Coomes v. State Personnel Bd.

• Decision Date: 06 May 1963
• Citation: 30 Cal.Rptr. 639,215 Cal.App.2d 770
• Parties: Lawrence H. COOMES, Petitioner and Appellant, v. STATE PERSONNEL BOARD of the State of California, et al.,. Respondents. Civ. 10558.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 639

30 Cal.Rptr. 639

215 Cal.App.2d 770

Lawrence H. COOMES, Petitioner and Appellant, v. STATE PERSONNEL BOARD of the State of California, et al.,. Respondents.

Civ. 10558.

District Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

May 6, 1963.

Rehearing Denied May 29, 1963.

Hearing Denied July 3, 1963.

Donald A. Peters, North Highlands, for appellant.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., by Willard A. Shank, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, for respondents.

FRIEDMAN, Justice.

Appellant Coomes, a civil service psychiatric technician at Camarillo State Hospital, became involved in a struggle with a patient named Osborne. Two other psychiatric technicians, Havener and Miles, were also participants. All three employees were dismissed. The dismissal notices alleged that the respective employees 'did physically beat and did assist in physically beating' Osborne. The three employees appealed to the State Personnel Board and hearings were had before the board's hearing officer.

After taking evidence the Personnel Board adopted a decision in the Coomes case finding that 'while on duty as a Psychiatric Technician at the Camarillo State Hospital, appellant participated in the physical beating of a patient and inmate of said hospital, to wit, one William Pinkson Osborne, by holding and restraining said patient while he was being struck and beaten by another employee.' The decision concluded that Coomes' conduct violated Rule 84 of the Department of Mental Hygiene, ¹ constituted insubordination and willful disobedience within the meaning of Government Code, section 19572, ² and sustained his dismissal. Parallel decisions were made as to Havener and Miles. In the former's case the proposed decision recited a finding that the employee had willfully and intentionally struck Osborne with his fists. Miles was found to have attempted to strike the patient with his knee while he was held by Coomes and hit by Havener.

The three employees then requested a rehearing, which was ordered by the State Personnel Board. Testimony of additional witnesses was taken. The dismissals were confirmed and the three employees then petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate. That court found that the findings of insubordination and willful disobedience were supported by substantial evidence and denied the writ. All three employees filed notices of appeal to this Court. Subsequently Havener and Miles abandoned their appeals. Coomes' principal contentions on appeal are: that the findings were not supported by substantial evidence and that the dismissal decision is not supported by the findings. We do not consider the propriety of the orders sustaining Havener's and Miles' dismissals.

The trial court's function was to review the transcript of the State Personnel Board hearings to determine whether the board's findings were supported by substantial evidence. (Shepherd v. State Personnel Board, 48 Cal.2d 41, 46-47, 307 P.2d 4; Genser v. State Personnel Board, 112 Cal.App.2d 77, 80, 245 P.2d 1090.) The substantial evidence rule is equivalent to the concept of 'substantial evidence in the light of the whole record.' (Martin v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board, 52 Cal.2d 238, 246, 340 P.2d 1, 5; Argonaut Insurance Exchange v. Industrial Accident Commission, 49 Cal.2d 706, 713, 321 P.2d 460.) In this kind of proceeding the role of the appellate court is to ascertain whether the administrative record embodies substantial evidence to support the findings of the administrative agency and of the trial court. (Borders v. Anderson, 204 A.C.A. 448, 457, 22 Cal.Rptr. 243; Greenblatt v. Martin, 189 Cal.App.2d 787, 789, 790, 11 Cal.Rptr. 669; Fromberg v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 169 Cal.App.2d 230, 232, 337 P.2d 123.) ³

As revealed by the transcript of evidence before the State Personnel Board, the facts are essentially as follows: On a particular morning Mrs. Wilkinson, superintendent of nursing services at the state hospital, received a complaint from patient Wolfe, who reported abuse of patient Osborne the previous evening in the dayroom of Ward 6A. Mrs. Wilkinson assured Wolfe that 'action would take place.' She called other hospital officials, who examined Osborne and found no sign of physical injury. She then interviewed patients Garcia, Lindsay and Rivas. Garcia and Lindsay related the incident to her but Rivas said he had been in the bathroom shaving and had not seen the incident. Wolfe and Lindsay were mentally ill patients. Hospital records described them as afflicted with 'schizophrenic reaction, chronic undifferentiated type,' and Wolfe had the additional diagnosis of 'neurological brain disease associated with intoxication.' Rivas and Garcia had been committed for narcotics addiction.

