga.App. 473, 602 S.E.2d 235 (2004), a majority of the Court of Appeals held that General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) was not an innocent interest holder in a Chevrolet Silverado truck in which it held a security interest, and that, therefore, GMAC's interest in the vehicle was subject to forfeiture by the State under OCGA § 16-13-49(e)(1)(A).¹ Because we conclude that the Court of Appeals erroneously applied an improper legal standard in reaching that determination, we reverse.

James Childrey purchased a 2002 Chevrolet Silverado truck on credit. The dealer assigned the retail installment contract to GMAC, which obtained a first priority security interest in the vehicle. In June 2002, Childrey and his wife were arrested after the Fayette County Drug Suppression Task Force searched their home and vehicles and recovered approximately two pounds of methamphetamine and one pound of marijuana in another vehicle owned by Childrey. The State seized a boat and two other automobiles in which Childrey had significant equity. The Silverado was parked near the residence; no contraband was found inside, and the agents declined to seize it after learning that Childrey had no equity in the vehicle.

Several days later, task force Agent David Neal telephoned a GMAC representative and informed him of Childrey's arrest.² Agent Neal also advised GMAC that Childrey was using other GMAC-financed vehicles for the transportation and sale of illegal narcotics, and should Childrey be caught again, GMAC would no longer be considered an innocent interest holder with respect to those vehicles. Agent Neal also told GMAC that the task force did not have cause to seize the other vehicles, but he requested that GMAC repossess them.³ Because the only information that GMAC had at that point was Agent Neal's statement that Childrey was selling drugs, GMAC was concerned that it had insufficient documentation to support repossession of the vehicles, and it asked for written confirmation. Agent Neal replied that he would have law enforcement send a letter to that effect; but despite the agent's assurances, no written confirmation was ever provided. Nonetheless, GMAC undertook its own investigation by sending a field representative to inspect the Childrey property and to interview Mrs. Childrey. She informed the GMAC representative that her husband was presently incarcerated on drug charges and that the Silverado was being used by an employee of their siding business. The vehicle was not seen on the premises at the time and GMAC independently verified the fact that Mr. Childrey remained incarcerated. Although GMAC's financing contract with Childrey permitted repossession of a vehicle which is "expose[d] ... to misuse, seizure or confiscation," it is the company's policy to require concrete facts before effecting a repossession. Based on his observations, his interview with Mrs. Childrey, and independent verification, the field representative determined that there was no "concrete evidence" to authorize a repossession.

GMAC had no further contact with the State authorities until March 2003, when Agent Neal telephoned GMAC to advise the company that Childrey had been arrested again on drug charges, and on this occasion, he was driving the Silverado.

The State filed a complaint for forfeiture against the Silverado, naming Childrey and GMAC as owners and/or interest holders in the property. GMAC filed an answer maintaining an innocent interest holder defense under OCGA § 16-13-49(e).⁴ After a hearing, the trial court granted forfeiture of the vehicle to the State. The Court of Appeals affirmed. GMAC, supra.

"In a condemnation action, once the State has presented a prima facie case for forfeiture, the claimant has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that [it] is an innocent owner." Mitchell v. State, 236 Ga.App. 335, 337, 511 S.E.2d 880 (1999). See also OCGA § 16-13-49(o)(5) and (p). The State's evidence at the hearing showed that the Silverado was used to transport contraband, and thus established a prima facie case for forfeiture. The burden was then on GMAC to establish its entitlement to a statutory exception under OCGA § 16-13-49(e). The relevant provisions of that statute provide that a property interest will not be subject to forfeiture if the owner or interest holder establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that it is "not legally accountable for the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture, did not consent to it, and did not know and could not reasonably have known of the conduct or that it was likely to occur." OCGA § 16-13-49(e)(1)(A). Only the last prong of that Code section is relevant to our inquiry here.⁵

