General Teamsters Union, Local No. 406 v. Uptown Cleaners & Hatters, Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 June 1959
• Docket Number: No. 58,58
• Citation: 356 Mich. 204,97 N.W.2d 593
• Parties: GENERAL TEAMSTERS UNION, LOCAL NO. 406, Plaintiff, Apellee and Cross-Appellant, v. UPTOWN CLEANERS & HATTERS, INC., a Michigan Corporation, Michael P. Salhaney, Nicholas Salhaney and James P. Salhaney, Defendants, Appellants and Cross-Appellees.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 593

97 N.W.2d 593

356 Mich. 204

GENERAL TEAMSTERS UNION, LOCAL NO. 406, Plaintiff, Apellee and Cross-Appellant, v. UPTOWN CLEANERS & HATTERS, INC., a Michigan Corporation, Michael P. Salhaney, Nicholas Salhaney and James

P. Salhaney, Defendants, Appellants and

Cross-Appellees.

No. 58.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

June 5, 1959.

Morse & Kleiner, Grand Rapids (A. Robert Kleiner, Grand Rapids, of counsel), Padway, Goldberg & Previant, Milwaukee, Wis., for plaitiff-appellee, and cross-appellant.

Warner, Norcross & Judd, by Harold S. Sawyer, Varnum, Riddering, Wierengo & Christenson, by Clifford C. Christenson, Eugene Alkema, Grand Rapids, for defendants and appellants.

Harold A. Cranefield, Kurt L. Hanslowe, Redmond H. Roche, Jr., Gordon A. Gregory, Detroit, for International Union UAW, Amicus Curiae.

Beaumont, Smith & Harris, Frank E. Cooper, Dwight H. Vincent, Detroit, for Mich. Manufacturers' Ass'n, Amicus Curiae.

Before the Entire Bench.

EDWARDS, Justice.

We believe the issues presented by this record are:

1) Is plaintiff the representative of a majority of the 9 driver-salesmen employed by defendants?

2) Did the chancellor have power, under the agreement between the parties and the terms of the labor mediation act (C.L.1948 and C.L.S.1956, § 423.1 et seq. [Stat.Ann.1950 Rev. § 17.454(1) et seq.]), to require defendants to enter into collective bargaining with plaintiff?

Certain features of this case make our task somewhat easier than it might otherwise be. First, we have here a purely intrastate problem with no question of preemption of the field by Federal labor legislation. Second, although we deal with a dispute of some bitterness, the record discloses no strike, stoppage of work, or counterclaim of unlawful labor activity. Third, the parties are in reasonable agreement as to the issues and have filed excellent briefs. And fourth, the circuit judge who heard this chancery action wrote a careful and thorough opinion of which we shall make frequent use.

The employer defendant in this case is a dry cleaning company in the city of Grand Rapids, which employs approximately 75 persons. The business is owned and operated by Michael, Nicholas and James Salhaney, and has been so operated for over 20 years. Included among the defendants' employees are 9 men who are described as driver-salesmen.

Functions of driver-salesmen include soliciting business for the firm and picking up laundry and cleaning throughout the city, and bringing such materials to the plant where the goods are cleaned, pressed and laundered. After delivering the article to the customers, the driver-salesmen collect the amount due or allow the customer to charge the amount. Some of the charge accounts are carried directly by the employer. Most accounts, however, are ones of the cash-and-carry variety. In relation to these, where a driver-salesman allows a customer to charge an item where the customer is not a firm charge account, the company rules required the driver-salesman to pay the firm for such charge accounts after 30 days have elapsed. Other than these accounts, driver-salesmen turn in all money at the end of each workday. Testimony indicated that the aforementioned 30-day accounts were in actuality not always brought up to date at the end of 30 days and that the defendant firm allowed driver-salesmen some leeway as to clearing up such accounts.

This record does not disclose any record of union organization at Uptown prior to 1957. On February 5, 1957, a representative of Teamsters Union Local 406, who was a personal friend of at least 1 of the driver-salesmen, met with 6 of the 9 drivers to talk about the union. At this meeting the 6 men present signed cards joining the union, and authorizing Local 406 to represent the men in obtaining a contract with defendant firm.

The following day the 3 other driver-salesmen, upon being informed of what transpired the previous night, also signed similar cards.

Pursuant to such authorizations, representatives of Local 406 approached defendant firm's officers, Nicholas and Michael Salhaney, seeking to set a time for the purpose of negotiating a contract. Nick Salhaney expressed great surprise that his men had joined a union, and asked for time to think about the matter.

