Genser v. State Personnel Bd. of Cal.

• Decision Date: 27 June 1952
• Citation: 245 P.2d 1090,112 Cal.App.2d 77
• Parties: GENSER v. STATE PERSONNEL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA et al. Civ. 8030.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 1090

245 P.2d 1090

112 Cal.App.2d 77

GENSER v. STATE PERSONNEL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA et al.

Civ. 8030.

District Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

June 27, 1952.

Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., Wilmer W. Morse, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellants.

Anthony J. Kennedy, Sacramento, for respondent.

SCHOTTKY, Justice.

Respondent, Morris Genser, who held a position as Investigator, Grade Two, in the Motor Vehicle Department, was suspended from his position on May 6, 1948. Charges were filed against him on May 12, 1948, and the appellant State Personnel Board, through a hearing officer, conducted a hearing on the charges on July 20, 1948. The State Personnel Board found that the following charges against respondent were true:

(1) Engaging in the business of buying and selling automobiles, purchasing the same from new car dealers, while occupying the position of Motor Vehicle Investigator, Grade Two, with the Department of Motor Vehicles, the same being incompatible with his duties as investigator and inimical to the public welfare.

(2) Securing preference in delivery of automobiles from dealers by reason of his official position not accorded other customers.

(3) Falsely representing to dealers that the vehicles purchased were for his own personal use and would not be resold.

(4) Violating Vehicle Code section 236 by causing a motor vehicle to be registered to a wrong address.

(5) Failing to expedite the issuance of a certain dealer's license as promised.

(6) Falsely representing to an applicant for a dealer's license which he was handling, that the only car he had was a 1938 Chevrolet, and soliciting the applicant's aid in obtaining a new one.

On February 4, 1949, appellant Board rendered its decision that respondent be suspended from his position from the date of his suspension to March 1, 1949. Following the denial of his petition for a rehearing, respondent filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Superior Court, alleging: That in making said findings of fact, decision and order of suspension and in denying said petition for rehearing, respondent State Personnel Board proceeded in excess of its jurisdiction and committed prejudicial abuse of its discretion as follows:

(a) The acts of petitioner found to be incompatible with the duties of his said position were lawful acts done by petitioner in his private capacity.

(b) The charges, together with the amendments and supplement thereto and the hearing had thereon were an invasion of petitioner's non-official private life outside the authority of respondent director and respondent Board.

(c) The findings that acts of petitioner were incompatible with the duties of his position are not supported by the evidence.

(d) The order and decision of dismissal and denial of salary are not supported by the findings.

(e) The hearing procedure was defective.

No oral evidence was given upon the trial in the Superior Court, but the case was submitted on the transcript of the testimony in the hearing before the Board, the findings of the Board, and the pleadings. The court found that the State Personnel Board acted in excess of its jurisdiction, abused its discretion and acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and found further 'that there was no substantial evidence, and the evidence received at said hearing by the State Personnel Board was insufficient to support' the charges against the petitioner.

Appellant contends that the petition does not state a cause of action to set aside the decision of appellant Board, under the theory that the hearing procedure was not in accordance with law, and also that the judgment could not be supported on this theory since the trial court did not find on the allegation, paragraph (e), that the hearing procedure was defective. However, respondent concedes that no part of the court's order was based upon said paragraph (e) and that upon failure to find upon it the allegations and contention that the hearing procedure was defective became moot.

Appellant next contends that the petition does not state a cause of action to set aside the appellant Board's decision, under the theory that the decision is not supported by the Board's findings, because the findings of the Board are neither set out in nor attached as an exhibit to the pleadings, nor is the substance of the findings alleged. However, as pointed out by respondent, the entire record of proceedings before the appellant State Personnel Board, including the testimony and the findings, were filed with the court upon stipulation of the parties submitting the case to the court for decision. In view of this we deem it unnecessary to discuss this contention at any length because we believe that the allegations of the petition were sufficient to bring the matter before the court under section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and where, as here, the matter was submitted upon the entire record, it should be disposed of upon the merits rather than upon any technical rules of pleading.

