Verge v. County of Morris

Decision Date05 April 1994
Citation272 N.J.Super. 118,639 A.2d 378
PartiesLinda VERGE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF MORRIS, Respondent-Appellee.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Ronald W. Bronstein, Succasunna, argued the cause for petitioner-appellant (Nusbaum, Stein, Goldstein & Bronstein, attorneys; Robert Stefani, on the brief).

Michael Hubner argued, Riverdale, the cause for respondent-appellee (Johnson, Murphy, Hubner, Mc Keon & Wubbenhorst, attorneys; Irma W. Francis, on the brief).

Before Judges SHEBELL, LONG and LANDAU.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

SHEBELL, P.J.A.D.

Linda Verge (petitioner) appeals from the dismissal of her claim petition for workers' compensation benefits. The claim was held to be non-compensable on the grounds that her accident was an "idiopathic event." We reverse and remand.

On January 13, 1993, petitioner filed claim petition, number 93-001413, alleging that she "twisted her left knee walking in court house" and suffered a "[p]ermanent orthopedic injury to left leg." On or about February 8, 1993, respondent, County of Morris, filed an answer denying that injury arose in course of employment. Petitioner filed a motion, dated March 16, 1993, for temporary disability and medical benefits, to include arthroscopic surgery on her knee.

A hearing on the motion was held on April 30, 1993. At the conclusion of petitioner's testimony, the judge of compensation refused to hear any further testimony or to permit petitioner's counsel to be heard as to legal argument. The judge immediately rendered the following decision:

This is a Motion for Temporary Disability and Medical Treatment brought by Linda Verge, an employee of Morris County, as a result of an injury to her left knee suffered on December 15, 1992, when as a court clerk in the employ of Morris County, she was walking in the lobby of the courthouse and slipped on the rug injuring her left knee.

She testified that she did not fall to the floor. There was no contact between her knee and the floor or any other object.

She received relatively immediate medical attention at the Morristown Memorial Hospital.

The record of the emergency room has been placed in evidence as Exhibit P-1. It gives a description of the accident as follows: "Twisted left knee while walking in lobby of courthouse."

The symptoms were pain in the left knee.

Petitioner additionally testified that she had a long history of prior injury to her left knee beginning in childhood and it included surgery to her left knee joint in 1985 involving cartilaginous damage to her left knee.

She disclaims any problems with the left knee between that period of time and the incident in December of '92, when she was walking in the lobby of the courthouse.

Petitioner indicates that presently she's in need of further surgery to her knee and requests the Court to authorize same based upon an alleged accident arising out of and in the course of employment on December 15, 1992.

The issue is whether under the circumstances described by the petitioner--and I accept every word of her testimony as being true--whether her employment was a contributing cause to her injury; was the event reasonably incident to her employment.

I am constrained to find otherwise.

Petitioner describes an idiopathic event and not one that can be found to be an incident of the employment. It was an event which could have occurred anywhere at any time. It was an event that which took place in normal walking.

Under the circumstances her claim is dismissed.

According to her testimony, petitioner, a twenty-five-year-old woman, was employed as a court clerk by Morris County and was working on December 15, 1992. She had worked for Morris County for approximately one and one-half months before her accident. Petitioner's testimony concerning her accident and injury was as follows:

Q. What--did something happen to you at the Morris County Courthouse that day? Did something happen while, while you were there?

A. Yes.

Q. Tell the Court exactly what happened.

A. In the lobby I slipped on a rug.

Q. You were in the lobby of the Courthouse.

A. Yes.

Q. And you, and when you say you slipped on a rug, can you--

THE JUDGE: You don't have to repeat what she says. It's in the record.

Q. I was going to ask you if you can be more specific. What, what slipped, what foot slipped?

A. My left foot slipped on a rug.

Q. And when that happened? Did you feel anything?

A. Yes, a stabbing pain in my left knee.

After she slipped, petitioner "hobbled" into the Sheriff's Office. Present were approximately five persons, including petitioner's husband who was an employee of the Sheriff's Office. The people in the office "sat [petitioner] down" and she explained to her husband what had happened. When petitioner's counsel sought to present the testimony of petitioner's husband at trial, the judge stated: "It's not relevant. I don't think we need any corroboration of the petitioner's testimony. * * * [i]t's not compensable. You can stop at this point and I'll explain why."

