George v. Great Eastern Food Products, Inc.
Decision Date | 09 February 1965 |
Docket Number | No. A--62,A--62 |
Citation | 44 N.J. 44,207 A.2d 161 |
Parties | Anast G. GEORGE, Administrator of the Estate of George A. Geotakes, deceased, Petitioner-Appellant, v. GREAT EASTERN FOOD PRODUCTS, INC., Respondent-Respondent. Sophie GEOTAKES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. GREAT EASTERN FOOD PRODUCTS, INC., Respondent-Respondent. |
Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Herman M. Wilson, Newark, for appellants (Robert Scherling, Newark, attorney, Herman M. Wilson, Newark, of counsel).
Everitt Rhinehart, East Orange, for respondent (John W. Taylor, East Orange, attorney, Everitt Rhinehart, East Orange, of counsel).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
In this workmen's compensation case, the employee died from a fractured skull sustained as the result of an idiopathic fall (used in the sense of a fall caused by a purely personal condition having no work connection whatever) 'in the course of' his employment. An attack of dizziness, apparently induced by some cardiovascular condition, precipitated the occurrence. He did not strike anything until his head hit the level concrete floor upon which he was standing, bringing about the injury. The Division of Workmen's Compensation dismissed the petitions seeking compensation for the period between the injury and death some few weeks later and for dependency benefits. The Essex County Court reached the same result on appeal and the Appellate Division affirmed in an unreported opinion, holding the case was controlled by this court's 4--3 decision in Henderson v. Celanese Corp., 16 N.J. 208, 108 A.2d 267 (1954), where the pivotal facts were essentially the same. We granted certification. 43 N.J. 261, 203 A.2d 715 (1964). Petitioners urge reconsideration of the rule of Henderson.
In Henderson, a case of first impression in this jurisdiction, the majority, in deciding that the accident was noncompensable conceded the existence of a division of authority in the precise situation among the other states, but determined that the rationale of some of our earlier cases dealing with the statutory language that a compensable injury must also derive from an accident 'arising out of' the employment, R.S. 34:15--7, N.J.S.A., dictated the result reached. The underlying thesis was taken from Spindler v. Universal Chain Corp., 11 N.J. 34, 39, 93 A.2d 171, 173 (1952):
The seeming exclusionary breadth of this thesis was, however, qualified by saying that, even if the inception of the fall was occasioned by a personal condition and non-work connected, the resulting injury was compensable if that injury was caused or contributed to by some added hazard or special condition of the employment. Concrete floors were found not to fall in that category because they are 'usual and common in industrial plants' and '(t)he same consequences would probably have been forthcoming had the appellant suffered his seizure in the street or in his home.' 16 N.J., at p. 214, 108 A.2d, at p. 270.
The result of the rule is the drawing of an obviously indefinite and, to us, unsatisfactory line. But cf. 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 12.00, 12.10--12.14 inc. (1964 rev.). If the inception of the fall has the slightest connection with the employment, the resulting injury is compensable. Freedman v. Spicer Manufacturing Corp., 97 N.J.L. 325, 116 A. 427 (E & A 1922) (where an employee became dizzy as a result of an inoculation recommended by the employer and fell to the floor, fracturing his skull); Hall v. Doremus, 114 N.J.L. 47, 175 A. 369 (Sup.Ct.1934) ( ). If the employee is caused to fall idiopathically and is located in the course of his employment at even a slight height at the fall's inception or is standing at floor level and on the way down falls into a pit or strikes a table, chair, desk, stove, machinery or some other object situate on the employment premises, the resulting injury is compensable. Reynolds v. Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners, 130 N.J.L. 437, 33 A.2d 595 (Sup.Ct.1943), affirmed o.b. 131 N.J.L. 327, 36 A.2d 429 (E & A 1944); Furda v. Scammell China Co., 17 N.J.Super. 339, 86 A.2d 39 (Cty.Ct.1952); Williams v. Corby's Enterprise Laundry, 64 N.J.Super. 561, 166 A.2d 827 (App.Div.1960), certif. denied 34 N.J. 330, 168 A.2d 693 (1961). Seemingly also, he would be compensated if, through sheer awkwardness, he...
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