The union representatives returned the following day, at which time Nick Salhaney expressed disbelief that his men had joined a union. Possibilities of a representation election were discussed.

The next day, after consulting with his attorney, Nick made arrangements for a representation election to be held February 15, 1957, under the auspices of the State labor mediation board. A formal mediation board agreement was executed by the parties calling for a secret ballot among the drivers 'to determine the representative, if any, desired by them for the purposes of collective bargaining.'

Prior to the election Nick spoke to his drivers, expressing his disappointment that the drivers wanted a union, because, he said, their problems had always been solved amicably. Prior to the election defendant firm also sent letters to the driver-salesmen instructing them as to the manner of the election. In this letter, disappointment over the desire for a union was again expressed. In addition, the letter noted:

1) Upon members pay $60 per year dues.

'What can the union do for you for this $60 or more a year that you cannot do for yourself?';

2) The possibilities of strikes;

3) The congressional investigation of the Teamsters Union;

4) The high driver commission rate paid by Uptown.

The election was held as scheduled, with a resulting vote of 6-3 in favor of Local 406 being exclusive representative for collective bargaining.

On the day of the election after the results were known, Nick Salhaney had all drivers bring their 30-day accounts up to date. There is some dispute in the testimony on this matter, but it appears that the accounts generally were not handled by Nick Salhaney and that the drivers had not generally been required to keep them up to date.

Between February 15 and March 1, 1957, friction mounted between the drivers and the Salhaneys. Mike Salhaney reproached 1 driver over the union, used abusive language to him, and threatened him with violence. Reports were circulated among the drivers that defendant firm was going to go on a cash-and-carry basis, that some drivers would lose their jobs, and that strikes would injure the drivers.

One driver spoke to Nick Salhaney about quitting the union and organizing an independent union. Nick suggested that the way to solve the problem was for the drivers to sign a petition withdrawing from the union. This petition was typed in the defendants' office after suggestions as to its wording by Nick Salhaney, and circulated and signed by all 9 men. The petition was kept in the firm safe at night, to which no driver had independent access.

Testimony also indicated that Mike Salhaney encouraged the drivers to sign the petition 'joining the bandwagon.' One late signer testified that Salhaney asked him why he had not already signed.

When all signatures were obtained, Local 406 was notified of the drivers' withdrawal from the union, and thereafter defendants refused to recognize the Local or bargain with it as representative of its driver-salesmen.

Plaintiff Local thereupon brought this action claiming unlawful interference by defendants in the exercise of employees' rights to organize, and that such interference rendered the petition of withdrawal from the union inoperative. Plaintiff also sought injunctive relief to restrain defendants from interfering with plaintiff's rights to organize and from refusing to bargain.

The circuit judge who heard the matter found in his opinion that the defendants had interfered with the rights of self-organization of the employees, and that the petition dated February 26 was ineffective because of such interference to terminate plaintiff's authority as representative of the employees. He thereupon entered a decree containing the following provisions 'It Is Ordered that the defendants, their officers and agents, shall absolutely cease and desist from:

'(a) Interfering with, restraining or coercing their employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization.

'(b) Initiating, creating, dominating, contributing to, or interfering with the formation or administration of any labor organization.

'It Is Further Ordered that the defendants, and their officers and agents, shall enter into collective bargaining, in good faith, with the plaintiff over the wages, hours and working conditions of the defendants' employees who are driver-salesmen, until the further order of this court.'

Both parties appeal, the plaintiff arguing that the decree should have contained an anti-discrimination provision, and defendants contending that the judge's finding as to interference was in error and that the collective bargaining order was beyond the power conveyed by the labor mediation act.

We believe that the major issues presented on appeal are as stated at the outset:

1) Is plaintiff the representative of a majority of the 9 driver-salesmen employed by defendants?

2) Did the chancellor have power, under the agreement between the parties and the terms of the labor mediation act, to require defendants to enter into collective bargaining with plaintiff?

The chancellor summarized the facts bearing upon the represented question thus in his opinion:

'Prior to the election defendants made known their opposition to the union both at a meeting with the employees and by means of a letter sent out to each employee. In the letter, which was carefully drafted, and standing by itself would appear to have been permitted under both the constitutional and statutory free-speech rule, defendants marshaled the arguments against the union--the monthly dues, the possibility of strikes, the events then taking place before a congressional committee with respect to...