George Bolln Company v. North Platte Valley Irrigation Company

• Decision Date: 13 February 1912
• Docket Number: 678
• Citation: 121 P. 22,19 Wyo. 542
• Parties: GEORGE BOLLN COMPANY v. NORTH PLATTE VALLEY IRRIGATION COMPANY
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

121 P. 22

19 Wyo. 542

GEORGE BOLLN COMPANY v. NORTH PLATTE VALLEY IRRIGATION COMPANY

No. 678

Supreme Court of Wyoming

February 13, 1912

RESERVED QUESTIONS from District Court, Converse County; HON CHARLES E. CARPENTER, Judge.

The reserved questions are stated in the opinion.

F. H Harvey, for plaintiff.

The general propositions involved in the question as to the legislative procedure in the passage of the act referred to in the reserved questions were fully considered by this court in Hynds v. Cahill, 12 Wyo. 225, and State v Swan, 7 Wyo. 166, and that phase of the case is submitted on the part of the plaintiff without argument. The novelty of the statute does not necessarily militate against its validity. It is a matter of legislative policy to determine to whom the protection of such laws shall extend. The abstract question whether the grocer who supplies the food for the men who do the work in excavating a ditch or canal contributes to the value of the completed work in a measure and manner sufficiently direct to justify his protection by the law has been determined in the affirmative by the legislature; and if the law is not violative of some constitutional provision, it should be sustained. The original purpose of mechanics' lien laws has long since been lost sight of, and, by an imperceptible process of extension, they have been brought to include everything that may be necessary to secure to either mechanics, material-men or contractors, pay for any service rendered in the betterment of the property. "Whatever may be said of the wisdom of this sort of class legislation, its validity and constitutionality is too well settled to admit of dispute." (Church v. Smithea, (Colo.) 35 P. 267.) The reasoning in the case of Gibbs v. Tally, 65 P. 970, relied upon by counsel for the defendant, is not satisfactory, but it is submitted that the better reasoning is to be found in the line of decisions represented by Laird v. Moonan, 32 Minn. 358, and Henry &c. Co. v. Evans, (Mo.) 10 S.W. 868, which hold that statutes providing for liens in favor of sub-contractors and others are not unconstitutional, although the liens are not limited to the amount agreed to be paid to the owner by the contractor. (27 Cyc. 19.) As to the contention that the statute is class legislation, it may be said that though mechanics' lien laws have generally been assailed on that ground, the validity of the laws has been sustained. (State v. Loomis, 115 Mo.) The determination of what constitutes a reasonable basis for separate laws with reference to given matter is a matter resting primarily with the legislature. This state had entered an era of extensive ditch and railroad construction. It was desirable to encourage and facilitate this work, and on the other hand quite as desirable that the local producers and dealers, who might furnish the necessary material, produce and supplies, should have some effective security. Ordinary lien laws had proved ineffective to protect them. It is a fact demonstrated by actual experience that ranchmen and merchants have found that ditch and railroad owners, in the matter of construction of ditches and railroads, constitute a distinct class which cannot be effectively dealt with under ordinary business methods. The act under consideration seems to reasonably solve the difficulty, and it imposes no serious burden upon the owner, while furnishing effective security to the producer and dealer. The conditions which thus exist evidently brought about the enactment of this statute.

Clark & Clark, for defendant.