Appellant contends that this proceeding is of the type in which the trial court does not exercise its independent judgment on the evidence but merely determines whether the Board's findings are supported by substantial evidence. Respondent, in reply, argues that the Superior Court under the provisions of section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure was required to exercise its independent judgment upon the evidence submitted. This same question was before us in the recent case of Nelson v. Department of Corrections, 110 Cal.App.2d ----, 242 P.2d 906, and we there held that the trial court in reviewing a decision of the State Personnel Board is bound by the substantial evidence rule and is not entitled to exercise its independent judgment as to the weight of the evidence. In so holding we followed the decisions of the Supreme Court in Boren v. State Personnel Board, 37 Cal.2d 634, 234 P.2d 981, and Covert v. State Board of Equalization, 29 Cal.2d 125, 173 P.2d 545. In view of these authorities we consider that it is now settled that the substantial evidence rule is the rule by which a court is bound in reviewing a decision of the State Personnel Board.

In the case of Southern California Jockey Club v. California Horse Racing Board, 36 Cal.2d 167, 223 P.2d 1, 6, the court quoted from McDonough v. Goodcell, 13 Cal.2d 741, 91 P.2d 1035, 123 A.L.R. 1205, as follows:

"Unquestionably the testimony before the commissioner would sustain a conclusion either way upon the issue of the good moral character and fitness of the petitioners to engage in the bail bond business in San Francisco. If the trial had been before a court the evidence was sufficient to support findings either way or was sufficient to support a verdict either way on the issue. With this state of the record our inquiry on this phase of the case is at an end, for it cannot be said that there was not a sufficient factual basis for the conclusion of the commissioner and therefore he did not act arbitrarily or otherwise abuse his discretionary power in denying the permit."

The court then said:

'Those views have been consistently approved. [Citing cases.] And the rule was not changed by statute as is evident from the wording of section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We therefore hold, that in a case such as this, the trial court should not reweigh the evidence, and its sole function is, to determine from a review of the record, whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the ruling of the board. If the trial court should hold the evidence insufficient, and this holding is attacked on appeal, the court to which the appeal is taken must review the record and determine the sufficiency of the evidence. If the evidence is found to be sufficient, the ruling of the board must be sustained.'

And in Bank of Italy v. Johnson, 200 Cal. 1, at page 32, 251 P. 784, at page 796, which involved judicial review of administrative determination, the court said:

'When the court is called upon, as in this case, to determine the character and sufficiency of the evidence to justify the writ as against the respondent, we are governed by the rule that, if there be any substantial evidence in the record which would have supported a conclusion on the part of the respondent that public convenience and advantage would not be promoted by the opening of such branches, the writ must be denied. The rule which applies here is analogous to the rule that, if there be any substantial evidence to support the finding of a trial court on an issue of fact, such finding may not be disturbed, even though the court on appeal might consider that the evidence preponderated the other way.' (Italics added.)

The rule referred to in the quotation is stated in Estate of Bristol, 23 Cal.2d 221, at page 223, 143 P.2d 689, at page 690, as follows:

'The rule as to our province is: 'In reviewing the evidence * * * all conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent, and all legitimate and reasonable inferences indulged in to uphold the verdict if possible. It is an elementary * * * principle of law, that when a verdict is attacked as being unsupported, the power of the appellate court being and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the conclusion reached by the jury. When two or more inferences can be reasonably deduced from the facts, the reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court.' (Italics added.) (Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co. (1935), 3 Cal.2d 427, 429, 45 P.2d 183, 184.) The rule quoted is as applicable in reviewing the findings of a judge as it is when considering a jury's verdict. * * * Appellate courts, therefore, if there be any reasonable doubt as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a finding, should resolve that doubt in favor of the finding * * *.'

Having determined that the substantial evidence rule...