Ramos v. Commissioner of Correction, (SC 15840)

• Decision Date: 16 March 1999
• Docket Number: (SC 15840)
• Citation: 727 A.2d 213,248 Conn. 52
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: REYNALDO RAMOS v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

248 Conn. 52

727 A.2d 213

REYNALDO RAMOS v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

(SC 15840)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 14, 1999.

Officially released March 16, 1999.

Callahan, C. J., and Borden, Berdon, Palmer and Peters, JS. G. Douglas Nash, public defender, with whom, on the brief, was Donald D. Dakers, for the appellant (petitioner).

Susann E. Gill, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Jonathan C. Benedict, state's attorney, and Richard F. Jacobson, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).

Opinion

PETERS, J.

A petitioner seeking appellate review, under General Statutes § 52-470 (b), of a ruling on his or her petition for a writ of habeas corpus ordinarily must obtain certification from the habeas court that he or she is entitled to such review.¹ Upon certification, the petitioner has only twenty days to file an appeal. See Practice Book § 80-1, formerly § 4166C. In the present case, through no fault of the indigent petitioner, the appeal was delayed for almost six months. The issue before us is whether, under the uncontested circumstances of the administrative confusion that caused the inordinate delay, the Appellate Court abused its discretion by dismissing the petitioner's untimely appeal. We conclude that it did and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The petitioner, Reynaldo Ramos, was convicted of the crimes of attempted murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54a (a),² robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (2),³ and carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes §§ 29-35 and 29-37 (b).⁴ On his direct appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of conviction. State v. Ramos, 36 Conn. App. 831, 661 A.2d 606, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 902, 665 A.2d 905 (1995).

On August 22, 1994, the petitioner filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he challenged the validity of his criminal conviction on the ground of the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel and his appellate counsel. On October 29, 1996, after an evidentiary hearing, the habeas court dismissed the petition, but granted the petitioner's request for certification to appeal.

Throughout the proceedings that followed, the petitioner manifested his intent to appeal the dismissal of his petition. The habeas court waived the fees and costs associated with an appeal, but did not appoint appellate counsel. Nothing further transpired until, stirred to action by the petitioner's inquiry, appellate counsel from the office of the chief public defender inquired into the situation and, on April 30, 1997, filed a late appeal on the petitioner's behalf.

On the same day as the filing of the late appeal, at the suggestion of the Appellate Court, the petitioner's counsel filed a motion to permit a late appeal. The respondent, the commissioner of correction, filed a written objection to the motion on the ground of the petitioner's insufficient showing of good cause. On July 9, 1997, the Appellate Court denied the petitioner's motion.

On September 17, 1997, the Appellate Court, on its own motion, held a hearing for the petitioner "to appear and give reasons, if any, why the appeal should not be dismissed as untimely pursuant to [Practice Book] § 4166C [now § 80-1]."⁵ Because of an oversight, no counsel appeared to represent the respondent. Counsel for the petitioner explained, in some detail, the administrative reasons for the inordinate delay.⁶ Counsel represented that, after the habeas court's dismissal of the petition, there was confusion about who would represent the petitioner on appeal. In the office of the chief public defender, the habeas corpus unit serves as counsel at a habeas trial, while the legal counsel unit provides representation on appeal. Further confusion resulted from possible claims of conflict of interest, because the petitioner, throughout his criminal trial, had been represented by an attorney associated with the office of the public defender.⁷

Following the hearing, the Appellate Court dismissed the appeal. Thereafter, it denied the petitioner's subsequent motion for reconsideration or reargument, in which the petitioner had reiterated the administrative circumstances that had caused the inordinate delay.⁸ This court granted the petitioner's request for certification, limited to the following issue: "In the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court properly dismiss the petitioner's appeal from the habeas court's denial of his petition on grounds of untimeliness?" Ramos v. Commissioner of Correction, 243 Conn. 958, 704 A.2d 805 (1997). We conclude that the Appellate Court abused its discretion in dismissing the petitioner's appeal under the unusual circumstances of this case.

I

Our analysis begins with two background observations. One relates to the nature of appeals from dismissal of petitions for habeas corpus under § 52-470 (b). The other relates to the office of the public defender.