The legislative journal shows a full compliance with the constitutional provisions relating to the passage of the bill, with the exception of the signing of the enrolled act by the president of the senate. This court has laid down certain rules with reference to the necessity for a showing by the journal of the signing of the enrolled act at the time and in the manner required by the constitution. (Hynds v. Cahill, 12 Wyo. 225; State v. Swan, 7 Wyo. 166.) Assuming the law to be that the journals must affirmatively show the signing of the bill by the presiding officers in the presence of the respective houses, the question arises whether such an affirmative showing is made in this instance. Had the entry in the senate journal been that the president of the senate signed "Enrolled Act No. 73," it must be conceded that it would be sufficient, it appearing that the original enrolled act was No. 73. But the entry goes further than that and states the number of the original house bill as well as the title of the bill bearing that number. While it is easy to make a mistake by the inversion of numbers, it is not usual to make mistakes in the reading or entry of the entire title of a bill. The court is not authorized to enter the realm of conjecture to uphold this act upon the supposition that one mistake was made instead of another, or that the entry did not speak the truth. Legislative journals are not kept as a matter of convenience, but are required by the constitution, and by that constitution are made conclusive evidence, so that their verity cannot be impugned. (Cohn v. Kingsley, 5 Ida. 416; Hunt v. State, 22 Tex.App. 401; R. R. Co. v. Smyth, 103 F. 376; State v. R. R. Co., 60 Neb. 741; Fillmore v. Van Horn, 129 Mich. 52.) The mere fact that the senate journal shows the signature of the president to enrolled act No. 73, together with the evidence of the house journal that said enrolled act was the bill here in question, is not sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement that the fact of signing in the presence of the senate be entered in the journal; for the senate journal affirmatively shows that the enrolled act then before the president, the title of which was publicly read, as required by the constitution, was a bill with another title, and dealing with another subject. It cannot be demonstrated that this was a mere clerical error, and such a showing, if it can be made, would be immaterial, for the journals imply absolute verity, and when they set out the title of a bill it must be conclusively presumed that the bill had such title at the time in question.

The constitutionality of original mechanics' lien laws has been esablished beyond question. (Jones v. Hotel Co., 86 F. 370, 193 U.S. 532.) The basis for such laws is the equitable right to compensation of those whose labor or materials have gone into the improving of another's property. The statute in question ignores that basis upon which such laws have been sustained. The furnishing of such articles as food, clothing and fuel to workmen engaged by the contractor in constructing a ditch cannot be said to be materials entering into the construction of the improvement. Such a statute as this, which can only be sustained upon the same ground that a mechanics' lien law is sustained, making the owner liable for provisions and clothing, &c., furnished to the contractor for his employees, must be considered an invalid deprivation of property without due process of law. The statute does more than create a lien upon property, for it creates an obligation upon the owner for materials which he did not order and which were not furnished upon his credit. Assuming that the owner's property has been improved by the labor or materials furnished, the statute endeavors to make him liable for the entire value of the material furnished, even though far in excess of the value of the property improved. There is no equitable or moral reason why a ditch company should be responsible for such material or provisions furnished to the contractor employed by the ditch company to construct its ditch. The section of the statute, so far as it imposes a personal liability upon the owner, is clearly unconstitutional. (Gibbs v. Tally, 133 Cal. 133, 65 P. 970.) Another fatal objection to the statute is that it is class legislation, and therefore violates the provision of the federal constitution prohibiting the states from denying to any person the equal protection of the laws. (R. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150; Shaugnessy v. Surety Co., 138 Cal. 543.)

BEARD, CHIEF JUSTICE. SCOTT and POTTER, JJ., concur.

OPINION

BEARD, CHIEF JUSTICE.

This case comes to this court on questions reserved by the district court of Converse county and certified here for decision as to the constitutionality of Chapter 78 of the Session Laws, 1909, entitled: "An act to protect laborers, mechanics, ranchmen, farmers, merchants and other persons furnishing work or labor, material, ranch or farm products, goods or provisions, to contractors or sub-contractors in the construction of ditches, canals and reservoirs;" and now being Sections 3823, 3824 and 3825, Comp. Stat. 1910. The reserved questions being as follows:

"1. In the passage of Chapter 78 of the Sssion Laws of Wyoming, 1909, did the legislature violate the provisions of Section 28 of Article III of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming?"

"2. Does the journal of the senate of the Tenth State Legislature of the state of Wyoming sufficiently show the signing by the president of the senate in the presence of the senate of Chapter 78 of the Session Laws of Wyoming, 1909?"

"3. Does the first sentence of Section 1 of Chapter 78 of the Session Laws of Wyoming, 1909, violate the provisions of Section 6 of Article I of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming?"

"4. Does the first sentence of Section 1 of Chapter 78 of the Session Laws of Wyoming, 1909, violate the provisions of Section 1 of [121 P. 23] the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States?"

Section 28, Article III of the Constitution, referred to in the first question, is as follows: "The presiding officer of each house shall, in the presence of the house over which he...