About an hour later, petitioner was taken to Morristown Memorial Hospital. The hospital record stated that petitioner "[t]wisted left knee while walking in lobby of courthouse." She was sent to the County's doctor, who recommended that she see an orthopedic specialist, who sent petitioner for therapy. Petitioner received therapy to her knee from about December 20, 1992, to the beginning of April 1993. Petitioner was also treated by another orthopedic physician, who prescribed a knee brace. Both orthopedists recommended arthroscopic surgery. Petitioner testified that she did not undergo the surgery because of "lack of funds." Since her accident of December 15, 1992, petitioner has not returned to work for the county. By letter dated February 4, 1993, petitioner was notified by the court administrator of Morris County that her employment was terminated because of her inability to work.

Petitioner testified that she first had problems with her left knee in the early 1970's, attributable to growing problems. She had knee surgery in 1978, at age ten, when she was in the fourth grade. Ultimately, she had a total of three surgeries on her left knee, with the last surgery taking place in 1985. Petitioner asserted that she had no problems with her knee since her last surgery, and that she required no further treatments until this incident. She testified that after 1985, the knee was fine and she was able to perform all her work duties when she entered the job force. Prior to the present injury, petitioner enjoyed figure skating and playing tennis and basketball, and had no knee problems when she performed these activities.

The judge of compensation correctly stated that the issue was "whether [petitioner's] employment was a contributing cause to her injury" and whether the "event [was] reasonably incident to her employment." He stated that he accepted every word petitioner said as true, but nonetheless he found that her "slip" was an "idiopathic event" and not one that could be found "to be an incident of the employment." He reasoned that "[i]t was an event which could have occurred anywhere at any time" and that "[i]t was an event that which took place in normal walking." In dismissing petitioner's claim, the judge pointed out that there had been no contact between petitioner's knee and the floor and that petitioner had a long history of prior injury to her left knee.

On appeal, petitioner asserts that the judge of compensation erred in characterizing her "fall" as an idiopathic event. Petitioner argues that the slip on the courthouse rug represents a "neutral" risk incident to the employment and this satisfies the "arising out of" portion of the Workers' Compensation Act. See N.J.S.A. 34:15-7.

When this court reviews a decision regarding a claim for workers' compensation benefits, we decide only whether the findings of fact made by the judge of compensation could reasonably have been reached on "sufficient credible evidence present in the record," considering the proofs as a whole. Close v. Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599, 210 A.2d 753 (1965). However, if there has been a mistaken application of the law to the facts, we must grant appropriate relief.

The New Jersey's Workers' Compensation Act (Act) provides in relevant part that:

[w]hen employer and employee shall by agreement, either express or implied, as hereinafter provided, accept the provisions of this article compensation for personal injuries to, or for the death of, such employee by accident arising out of and in the course of employment shall be made by the employer without regard to the negligence of the employer....

[ N.J.S.A. 34:15-7

(emphasis added).]

The statutory requirement that a compensable accident arise out of the employment "looks to a causal connection between the employment and the injury." Coleman v. Cycle Transformer Corp., 105 N.J. 285, 290, 520 A.2d 1341 (1986).

We held in Giambattista v. Thomas A. Edison, 32 N.J.Super. 103, 115, 107 A.2d 801 (App.Div.1954), that it is sufficient if the employment is "a contributing, though not the sole cause of the accident or injury...." An "idiopathic fall" is one which is caused by "a purely personal condition having no work connection whatever...." George v. Great Eastern Food Products, Inc., 44 N.J. 44, 45, 207 A.2d 161 (1965). To bar recovery, the record must substantiate a finding that the event was caused solely by disease or infirmity peculiar to the individual and not a condition of the employment. Spindler v. Universal Chain Corp., 11 N.J. 34, 39, 93 A.2d 171 (1952). Common examples of "idiopathic falls" are falls brought on by heart attacks or epileptic seizures. Coleman Cycle Transformer Corp., 105 N.J. 285, 292, 520 A.2d 1341 (1986) (citing George, supra, 44 N.J. at 44, 207 A.2d 161; Henderson v. Celanese Corp., 16 N.J. 208, 108 A.2d 267 (1954); Reynolds v. Passaic...

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