As we have held repeatedly, § 52-470 (b) does not impose a jurisdictional constraint on appellate review. See Seebeck v. State, 246 Conn. 514, 527, 717 A.2d 1161 (1998); James L. v. Commissioner of Correction, 245 Conn. 132, 137, 712 A.2d 947 (1998); Iovieno v. Commissioner of Correction, 242 Conn. 689, 696-97, 699 A.2d 1003 (1997); Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 614-15, 646 A.2d 126 (1994); see also Practice Book § 80-1.⁹ That construction of the statute is rooted in our commitment to the purpose that animates our habeas corpus jurisdiction. "[T]he principal purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to serve as a bulwark against convictions that violate fundamental fairness." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lozada v. Warden, 223 Conn. 834, 840, 613 A.2d 818 (1992).

The office of the public defender is a well respected and important part of our criminal justice system. The office provides invaluable services to large numbers of indigent individuals who need its assistance to effectuate their state and federal constitutional rights to counsel in criminal proceedings. The present case is not, however, the first instance of difficulties, attributable to the internal processes of the office, that have caused unacceptable delays in the vindication of appellate rights. See Gaines v. Manson, 194 Conn. 510, 513-14, 521-28, 481 A.2d 1084 (1984).

The issue that we certified for appeal concerns the relationship between the purpose for the time limitation on habeas corpus appeals and the function performed by the public defender's office. If confusion in the office of the public defender causes an inordinate delay in the filing of an appeal for a habeas corpus petitioner, the issue for appellate courts is to determine the appropriate remedy. One remedy would require the petitioner to file a new petition for habeas relief premised on the inadequacy of appellate habeas counsel. That remedy would be inescapable if there were significant factual uncertainties about the specific cause for the delay. Another remedy would be to permit a late appeal. It is a reasonable inference from the per curiam judgment of the Appellate Court that it thought that the petitioner should rely on the former rather than on the latter remedy.

The petitioner has raised two separate subissues about the propriety of the judgment of the Appellate Court dismissing his appeal. First, did the Appellate Court have the authority to dismiss the appeal in the absence of a filing of a motion to dismiss by the respondent? Second, if the court had such authority, did it abuse its discretion in dismissing the appeal?

II

The petitioner challenges the authority of the Appellate Court to dismiss his appeal in light of the respondent's failure to file a motion to dismiss the late appeal. Recognizing that the respondent filed a timely opposition to the motion to file the late appeal, the petitioner nonetheless asks us to hold that the Appellate Court was powerless to act, on its own motion, without a motion to dismiss from the respondent. We disagree.

The rules of practice vest broad authority in the Appellate Court for the management of its docket. Section 60-2 of the Practice Book provides that "[t]he supervision and control of the proceedings on appeal shall be in the court having appellate jurisdiction from the time the appeal is filed .... The court may, on its own motion or upon motion of any party ... (6) order that a party for good cause shown may file a late appeal... unless the court lacks jurisdiction to allow the late filing...." Section 60-3 provides, in addition, that "[i]n the interest of expediting decision, or for other good cause shown, the court in which the appeal is pending may suspend the requirements or provisions of any of these rules in a particular case on motion of a party or on its own motion and may order proceedings in accordance with its direction."

Although these sections support the authority of the Appellate Court to dismiss a late appeal on its own motion, the petitioner argues that they are superseded by the provisions of Practice Book § 66-8. That section, entitled "Motion to Dismiss," provides that "[a]ny claim that an appeal ... should be dismissed, whether based on lack of jurisdiction, failure to file papers within the time allowed or other defect, shall be made by a motion to dismiss the appeal .... Any such motion must be filed in accordance with Sections 66-2 and 66-3 within ten days after the filing of the appeal or the return day of the writ, or if the ground alleged subsequently occurs, within ten days after it has arisen, provided that a motion based on lack of jurisdiction may be filed at any time. The court may on its own motion order that an appeal be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction." Emphasizing the last sentence, the petitioner claims that the Appellate Court had no authority to dismiss his appeal under the circumstances of this case.

The...