After interviewing these patients Mrs. Wilkinson submitted a written report to the associate superintendent of the hospital and to the personnel officer. The associate superintendent then interviewed these and other patients. On the following day Havener, Miles and appellant Coomes were called to the associate superintendent's office and given notices of suspension pending disciplinary action. The employees had not been interviewed and had no prior knowledge of accusations against them.

At the hearing Wolfe and Lindsay described the incident. Three other patients, Bauman ('schizophrenic reaction, paranoid type'), Barber (same diagnosis) and Gutierrez ('schizophrenic reaction, chronic undifferentiated type') also described the occurrence, which had taken place about seven o'clock in the evening in the dayroom of Ward 6A. About 50 patients were in the room, most of them watching television. Attendants on duty were Coomes, Havener and Miles, all of whom were in a small office adjoining the dayroom. Coomes was the senior attendant. Osborne, a patient in his early twenties, became upset after some words with a patient named Feliciano. Osborne picked up a wooden ash stand and waved it at Feliciano. He them smashed the ash stand against the floor and brandished it in the air as a club. Feliciano picked up a chair and held it before him for protection. Hearing the disturbance, Havener and Coomes came toward Osborne. Coomes stepped behind him and put his arm around Osborne's neck or upper chest, in a hold which was variously described as a headlock or necklock. According to the patients, Havener then started to hit Osborne in the area of the upper abdomen. Several of the patients described an attempt by Miles to kick or knee the patient in the stomach or groin. None of these patients testified to any blows by Coomes.

Coomes testified that he heard a crash and saw Osborne waiving the ash stand in Feliciano's direction; that Osborne did not put the ash stand down when told to do so by Havener; that he then got behind Osborne and applied a neckhold to the patient (apparently with the inner elbow held beneath the patient's chin); that he was trying to prevent Osborne from harming himself or others. Havener testified that he was trying to grasp the patient's left arm and hand. Miles testified that he saw Coomes and Havener struggling to get the ash stand away from Osborne and that he tried to grasp Osborne's right arm. All three employees denied any mistreatment of the patient.

Most of the witnesses agreed that Osborne subsided and walked from the room erect and unassisted, with an attendant at either side. According to the attendants, the whole affair took 10 to 15 seconds. Patient's estimates of the time span ranged from 'not over a minute' to five minutes. Testimony of hospital personnel indicated that Osborne was known as a disturbed patient who had frequent altercations with other patients. After the incident he received a tranquilizing injection and was later transferred to a ward for acutely disturbed patients.

In the light of these facts we appraise the evidentiary support for Coomes' dismissal. Preliminarily, we turn to Government Code section 19572, subdivisions (e) and (o). The former specifies 'insubordination' as a ground for discipline, the latter 'willful disobedience.' The two terms overlap. So far as they are distinguishable, dictionary definitions indicate that disobedience connotes a specific violation of command or prohibition, while insubordination implies a general course of mutinous, disrespectful or contumacious conduct. In the statute, the term 'disobedience' is modified by the adjective 'willful,' but the ground of insubordination is without a modifying adjective. Still, the latter term carries a volitional coloration which excludes the notion of accidental or even negligent conduct. A proper construction of section 19572 impels the view that insubordination, equally with willful misconduct, requires proof of intent or willfulness. The latter elements imply that the person knows what he is doing and intends to do what he is doing. (See In re Trombley, 31 Cal.2d 801, 807, 193 P.2d 734; People v. McCree, 128 Cal.App.2d 196, 202, 275 P.2d 95.)

Thus, in order to justify disciplinary action under either subdivision of section 19572, State Personnel Board findings must rest upon evidence of intentional or knowing conduct. Evidence which fails to establish willfulness, knowledge or intent lacks an indispensable element for proof of guilt and is not substantial. Precisely at this point the evidence in this case fails completely to establish knowing insubordination or willful misconduct on the part of appellant Coomes.

Operation of institutions for the care and treatment of the mentally ill occasionally demands reasonable restraint of patients. A disturbed patient may indulge in an outburst of aggressive action, threatening harm to himself, to other patients,...