The State concedes that, prior to March 2003, GMAC did not acquire firsthand knowledge that Childrey was using a GMAC-financed vehicle in connection with illegal drug activity. The telephone call in 2002 from an agent unknown to GMAC conveyed nothing more than a mere suspicion of future illegal activity. GMAC reasonably requested written confirmation of those unsubstantiated claims, which was never provided. There was no further communication from the authorities until almost a year later when Childrey was arrested in the Silverado and the vehicle was seized by the State. In the meantime, GMAC conducted its own on-site inspection of the Childrey property. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that investigation lacking, in that GMAC failed to "contact police to obtain a police report, to confirm Agent Neal's authority, [or] to obtain any further information from police" to substantiate Childrey's 2002 arrest. GMAC, supra at 476, 602 S.E.2d 235. In this regard, the Court of Appeals characterized GMAC's actions as "superficial" and its investigation "inadequate ... to prevent the illicit use of the vehicle." Id.

As noted above, in order to retain its status as an innocent interest holder under OCGA § 16-13-49(e)(1)(A), GMAC must establish that it "did not know and could not reasonably have known of [Childrey's] conduct or that it was likely to occur." According to the Court of Appeals, the 2002 phone call from Agent Neal provided GMAC with the requisite knowledge that Childrey would likely use the Silverado for illegal purposes. That holding reduces the quantum of knowledge sufficient for an interest holder to lose statutory protection to mere suspicion. Such an interpretation of the knowledge requirement does not accurately express the intent of the legislature in enacting the forfeiture provisions: "one of the express purposes of OCGA § 16-13-49[is] the protection of the property interests of innocent owners." Ford v. State of Georgia, 271 Ga. 162, 163, 516 S.E.2d 778 (1999). And because forfeiture of property is disfavored, the statutory scheme must be "strictly construed and limited." Pabey v. State, 262 Ga.App. 272, 277, 585 S.E.2d 200 (2003).

Presumably, the State could have instituted forfeiture proceedings when it found the Silverado in close proximity to the contraband on Childrey's property. See OCGA § 16-13-49(d)(6); Manley v. State, 217 Ga.App. 556(3), 458 S.E.2d 179 (1995). It declined to do so. Instead, it placed the onus on GMAC to repossess the vehicle based on allegations on which the State refused to act. Lienholders have only contractual rights, strictly governed by statute, to exercise remedies upon default, and are subject to legal challenge in the form of wrongful repossession or foreclosure. See generally Boaz v. Latson, 260 Ga.App. 752(2)(a), 580 S.E.2d 572 (2003), rev'd on other grounds in Latson v. Boaz, 278 Ga. 113, 598 S.E.2d 485 (2004). To hold under these facts that GMAC acquired knowledge that Childrey would use the vehicle in a manner giving rise to its forfeiture misconstrues the intent of the statute and undermines the rights of innocent lienholders. Compare State v. Tucker, 242 Ga.App. 3, 528 S.E.2d 523 (2000) and James v. State, 240 Ga.App. 288, 523 S.E.2d 354 (1999) (both involving family member owners who had prior firsthand knowledge that the forfeited vehicles were involved in illegal drug activity). It follows that the Court of Appeals interpreted the reasonable knowledge prong of OCGA § 16-13-49(e)(1)(A) in a manner which exceeds the duty imposed by the legislature. In so doing, that court applied an improper legal standard.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except CARLEY, J., who dissents.

SEARS, Presiding Justice, concurring.

I agree with the majority opinion and concur in its judgment. I write simply to highlight the unfairness of the State's position in this case. At the time that Agent Neal telephoned GMAC and told GMAC that it should repossess the vehicle, the State could have subjected the vehicle to forfeiture if it could have shown that the vehicle was "directly or indirectly" "intended for use in any manner to facilitate a [controlled substance] violation."¹ Agent Neal informed GMAC that the State did not have enough evidence to seize the vehicle under the foregoing standard. However, the State now asserts that, based on what Agent Neal told GMAC, GMAC at that time had enough evidence so that it "reasonably should have known" that the vehicle would be used for a controlled substance violation or that such a violation "was likely to occur."² The State relies on this assertion in its attempt to defeat GMAC's interest in the property. However, if the State did not believe that it could have shown that the vehicle, even indirectly,...